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This dissertation assumes that Marxist categories have been woefully insufficient 
in accounting for gender. I contend that this failure to account for gender has as much to 
do with the reification of gender as a theoretical category as with any intentional or 
unintentional misogyny. Gender analysis should not be figured exclusively as a 
specialized area of study. Major theoretical paradigms, such as the ones I’ve privileged 
here—Marxism, psychoanalysis, and deconstruction—should all as a matter of form 
include gender as they articulate human structures. Jean Paul Sartre’s methodological 
work in Marxism and existentialism serves as an instructive example. In Search for a 
Method (and subsequently in the Critique of Dialectical Reason) Sartre argues that 
Marxism and psychoanalysis fail to account for human freedom, which signifies a 
paucity of ontological categories in these two methods. Accordingly, Sartre concludes 
from his search for a method that we must understand Marxism together with 
existentialism in order to envision a revolutionary world. While Sartre does not articulate 
gender as a significant category, and in fact overlooks it himself, his method allows an 
accounting of gender. Whether we have taken seriously Sartre’s call for a synthesis of 
Marxist and existentialist methods, the present work marks an attempt to dereify gender 
and integrate it more seamlessly into the workings of Marxist, psychoanalytic, and 
deconstructionist analysis. 
 Conspiracy culture serves as a useful aperture for envisioning a theoretical 
paradigm that assimilates gender into the forms of Marxist, psychoanalytic, and 
deconstructionist investigation. Conspiracy narratives have come to amplify the 
postmodern condition of the masculine subject in crisis in America since World War II. 
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The masculine subject in crisis is an historical figure, emerging in concert with the 
developing post-World War II American security infrastructure. Marxist analysis has 
focused on this period in history as the third wave of capitalism, and this analysis has 
done much to elucidate the economic conditions and their concomitant ideological 
structures. However, Marxist inquiries have all too often failed to account for the way 
gender shapes these ideological contours. Conspiracy culture demonstrates the way in 
which this economic analysis must include a study of gender in order to understand the 
economic, ontological, epistemological, and political categories that are at work in the 
postmodern period. Psychoanalysis articulates the human structures that explain the post-
war phenomenon of conspiracy culture, specifically with a few to the way gender shapes 
human psychosexual development. Using psychoanalytic categories we can see that the 
conspiracy theorist is indeed a gendered subject; once we have done so, we have refined 
the aperture through which we view history to include the important category of gender. 
The post-World-War II conspiracy theorist typically takes as his object of interest the 
workings of large historical institutions such as the American government, political 
system, and corporate infrastructure. By analyzing him and his psychosexual formation, 
we then have a better understanding of the relationship between human structures and the 
political, social, and economic terrain out of which he emerges and in which we dwell.  
Above all, the conspiracy theorist is characterized as paranoid, both in lay and 
academic circles, but a study of Freud’s categories will show that ordinarily the 
conspiracy theorist is not paranoid but rather hysterical. Freud, in his analysis of the case 
history of Dr. Daniel Schreber, tells us the paranoiac progresses through three phases of 
repression that more adequately express the pathology of paranoia. The first phase is 
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fixation, where some libidinal investment or instinct does not develop normally along 
with other instincts. The second phase is repression itself, where the paranoiac has a 
strong aversion to some libidinal investment that he finds in himself. These first two 
phases, however, are not abnormal. These occur in normal psychosexual development. 
The pathology of the paranoiac lies principally in the “failure of repression, of irruption, 
of return of the repressed. This irruption takes its start from the point of fixation [the 
failure of some libidinal investment to develop], and it implies a regression of the 
libidinal development to that point” (Complete Works v 12 67-68 Freud’s italics). The 
paranoiac ceases to focus his libido on a love object. Symptoms of paranoia appear when 
the paranoiac negates his love object. The paradigmatic statement in this case would be 
“’I do not love at all—I do not love anyone’” (CW12 65 Freud’s italics). But, as Freud 
points out, “since, after all, one’s libido must go somewhere, this proposition seems to be 
the psychological equivalent of the proposition: ‘I love only myself’”(CW12 65). The 
particular pathology of the paranoiac centers primarily on a negation. The love object 
was originally the focus of the libidinal investment; when the paranoiac rejects the love 
object, symptoms of the illness appear. The libido demands a presence; the ego then 
becomes the focus of the paranoiac’s libido—this Freud calls megalomania. 
 But the paranoiac moves beyond this phase of his illness; he reassumes the love 
object, albeit in an altered, delusional way. In the case of Dr. Schreber, Freud found that 
Schreber had suffered an abrupt truncation of his relationship with his father; he 
transferred his feelings for his father onto his physician, Dr. Flechsig. At some point, 
Freud postulated, Schreber rejected Flechsig as a love object, although Freud maintained 
he could not know this directly. It was only through the symptoms that he could see this 
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rejection. However, Schreber eventually reassumed Flechsig as a libidinal investment, 
but in a radically altered way: he believed that Flechsig was persecuting him, trying to 
murder his soul. For Freud, the important difference of paranoia from other disorders is 
the process of reconstruction: “The delusional formation, which we take to be the 
pathological product, is in reality an attempt at recovery, a process of reconstruction” 
(CW12 71 Freud’s italics). 
 Freud’s discussion implies the paranoiac is not altogether pathologically disabled. 
The delusional formation is part of the process of recovery. Dr. Schreber was, except in 
the deepest throes of his illness, a normally functioning German government official. He 
was married (happily, according to his memoirs), and a respected judge. He carried on his 
affairs for the majority of his life with competence; he was astutely aware of his own 
mental condition, enough to write it all down in his memoirs for the purpose of scientific 
study. In the formation of the delusions the paranoiac attempts to recover. For the 
conspiracy theorist as paranoid, the attempt to formulate a systematized story of a 
conspiracy is a gesture toward reconstruction, a reinvestment of libidinal drives. 
 The reinvestment of libidinal drives also signifies the moment at which the 
paranoiac begins to reconstruct his subjective world. The paranoiac’s belief in either the 
end or the eventual end of the world is symptomatic of his rejection of the love object. 
Freud says, “The patient has withdrawn from the people in his environment and from the 
external world generally the libidinal cathexis which he has hitherto directed on to them . 
. . The end of the world is the projection of this internal catastrophe [of failed repression]; 
his subjective world has come to an end since his withdrawal of his love from it” (CW12 
70). When the conspiracy theorist negates his investment in his love object, he invests his 
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libido in his own ego. He thereby reverts to a kind of narcissism. He is at the center of the 
world. But once he begins to form a story of the conspiracy, he begins to reconstruct 
some version of a healthy psychosexual development. The conspiracy theorist 
reconstructs his subjectivity as he reconstructs the world. If the conspiracy theorist in 
America since World War II has no place, then the existence of that subjectivity is 
unstable. The process of the paranoiac’s recovery involves reconstructing a world; once 
he does so, he is in some measure “cured.” The conspiracy theorist both constructs a 
story to explain history and at the same time creates a location for his own subjectivity. 
There is a sense, then, in which the conspiracy theory itself is an integral component of 
subject-making in post-World-War-II America. The conspiracy theorist cures himself of 
paranoia, and of his subjectivity in crisis, by theorizing conspiracy. 
 For Freud, though, one of the pathogenic functions in the paranoiac is 
megalomania—the turning of the libido toward the ego. The paranoiac, in the process of 
his recovery—by consciously reconstructing his world—locates himself at the center of 
the persecution. The conspiracy theorist, however, does not consistently show this 
megalomaniacal symptom. Oliver Stone, a key conspiracy theorist in 20th- and 21st-
century America, does not locate himself anywhere in the conspiracy network laid out in 
JFK. In fact, Stone effaces the center of the conspiracy as much as he can—Lyndon 
Johnson may be near the center of the conspiracy, but the implementation of the 
assassination only occurs as the work of discrete but curiously and mysteriously related 
cells (the Mafia, Cuban counter-revolutionaries, American military personnel, politicians, 
and appointed officials). Stone not only does not situate himself megalomaniacally as a 
victim of this conspiracy, he works assiduously to erase the impression of any center. 
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Regardless of any speculations about Stone’s personal egomania (and anecdotal evidence 
does suggest that he is an egomaniac),1 Stone’s conspiracy theory does not register this 
key component of Freud’s theory of paranoia. 
 There is, moreover, a close relationship, for Freud, between paranoia and hysteria. 
The symptoms of both of these illnesses are caused mainly by a repressed homosexual 
wish, that both paranoia and hysteria reveal bisexuality, a point that Freud felt he could 
not stress enough. The function of repression works differently in each illness. Whereas 
the paranoid’s fantasies tend to irrupt into consciousness, the hysterical fantasies tend not 
to return so quickly, if at all.  More technically, hysteria is characterized by its tendency 
toward condensation. In Dora: An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria, Freud finds 
condensation in Dora, where very often her dream imagery served to represent several 
different and intersecting repressed wishes—what Freud called overdetermination. He 
isolated “switching words,” which served as something like railroad track switches, in her 
speech and her dreams on which these intersecting fantasies pivoted (Dora 82).2 By 
contrast, paranoia tends toward decomposition. Freud’s paranoid, Dr. Schreber, had an 
elaborately and carefully designed schematization of the nature of God. Schreber’s 
persecutor was, at the same time and in some sense the same entity, both his physician 
and God. Schreber then further divided his physician, Dr. Flechsig, into “God Flechsig” 
and the “real Flechsig” whom Schreber knew in some sense not to be his persecutor. 
God, too, was divided into an “upper God,” a fair God not unlike the Aryans, and a 
“lower God,” a dark God somewhat like the Semites. But Freud is extremely quick to 
point out that the process of decomposition in the paranoiac is more complicated because 
the paranoiac decomposes after he has gone through some unconscious process of 
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condensation. He says, “Paranoia decomposes just as hysteria condenses. Or rather, 
paranoia resolves once more into their elements the products of the condensations and 
identifications which are effected in the unconscious” (CW12 49 my italics). The idea of 
the conspiracy theorist as paranoid fails to register the hysteric component of 
condensation. After all, the conspiracy theorist is such precisely because he seeks and 
finds intersections. For Stone, these intersections are the different cells of the conspiracy, 
such as the Mafia, Cuban counter-revolutionaries, and American business interests in 
Cuba. Stone’s decomposition of the center of this conspiracy is only relevant once he has 
condensed these components into unified cells. To the degree that Stone fantasizes a vast 
and seamless, if disarticulated, conspiracy, his film is a symptom of paranoia. In order, 
however, to construct this theory of the Kennedy assassination, Stone must condense 
several fairly disparate components of American life; to that degree he is unequivocally 
hysterical. 
 Hysterical condensation in the conspiracy theorist shows itself inexorably in the 
form of a reasserted Oedipal drama and resolution. In order for the conspiracy theorist to 
cure himself of paranoia he must condense his intersecting fantasies into a coherent story. 
Over and over again, as we shall see, the ordering narrative for the conspiracy theorist is 
the narrative of Lacan’s rereading of the Oedipal complex: the symbolic order as the Law 
of the Father. The symbolic order is reinstituted in the conspiracy theorist’s move from 
paranoia to hysteria. The 1997 film Conspiracy Theory is a fine illustration of the 
relationship between paranoia and hysteria. Jerry Fletcher (Mel Gibson) is a New York 
cab driver who is convinced somebody is out to get him. Jerry gives the usual litany of 
theories: “they” put flouride in the water to control American minds; Jerry Garcia is still 
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alive and serving as a British agent with “00” status. His apartment is lined with some 
sort of metallic sheeting; we later learn that he has rigged his apartment to incinerate with 
the press of a button without burning any other apartment in the building. In addition to 
several deadbolts, he balances a beer bottle on the doorknob; his refrigerator and all of 
the food canisters inside of it have combination locks on them. He prints a newsletter 
called “Conspiracy Theory,” which has 5 subscribers. Jerry cannot, however, remember 
very much about the real conspiracy in which he is caught. One of the goals of the MK 
Ultra Program, which developed Jerry into an assassin, is to induce amnesia in the 
subjects so they don’t remember the treatment.3 Jerry was assigned, we find out at the 
very end of the film, to kill a federal judge who was about to reopen a case that would 
expose the MK Ultra program and its conspirators. Jerry did not kill the judge because he 
knew in some vague way it was wrong; the film implies that the mind control technology 
is not foolproof.  The judge was killed nonetheless by some other conspiratorial agent. 
Jerry, in his anamnesis, remembers enough to find and attach himself to the judge’s 
daughter, Alice Sutton, and become her guardian, as a promise to the dying judge. Jerry 
remembers little of this traumatic event until the final scenes of the film. The issue of 
mind control plays up the irony of the unconscious: if the unconscious is indeed 
unconscious, then it ought to be controllable without the subject’s knowledge; but, if it is 
unconscious, then there is some facet of it that is always outside of conscious (both the 
subject’s and others’) view. 
 Jerry is obviously paranoid. He has situated himself as the focus of a sinister 
network; in this regard, he shows the megalomania that Freud attaches to the paranoid 
personality. He is also aware, at least to some degree, of his pathology, even if not as 
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much as Freud’s Dr. Schreber. Jerry’s amnesia, however, about his torturous past requires 
that he piece together his memories; he exhibits the anamnesis that Freud finds in 
hysterics.4 Jerry is provided with someone who will help him recover his memories—
Alice Sutton (Julia Roberts) is an attorney with the Justice Department for whom Jerry 
has affection. Jerry’s main problem is that he cannot remember what happened to him—
his pathology is characterized by a hysterical repression, the same repression that Freud 
found in his study of Dora in Dora: An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria. Jerry is also 
viscerally afraid of being penetrated; the locks on his refrigerator and food canisters 
resonate with the metaphorical force of Dora’s jewel case.  
 Both Alice and Jerry are embroiled in an Oedipal drama; while the judge’s 
assassination is an unconscious trauma for Jerry, it is a conscious trauma for Alice. The 
first scene in which Alice has dialogue is in a conference with her boss, who is 
reprimanding her for reopening the Ezekiel Walters case—the case for which her father 
died for attempting to reopen it. She is deeply disturbed by the mystery surrounding his 
death. But while her father’s death is immensely important to her, we discover in the final 
scenes of the film that the Oedipal drama is really Jerry’s, not Alice’s. Alice is a pivot 
around which Jerry revolves as he works out his hysterical symptoms, which are the 
repressed memories of his training as an assassin. Alice is initially a love interest for 
Jerry; in the first scene where we see them together, he has on a tie, symbolic of 
masculinity, and he asks her out on a date. She replies no. He meets her the next time in 
the lobby of her office building. At this second meeting he does not have on a tie, and he 
is extremely upset and incoherent; he has just escaped from the director of the MK Ultra 
Program, Dr. Jonas (Patrick Stewart), who had abducted him for torturous questioning. 
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Alice talks Jerry into relinquishing the gun he has swiped from a lobby guard and quiets 
him down. By the end of the scene, Alice has rested Jerry’s head in her lap in a maternal 
pose. Jerry is missing the trappings of masculinity in this scene; and to the degree that he 
is constructed as prelinguistic, he is also constructed as feminine. He is nearly incoherent, 
but he calms down when he is enfolded into Alice’s maternal plenitude. He is the son 
cathected fully to his mother. 
 In the shallow background, however, is Jerry’s motive to protect Alice. Alice’s 
father as he was dying had asked Jerry to look after Alice; Jerry assumed this patriarchal 
role fully even in his anamnetic condition. This motive is working against his desire to be 
enfolded in Alice’s maternal bliss. In the climactic scene of the film, Jerry “abducts” 
Alice—the film gives the scene ambiguity in order to suspend knowledge for the 
viewer—and takes her on a drive to her family’s ranch, where her father was killed. Jerry 
doesn’t know this is where he is driving—he is still working out his hysterical repression. 
Alice, under the influence of Dr. Jonas’ deception, believes that Jerry murdered her father 
and that he will also murder her. When they arrive at the stables, Alice confronts Jerry 
about the murder, asking him if he did it. Extremely confused, Jerry knows he is close to 
remembering. Alice gets upset and physically assaults him; this brings Jerry’s Oedipal 
drama to a crisis. He needs to remember the repressed memory (recover from his 
hysteria) and reconstruct his narrative (recover from paranoia) so that he can assume 
finally and fully his position as Alice’s protector. He struggles, finally remembers, and 
Alice believes him. He is able to assume the patriarchal role for Alice that was designated 
for him when her father was slain. Once he reveals the drama to Alice, he simultaneously 
recovers from his hysteria and enters into the reconstruction phase of his paranoid illness. 
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Jerry assumes the role of the father when and only when he regains control over his own 
narrative. His libidinal drive is reinvested in the position of patriarch. Conspiracy 
Theory’s staging of this Oedipal drama illustrates that paranoia is above all a masculine 
construction. Likewise, the conspiracy theorist, to the degree that he exhibits clinical 
paranoia, is also a masculine construction. 
 Alice, for her part, serves for Jerry first as a love interest, then mother, then 
daughter. She is the object of Jerry’s libidinal investments, which shift and change as he 
resolves his Oedipal drama. The love affair between Jerry and Alice never materializes. 
When Alice rescues Jerry from Dr. Jonas, they kiss in a friendly, non-eroticized way. 
They pause, realize there is an erotic tension, and begin to kiss more passionately, but 
they are interrupted before their lips touch by Jonas’ agents.5 They never kiss again. 
Agent Lowery, who is a doubly secret agent working to stop Dr. Jonas, takes Jerry into 
his protective custody at the end of the film. He tells Jerry that as long as Alice thinks he, 
Jerry, is dead, and Dr. Jonas’ people think Jerry’s dead, then Alice will be safe. Jerry 
regretfully, and paternally, acquiesces to this arrangement. He rejects his investment in 
Alice as both lover and son and accepts his libidinal investment in her as father. Lowery’s 
assistant then hands Jerry a stack of the day’s newspapers so that he can piece together 
the next conspiracy from the myriad headlines. Jerry comes to rest upon an investment in 
Alice as her paternal caretaker; in doing so, he rejects the megalomaniacal ego 
investment that Freud found to be characteristic of the clinical paranoiac. 
Examining the category of paranoia in this way shows the degree to which the 
appellation is imprecise with regard to the conspiracy theorist. The majority of works this 
dissertation studies demonstrate the conspiracy theorist most often as hysterical. By 
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destabilizing the idea of the conspiracy theorist as paranoid, we may better appreciate the 
refined question of what the conspiracy theorist actually knows. As Lacan said, all 
knowledge is paranoid knowledge. By that he meant all knowledge is within the realm of 
the symbolic order, which as such is only attained once the subject is irrevocably split. 
The paranoid remains at the threshold of the visible, not acceding to the symbolic. The 
conspiracy theorist, as we will see, finally accedes to the symbolic order in positing 
theories about historical events. The issue of knowledge thus functions as a lynchpin in 
establishing a paradigm for understanding the conspiracy theorist as both a 
psychoanalytic subject and a capitalist subject. The chapters that follow are organized in 
order to show the ways in which the masculine subject has been constructed in post-
World War II discourse and specifically through what historical and political 
circumstances this subject has come to be in crisis. This period encompasses the Cold 
War but also includes the post-Cold War period. Critics such as Robert Corber have 
argued that Cold War political discourse was shaped by gender; this is true, and I will 
show that the discursive contours of post-Cold War discourse are also shaped by gender.  
We will begin by examining the historical and psychoanalytic categories that 
define the post-war masculine subject. Chapter 1 will periodize precisely the post-war 
conspiracy theorist by looking at the historical circumstances out of which he arises. As 
well, by asking whether the conspiracy theorist is crazy or right, Chapter 1 raises the 
epistemological issues that are at stake in the culture of conspiracy. We will find that the 
conspiracy theorist is not truly paranoid because he eventually accedes to the symbolic 
order. Both psychoanalysis and capitalism have reified the primacy of the image, and 
because feminism has found that the image is prioritized because of the dominance of the 
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masculine look, we will find that the capitalist subject and the psychoanalytic subject are 
always masculine. As such, the conspiracy theorist is also always masculine. 
The assassination of President John F. Kennedy is the paradigmatic conspiracy 
narrative of the 20th century. It flashes up out of history as the Benjaminian glimpse that 
illuminates both the past and the future; the assassination has both dimmed and glowed in 
its role as oracle of history. Chapter 2 will examine two narratives of the assassination—
one by Oliver Stone and the other by Don DeLillo—and explore the ways in which these 
two artists deal with the implications of gender and capitalist ideology in conspiracy 
culture. Both JFK and Nixon revolve around the Bay of Pigs Invasion, Stone’s objet petit 
a, as a way of explaining the assassination, the resignation, and the Vietnam War. The 
Bay of Pigs is the object of desire for Stone, the explanation that can only be obliquely 
viewed in order to remain an explanation. The Bay of Pigs invasion is that necessary 
excess, the remainder of the process of bringing the symbolic order into the 
undifferentiated real. Don DeLillo’s Libra is a significant point of comparison to Stone’s 
relationship to history. DeLillo foregrounds the problem of history in his version of the 
assassination more self-consciously than Stone. Rather than attempting to connect 
disparate historical events into a seamless narrative, DeLillo uses fiction to liberate 
history from traditional epistemic categories. Where Stone tries to order history into a 
coherent narrative, thereby acceding to the symbolic realm, DeLillo reimagines the 
possibilities for knowledge of the assassination by engaging the genre of historical fiction 
more openly. Chapter 2 will consider the ways in which even academic discussions of the 
Bay of Pigs reify the symbolic order. I will consider in detail Van Gosse’s Where the 
Boys Are, which is a study of the ideological affinities between Cuba and the United 
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States. Taken with my critique of Stone’s films and DeLillo’s Libra, Van Gosse’s work 
will show the ways in which the masculine is reified in both works of fiction as well as 
theoretical discourse. 
Chapter 3 will examine John Frankenheimer’s film version of The Manchurian 
Candidate (1962) and Sidney Lumet’s Fail Safe (1964) in order to illustrate the political, 
social, and psychic fields of the postwar subject. We will find from this examination that 
conspiracy culture is the gateway through which we might view the discursive formations 
of gender and capitalist ideology and at the same time articulate a theoretical paradigm 
for future discussions of these discursive formations.Taken together, these two films 
mark the trajectory of the pleasure principle of Cold War discourse and the ways in 
which narrative and gender are imbricated in the production of political agendas. 
Conspiracies often involve a fairly seamless interaction between government 
entities and non-terrestrial races. Conspiracy culture, thus, cuts across at least two 
genres—this dissertation considers several works of historical fiction; it will also 
consider several works of science fiction as well. I will look at Philip K. Dick’s works as 
instances of Cold War science fiction. We will see in Dr. Bloodmoney, The Man in the 
High Castle, and Martian Time-Slip the beginning of a critique of masculinity that at 
moments dereifies the masculine. We will also see a failure to account for gender in 
Jameson’s theoretical discourse about Dr. Bloodmoney. 
Chapter 5 will turn to the television series and the film version of The X Files, 
which is emblematic of both Cold War and post-Cold War conspiracy culture. I will 
show the emergent pattern of Oedipal dramatization and entry into the symbolic realm 
that is evident in the relationship between Fox Mulder and Dana Scully. This relationship 
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closely resembles the relationship between Jerry Fletcher and Alice Sutton in Conspiracy 
Theory, with some important differences. Unlike the film Conspiracy Theory, The X 
Files appears in both televisual and filmic forms; as such the X Files film disrupts the 
formal qualities of the television series in a way that we cannot envision in the film 
Conspiracy Theory. We will see that the X Files phenomenon in its very production—as 
both film and television series—represents capitalist commodification.  
 In the Coda, I will consider a 21st-century conspiracy novel, William Gibson’s 
Pattern Recognition (2003), and suggest possibilities for whether the masculine subject 
continues to be in crisis in the post-Cold War era of globalization. We will find that even 
though Gibson has placed a woman character at the center of his novel, the symbolic 
order is nonetheless still effectively reasserted in the novel’s globalized setting. 
                                                 
1 A production of Don DeLillo’s Libra was underway at about the same time Stone was working on the 
production of JFK. Rumor has it that Stone worked to make the Libra production go away—and it did. The 
film was never made. While Stone works to efface the center of the conspiracy in his theory, he nonetheless 
worked to have his decentered theory placed at the center of all productions about the assassination. See 
Chapter 3 for a full discussion. 
 
2 These intersecting points are, in Lacan’s register, points de capiton. 
 
3 This plot circumstance, amnesiacal brainwashing, is the film’s homage to The Manchurian Candidate 
(1962) to which we will turn in Chapter Three. Raymond Shaw is similarly brainwashed in Manchuria 
during the Korean War, and similarly fails to carry out his final mission. While Shaw does not regain his 
memories as Jerry does, the control over Raymond’s mind nonetheless begins to fragment. 
 
4 This feature of Jerry’s psychic world closely resembles the circumstances in the film The Manchurian 
Candidate; Raymond Shaw (Laurence Harvey), though, has fewer recollections of his treatment. Bennett 
Marco (Frank Sinatra) is put to the task of psychoanalyzing Raymond in order to understand the 
conspiracy. 
 
5 We will see the interruption of a kiss again in The X Files: Fight the Future. See Chapter 5. 
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Feminism has all too often been reified as a theoretical category. Specifically, Marxist 
critical categories fail to account for the integral importance of gender in any 
sociopolitical critique. This dissertation attempts to dereify gender and demonstrate a 
theoretical model that seamlessly integrates psychoanalysis, Marxism, and feminism. 
Conspiracy culture in America since World War II is an ideal aperture through which we 
may envision such a theoretical approach, and indeed see the critical need for such an 
approach. This dissertation looks at several post-war American conspiracy narratives, 
including Oliver Stone’s JFK and Nixon, Don DeLillo’s Libra, Sidney Lumet’s Fail Safe, 
John Frankenheimer’s The Manchurian Candidate, several novels by Philip K. Dick, and 
Fox Broadcast Network’s The X Files. Through this study of conspiracy culture we see 
the post-war construction of masculinity and its connections to economic structures. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction: The Conspiracy Theorist: Is He [sic] Crazy or Is He [sic] Right? 
 
 I began this investigation into conspiracy culture in America because I found 
intriguing the always-widening web of deception around the JFK assassination—Oliver 
Stone made visible, if not plausible, the tracks of a vast conspiracy to assassinate 
President John F. Kennedy in his film JFK. I got the itch to trace the originary causes. 
Two years after Stone’s film was theatrically released in 1991, The X-Files debuted on 
Fox Broadcast Network, a television show that posited a vast infrastructural network of 
American governmental deception in both the normal and the paranormal worlds; I was 
hooked on conspiracy. When I revisited Stone’s film a couple of years ago, I realized that 
he posited the Bay of Pigs Invasion as one of the central reasons for Kennedy’s 
assassination. I assumed that concerted study in the history of this American political and 
military event would reveal some missing piece of the assassination. I found myself, 
instead, making an unexpected journey backward through history. Instead of 
understanding the Bay of Pigs Invasion, and thus understanding the reasons for 
Kennedy’s assassination if not learning the identity of the assassins, I was deferred. Each 
time I put in place one key piece of the puzzle, several other pieces would scatter. Worse, 
the boundaries, the limits, of the puzzle seemed to grow.  Not a unique experience by any 
means: DeLillo’s Nicholas Branch experiences just such vertigo in Libra. Appointed by 
the CIA to investigate the assassination, Branch finds himself literally surrounded by 
thousands and thousands of pages of data that seem to stretch up and out to infinity. 
People in the government who might have wanted Kennedy dead had been in power for a 
long time; their alleged involvement in Kennedy’s assassination would have been just 
another execution of the policies they had been implementing since at least immediately 
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after World War II. I found that Stone was wrong to make the Bay of Pigs Invasion a 
structural necessity of the JFK assassination.  
 Perched at the edge of a dizzying abyss, I decided that instead of trying to get 
away from this vertigo—by attempting to apprehend history in its totality—I would 
instead work from the vertigo and apprehend its causes. The JFK assassination is the 
unanswerable question, indeed the unintelligible question. I stopped trying to answer this 
question—and all the other questions of American governmental conspiracy—and began 
interrogating the question of conspiracy itself. I made a move, in that key decision, from 
conspiracy theorist to investigator of conspiracy culture. Rather than, in other words, 
positing theories of who killed JFK, I decided to investigate why we need to know who 
killed JFK and how we try to answer that question. This decision rearranged the JFK 
inquiry, making it a theoretical matter. The vertigo caused by the seeming infinite regress 
of history is the origin of my critical approach. It is no coincidence that my critical 
investigation begins in a spinning sense of falling—it is synechodal for my experience of 
history. I abandoned the idea of conquering American history—reaching back far enough 
to isolate the originary moment of when the conspiracy began—and settled instead for 
trying to discover why notions of conspiracy are posited in the first place.  
 Conspiracy theories have been around for a long time in the United States. 
Jedidiah Morse in 1798 delivered a sermon to a Boston congregation warning of the vast 
international conspiracy by the Illuminati to overthrow Christianity. Illuminism was 
thought by Americans to have been instrumental in starting the French Revolution at 
Ingolstadt; American fear of the French Revolution and its implications was exacerbated 
by and linked to the rise of Jeffersonian democracy (Hofstadter 13). The anti-Masonic 
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movement in the United States is linked to this fear of Jacobinical plots; the Masons were 
thought to be anti-government, in much the same way the Illuminati were seen 
(Hofstadter). During the 19th century, both abolitionists and southern slaveholders 
maintained that the opposing side was infiltrating the channels of power in American 
government to overthrow the other. While the two sides were certainly opposed, the idea 
that cabals from either group had formed to control federal power is less certain (Davis).  
 But 20th century conspiracy theories differ from notions of conspiracy that were 
characteristic of 19th century America because the former exhibits a peculiar 
dispossession that we do not see in the latter. Hofstadter puts it this way: 
The spokesman of those earlier movements [in the 19th century] felt that 
they stood for causes and personal types that were still in possession of 
their country--that they were fending off threats to a still well-established 
way of life in which they played an important part. But the modern right 
wing, as Daniel Bell has put it, feels dispossessed: America has been 
largely taken away from them and their kind, though they are determined 
to try to repossess it and to prevent the final destructive act of subversion 
(23). 
 
For Hofstadter, the conspiracy theorist of 19th century America had a place from which 
he spoke, and a place that he felt it his duty, honor, and responsibility to defend. By 
contrast, the 20th century conspiracy theorist has no place, it having been taken away 
from him by “not merely outsiders and foreigners but major statesmen seated at the very 
centers of American power. Their predecessors discovered foreign conspiracies; the 
modern radical right finds that conspiracy also embraces betrayal at home” (Hofstadter 
24). Hofstadter’s project in The Paranoid Style in American Politics is not to periodize 
particular kinds of American paranoia, but rather to identify the common denominator in 
all conspiracy culture in America. He finds conspiracy culture largely in the right wing of 
American politics, an unexamined point in his work and one to which I will turn later. 
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Rightly, he identifies it as paranoid; however, this paranoia he identifies is not a clinical 
paranoia, but rather a generalized style of political discourse. He declines to define 
paranoia in any more detailed way; for the goals of his project, no further definition is 
necessary.  
 At this point in the study of conspiracy culture—that is, in the early 21st century—
it seems to me to be necessary to explore some of the critical implications of Hofstadter’s 
work. First, Hofstadter’s early postmodern designation of an American political subject 
with no place requires elaboration in light of subsequent critical work on subjectivity.  
Second, Hofstadter’s unpolished notion of paranoia, while highly appropriate to his 
project in Paranoid Style, demands psychoanalytic elucidation; to do so enunciates 
further Hofstadter’s point about the subject with no place. Third, and Hofstadter fails to 
see this altogether, a study of the paranoiac shows that the American political subject of 
conspiracy theories is a masculine construction. Fourth, Hofstadter identifies 20th century 
conspiracy culture as being dominated by the right wing,  thinking of what was at the 
time of his writing, 1965, the recent wave of McCarthyism. Doubtless, Joseph McCarthy 
was on the radical right wing of American politics in the early 1950s. But Hofstadter too 
easily puts the responsibility of McCarthyism in the hands of the right wing. Conspiracy 
culture did not then, and does not now, fall neatly along the lines of bipartisan American 
politics.  
 Timothy Melley, in his book Empire of Conspiracy, notices the “bipartisanism” of 
conspiracy theories. He sees a deep commonality between J. Edgar Hoover’s Masters of 
Deceit and Vance Packard’s The Hidden Persuaders. Hoover writes of the communist 
conspiracy to overtake America; Packard writes about various operations designed to 
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control the American citizen’s thought processes and purchasing decisions through the 
use of psychological wisdom.  Melley notes that in both cases, the real cause for concern 
is over agency—a phenomenon that Melley calls “agency panic.”  Conspiracy theory, as 
exemplified by these two texts, is not dependent upon an idea of “private messages,” but 
rather suggests “that whole populations are being openly manipulated without their 
knowledge. For mass control to be exercised in this manner, persons must be 
significantly less autonomous than popular notions of individualism would suggest” (3). 
The bipartisanism of conspiracy theories is, I believe, more political than Melley’s notion 
of agency panic would imply. The “agency” to which Melley refers is a doubled 
category—human agency and government agency—and while Melley is aware of this 
doubling, his category fails to register how the one (government agency) produces and 
shapes the other (human agency). Robert Corber points to the Cold War consensus, or 
what he calls “the postwar settlement,” as the concessions liberals made in order to 
reclaim “liberalism from the cultural politics of the Popular Front” (In the Name of 
National Security 3). Liberals who were interested in preserving some version of the New 
Deal found a common ground with conservatives in the anti-Communist hysteria of the 
50s. Liberals and conservatives could happily agree that the American government was 
being infiltrated by commies and faggots. So long as this hysteria held, the liberal interest 
in social justice for women and minorities might in some measure be maintained. The 
women’s and black power movements of the 60s and 70s in some sense were permitted 
to happen as part of the Cold War bargain. In a bizarre move Cold War liberals, Corber 
suggests, divided and conquered social mobilization precisely by appearing to 
consolidate the liberal position. The postwar settlement thus “prevent[ed] competing 
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constructions of social reality from mobilizing popular support . . . in so doing, [Cold 
War liberals] gained control over the production of the postwar subject” (3). One of the 
great conspiracy theories of the 20th century in America, the theory of Communist 
conspiracy, was forged from disparate political interests—and this is the point—for 
political purposes. There is a panic over agency, but it is traced along the contours of 
political discourse. The Cold War consensus limited the social field for a specific 
political agenda. 
  The economic and political structures that locked in during and after World War 
II must be analyzed in order to understand American conspiracy culture of the post war 
period. World War II came with the development of several major technologies the likes 
of which had never been seen before. Ernest Mandel, in his Late Capitalism, places 
World War I squarely in the middle of what he calls the second technological revolution, 
which runs from the 1890s up to World War II. The major technological developments 
that Mandel identifies during this period are electricity and cars. World War I did not, for 
Mandel, engender any major technological revolution that was not already in motion by 
the time of the start of the war. The third technological revolution, however, begins 
precisely with the advent of World War II, when control of machines was given over to 
electronics and nuclear weapons technology was invented (120-21). Wartime goals and 
the demands of wartime economy are exclusively responsible for this explosion of 
technological development. Mandel calls these technological revolutions “long waves of 
capitalism,” a notion which very clearly indicates the relationship between clusters of 
technological advances and capitalist development. World War II marks the beginning of 
the third long wave of capitalism. 
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 Mandel does not point specifically to the rapid development of airwave 
technology after World War I as a major component of the third technological revolution. 
However, this particular technological advancement contributed to the invention of the 
most revolutionary information technology to date: the television set. Television 
technology had been slowly developing since the 1920s; but television sets did not 
impact the American marketplace significantly until the late 40s. Sales of television sets 
in America jumped 600% from 1948 to 1949 (Television History). By the 1950s, “mass 
media” had become a meaningful term. Not only did television make it possible to 
communicate news of the nation and the world more quickly, it also accelerated the 
growth of the advertising industry. Constructing consumer desire for products rapidly 
became a profitable undertaking for producers, broadcasters, and advertisers. At the same 
time, the post-war economy made it possible for consumers to afford such luxuries as the 
television set; both the war- and peacetime economies changed the way Americans 
produced and consumed information. In spite of the fact that the technology emerged 
prior to World War II, it is this intersection with the economic circumstances of World 
War II that makes television part of the third long wave of capitalism. 
Hofstadter is well aware of the effect of the mass media on conspiracy culture 
after World War II:  
The villains of the modern right are much more vivid than those of their 
paranoid predecessors, much better known to the public; the contemporary 
literature of the paranoid style is by the same token richer and more 
circumstantial in personal description and personal invective. For the 
vaguely delineated villains of the anti-Masons, for the obscure and 
disguised Jesuit agents, the little-known papal delegates of the anti-
Catholics, for the shadowy international bankers of the monetary 
conspiracies, we may now substitute eminent public figures like Presidents 
Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower, Secretaries of State like Marshall, 
Acheson, and Dulles, justices of the Supreme Court like Frankfurter and 
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Warren, and the whole battery of lesser but still famous and vivid 
conspirators headed by Alger Hiss (24). 
 
The mass media made possible the visibility—as Hofstadter puts it, the vividness—of 
both the conspiracy theorist and his inflaming rhetoric as well as the alleged 
conspiratorial public figures. The post-war saturation of American culture with television 
sets introduced for the first time the primacy of the image; the economic conditions of the 
post-war period made the image a mass-consumable product in a way that film never did. 
Kennedy’s success in the televised presidential debate with Nixon in 1960 was mainly 
because he looked so much better than Nixon—he was young, handsome, and self-
assured, whereas Nixon was sweaty, nervous, and uncertain. Although Franklin D. 
Roosevelt was the first American president to be televised, John F. Kennedy was the first 
president to make successful use of television in his campaign and term of office. 
Political figures became aware, as a matter of profession, that their image could and 
would exist independent of their records in office. Image became something to be 
managed. In the new era of mass-produced and consumed political images, there came to 
be a split in the identity of political figures—the image that the public sees, and the 
increasingly shadowy “real” person in office. As Hofstadter points out, vivid political 
figures on television replaced the “vaguely delineated” villains of the pre-World War II 
period. Nonetheless, political figures after World War II, by virtue of the technology and 
economy that animated their images, began to cast a long shadow themselves. In spite of 
their bright and vibrant images on television, politicians came to have a secret life behind 
the image. 
 The development of the American national security infrastructure enhanced the 
secret life of politicians. Again, certainly there were government secrets prior to World 
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War II. But secrecy in the American government was not systematized until after World 
War II; on July 26, 1947 Harry S Truman signed the National Security Act, which 
legislated what would come to be a state of perpetual mobilization. World War II was the 
first war in American history that was not followed by demobilization of the military. 
Because of the Cold War, the United States undertook an entirely new policy of 
maintaining a substantial military force, as well as dedicating significant funds to the 
research and development of the new nuclear weapons technology. The Cold War was 
not a stalemate; each element in the standoff changed significantly in the process of and 
as a direct result of the dialectical relationship between global communism and global 
capitalism. The secret security infrastructure developed in America after World War II in 
order to conduct a war without combat. Government officials began to cast a long 
shadow, a place marked less by the presence of something tangible and more by the 
implied presence that a shadow gives. A shadow in itself is nothing but the absence of 
light in an otherwise well-lit place; it is the absence that most hauntingly, and most 
inapprehensibly, suggests a presence. A shadow is no place.  
For Hofstadter, the 20th century conspiracy theorist has no place, no tangible 
sense of country.  The space of the shadow, that place where the shadow falls, is in effect 
no place. There is some sense in which the conspiracy theorist is in no place. He is as 
Hofstadter puts it a disenfranchised political subject; he is also a desiring subject—that is 
to say, a subject constructed by his lack (of knowledge of the truth of the conspiracy). He 
seeks the good place, the place where the answers are, that place in the shadow that 
reveals all there is to know. Etymologically, “utopia” means both “no place” and “good 
place.” We might strive for utopia but never, definitionally, achieve it. It is the 
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paradigmatic fantasy, the ultimate object of desire, for it both exists—as possibility—and 
can never exist. The conspiracy theorist posits the conspirator, but only as an implication 
of the shadow in which he seeks knowledge. The conspiracy theorist’s goals are 
essentially utopian and fantastic. He alleges the possibility of obtaining full and 
unmediated knowledge of the conspiracy; in so doing, he also constructs his own fantasy.  
The material realities of capitalism in no small part influence and define the 
categories of psychoanalytic discourse. Consider the coincident appearance in the 16th 
century of capital accumulation in Venice and the first use of manufactured mirrors. The 
emergence of a product which enabled humans to apprehend their own form more clearly 
than ever before (although not perfectly, as much as it may have seemed to the 16th-
century subject, and perhaps to us) marks the beginning of the Lacanian category of the 
mirror stage. I am not suggesting there is a direct causative relation between clear 
reflective surfaces and the Viennese capitalist hegemony. But there is no way to 
circumvent the fact that the production of a certain commodity, namely the mirror, 
essentially invented a psychoanalytic category. The historical production of the 
psychoanalytic subject coincides with the commodification of that image in the mirror. 
The 16th-century subject was, as Carl Freedman points out in The Incomplete Projects, 
both simultaneously a psychoanalytic and a capitalist subject (151). In the same way, the 
conspiracy theorist is a subject of post-World-War-II capitalism, a product of specifically 
late capitalist commodification of the image. To understand him, we must turn to a close 
analysis of the historical psychoanalytic categories implicit in this period of history. 
Lacan’s theory of ego formation explains how the conspiracy theorist is paranoid 
and yet not megalomaniacal. Lacan maintains a distinction between the ego and the 
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subject. The ego is above all an irreducible and inaccessible object, and it is not at the 
center of the human psyche. The paranoiac’s megalomaniacal investment in his ego, 
however brief, is not a matter of placing himself at the center of the conspiracy against 
him, but rather relating himself to himself as object. This situates the paranoiac in what 
Lacan understands to be founding moment of the ego—the mirror stage. The human 
infant apprehends itself in the reflection of the mirror in two simultaneous and distinct 
ways. First, it understands the reflection as itself, what Lacan calls me-connaissance, or 
“me-recognition.” Second, the infant also perceives “a contrasting size (un relief de 
stature) that fixes [the exteriority of the image] and in a symmetry that inverts it, in 
contrast with the turbulent movements that the subject feels are animating him . . . Thus, 
this Gestalt . . . symbolizes the mental permanence of the I, at the same time as it 
prefigures its alienating destination” (Écrits 2). Lacan plays on the homonym 
“méconnaissance” in order to convey the duality in the formation of the ego. 
Méconnaissance means both “misrecognition” and “self-knowledge.” What is key for 
Lacan is the fact that the paranoiac in some sense knows that he is misrecognizing what 
he sees, even if only vaguely. This is so much the case that Lacan is led to assert that all 
human knowledge is paranoiac knowledge: “What I have called paranoic knowledge is 
shown, therefore, to correspond in its more or less archaic forms to certain critical 
moments that mark the history of man’s mental genesis, each representing a stage in 
objectifying identification” (Écrits 17). If “the mirror-image would seem to be the 
threshold of the visible world,” then the paranoiac in Lacan’s register exists in it (Écrits 
3). Freud, too, saw evidence in Dr. Schreber’s memoirs of an awareness of his illness as 
illness. The conspiracy theorist does not libidinally invest in his ego; to the extent that he 
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skips this phase of the paranoiac pathology, he is not clinically paranoid. The conspiracy 
theorist shares with the paranoiac the privileged relationship to méconnaissance. Melley 
sees this affinity as a “crisis of interpretation”: “[I]t is remarkably difficult to separate 
paranoid interpretation from ‘normal’ interpretive practices” (17). 
The conspiracy theorist’s failure to libidinally invest in his ego is not, however, 
the only difference between him and the paranoiac. As I’ve shown in the analysis of the 
film Conspiracy Theory—and will also show later in an analysis of The X-Files—the 
conspiracy theorist rejects ego investment precisely in order to reinvest in his role as 
patriarch. The paranoiac does not make this investment. Lacan disagreed with Freud that 
the primary process in paranoia is a repression of homosexual desire. Lacan felt instead 
that the primary process in all psychoses is foreclosure—and this involves primarily the 
exclusion of the symbolic father. Foreclosure is not repression or negation; the paranoiac 
forecloses on the name of the father as if it never existed at all (Evans 63-64). The ego is 
above all in the realm of the imaginary order; the paranoiac, standing as it were in the 
threshold of the visible world, functions in the realm of the imaginary. He rejects the 
symbolic order of the father. By contrast, the conspiracy theorist acquiesces to the 
symbolic order of the name of the father when he rejects the megalomaniacal ego 
investment characteristic of the paranoiac. Because, as Freud said, the libido must go 
somewhere, in the conspiracy theorist it must go to the symbolic. The conspiracy theorist 
organizes his desire around the Oedipus complex; to the degree that he enters into the 
symbolic order, the conspiracy theorist deviates from the pathology of paranoia. 
To note this deviation is not to suggest that the conspiracy theorist is not paranoid. 
The conspiracy theorist is paranoid to a degree; and he is not, in fact, the only 
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paranoiac—the psychoanalyst must also be in some measure paranoid in order to 
apprehend the meanings of unconscious irruptions. In the process of his analysis of Dora, 
Freud decomposed things himself. For instance, in a 1923 note to the original text, which 
was published in 1905, Freud said that he was wrong in 1905 to suggest that the motives 
of hysteria are not present at the beginning of the illness, since motives very often appear 
prior to the illness. He endeavors to clarify this view by positing a distinction between the 
paranosic gain (primary advantage of the illness) and the epinosic gain (secondary 
advantage of the illness). This analytical move, while perhaps medically sound, is 
curiously like the decomposition that he describes in his analysis of Schreber. The 
psychoanalyst must be in some measure paranoid in order to divine the secrets of the 
unconscious by way of derivatives. Freud’s finding at the center of all human psychic 
development the component of sexuality is, I believe, exemplary of the affinity between 
conspiracy theory and psychoanalysis. 
The privileged relationship to méconnaissance that the conspiracy theorist and the 
paranoiac share is elucidated by Lacan’s notion of the modèle optique, or optical model. 
Méconnaissance is a kind of vision; it is the double vision of simultaneous recognition 
and misrecognition, much like the anamorphosis that Lacan discusses in the seminar of 
1959-60 (The Ethics of Psychoanalysis), to which I will turn below. Dylan Evans 
describes the optical model as “an optical experiment which is constructed by means of a 
plane mirror and a concave mirror. The concave mirror produces a real image of an 
inverted flower-pot, hidden from view by a box, which is then reflected in the plane 
mirror to produce a virtual image. This virtual image is only visible to a subject who 
places himself within a particular area of vision” (Ethics 130-31). For Lacan, the optical 
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model demonstrates the importance of the “position of the subject in the symbolic order 
(represented by the angle of the plane mirror)” and how it “determines the way in which 
the imaginary is articulated with the real . . . The optical model thus illustrates the 
primary importance of the symbolic order in structuring the imaginary” (Evans 131). 
While both the paranoiac and the conspiracy theorist share the privileged vision of 
méconnaissance, they do not share the same position relative to the plane mirror within 
the optical model. The symbolic order (the plane mirror) in this model acts as a guide to 
ordering the imaginary. The conspiracy theorist is able to organize his experience into the 
symbolic order, mainly by way of the Oedipus complex. His vision includes the virtual 
image that the plane mirror refracts. The paranoiac, on the other hand, is in a different 
position in relation to the plane mirror. He cannot see the symbolic order in the same way 
that the conspiracy theorist does. So, for instance, the paranoiac will experience as 
hallucinations those things that he cannot assimilate into the symbolic. The conspiracy 
theorist is less prone to hallucinations, precisely because he is able to include the name of 
the father in his psychic structure. To the degree that the conspiracy theorist enters into 
the symbolic, he also fails to sustain the anamorphotic suspension between mis-
recognition and recognition.  
Nonetheless, the double vision that the conspiracy theorist and the paranoiac share 
is a privileged vision. Lacan discusses the anamorphotic art of the sixteenth and 
seventeeth centuries in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (Book VII of the Seminars). There 
he points to Holbein’s The Ambassadors where “you will see an enigmatic form stretched 
out on the ground. It looks roughly like fried eggs. If you place yourself at a certain angle 
from which the painting itself disappears in all its relief by reason of the converging lines 
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of its perspective, you will see a death’s head appear, the sign of the classic them of 
vanitas” (Ethics 135). The painting gives over two images, but only relative to the 
viewer’s temporal and spatial positions. Holbein’s painting is for Lacan the optical 
model. Both the conspiracy theorist and the paranoiac have a measure of control over 
what they see; in the case of the paranoiac, he moves occasionally into the space where 
he is unable to see the refracted image of the symbolic. The conspiracy theorist is no less 
vulnerable to hallucinations—he is just less frequently so. Both the paranoiac and the 
conspiracy theorist have spatiotemporal control over their subjectivities, but in varying 
degrees. Lacan’s primary point, however, about anamorphotic art is that it is essentially 
organized around emptiness. In the case of the Holbein painting, it disappears as a result 
of converging lines of perspective. It is this emptiness that both the paranoiac and the 
conspiracy theorist see. The conspiracy theorist can order his imaginary realm through 
the refraction of the symbolic and so avoid the pathology involved in staring into 
emptiness. The paranoiac lacks the structuring safety of the symbolic, which articulates 
the emptiness of the undifferentiated real for the conspiracy theorist. When the paranoiac 
sees the undifferentiated, unmediated real, he hallucinates. 
 Lacan warns that the optical model should not be taken too seriously as an 
analytic tool; the images with which the optical model deals do not correspond in any 
meaningful way to the images with which psychoanalysis concerns itelf. The imaginary 
realm is not reducible to captive images. Thus, he opts for a topological model, which 
eschews the Euclidean sense of space (Evans 130). Nonetheless, the primacy of the 
image in Lacan’s work is undisputed. Kaja Silverman goes so far as to point out that 
Lacan’s prioritization of the specular in ego formation “has made it extremely difficult to 
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theorize the role played there by bodily sensation” (Threshold 14). Lacan is certainly 
aware of the body in space and time; the optical model and anamorphosis make this clear. 
Silverman is right, though, to point to the primacy of the specular—in order to show 
subject position, Lacan uses as model and metaphor none other than the optical sensation.  
It is Lacan’s prioritization of the image as fundamental to human psychic 
development that makes his work so fully historical. The latter half of the twentieth 
century is nothing if not dominated by the primacy of the image.1 Indeed, the model of 
the optical apprehension of knowledge has been paradigmatic at least since the beginning 
of the age of reason. Silverman’s work in The Threshold of the Visible World represents 
an attempt to shift the paradigm of ego formation from the highly localized, phallic, 
masculine construction of the look to an alternative one that disseminates sensory and 
knowledge apprehension across the surface of the entire body. Laura Mulvey 
demonstrated in 1975 that the classic construction of Hollywood cinema is organized 
around this patriarchal look; in spite of the fact that we are now in the 21st century, the 
look is still organized by masculine pleasure, and Mulvey’s work still pertains. In 
Conspiracy Theory, Alice Sutton’s first appearance is through a window, where Jerry is 
watching her with binoculars from his cab on the street. The closing scene of the film is 
of Jerry watching Alice from the tinted window of Agent Lowery’s SUV. Jerry’s 
recovery is both framed and organized by his ability to watch Alice as an object, and in 
both cases without her knowledge that she is being watched. What is even more 
persistently relevant about Mulvey’s work is that she articulates so well the materiality of 
psychoanalysis. There is a subject seated in a dark theater playing out a psychic drama 
with the screen, and that drama is specifically political. Mulvey demonstrates not only the 
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historicity of psychoanalysis, but also the psychoanalytic subject’s place in history. The 
subject in relation to the image is, for Mulvey, male, and in the register of my discussion 
of conspiracy theorists, this point cannot be underemphasized. If capitalism has produced 
a historical moment defined by the primacy of the image, then both the psychoanalytic 
subject and the capitalist subject are masculine. 
I have so far been arguing, first, that the conspiracy theorist after World War II is 
structurally different from the conspiracy theorists of earlier periods and, second, that the 
conspiracy theorist exhibits psychic structures both similar to and distinct from the 
paranoiac. I have not been attempting to prove the conspiracy theorist is not paranoid and 
therefore not crazy. Rather, I have been trying to problematize the intimate connection 
between the conspiracy theorist and the paranoiac in order to put into relief the 
epistemological issues that are implied by the category of paranoia. Lacan argues that all 
human knowledge is paranoid knowledge; therefore, if we assume unproblematically that 
the conspiracy theorist is wholly paranoid, then it would seem the conspiracy theorist is a 
privileged exemplar of human knowledge. This assertion, however, is not exactly tenable 
when we look at the ways the conspiracy theorist accedes to the symbolic. The paranoiac 
remains at the threshold of the visible world ultimately because he exists in the dialectic 
of méconnaissance.  The question is exactly not whether the conspiracy theorist is crazy 
or right, but rather what the conditions for human knowledge are at all. The conspiracy 
theorist is not a clinical case—he eventually opts for recognition; he is, in fact, a wholly 
historical figure, one who negotiates the vicissitudes of human knowledge with the 
material of history. The post-World-War II American conspiracy theorist could not have 
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appeared a moment before the onset of World War II, precisely because he emerges as a 
subject of specifically post-World-War-II capitalism.  
 Cold War politics, the development of televisual technology, and the mass 
dissemination of the image on the small screen all interact dialectically to create the 
necessary historical conditions for the post-war conspiracy theorist.  But we also need to 
work in the other direction in order to understand conspiracy culture more fully. That is, 
it is also the case that the conspiracy theorist himself constructs—he is not merely a 
product of the culture out of which he arises. The special propensity for interpretation is, 
after all, one of the primary features of both the paranoiac and the conspiracy theorist. 
The object of interpretation for the conspiracy theorist is history. This is the matter with 
which the remainder of this dissertation is concerned. Robert Corber makes the important 
argument that the Cold War consensus served bipartisan interests by surreptitiously 
limiting the postwar subject’s experience of the social field and, thus, eclipsing the 
mobilization of the Popular Front. Corber demonstrates the social compact Hitchcock 
made in the Cold War consensus by making films that ideologize the link between anti-
communism and ideological constructions (in Corber’s work it is homophobia). Corber’s 
work is useful both for the way in which he shows the political implications of accession 
to the symbolic that the Cold War consensus engineers, and for the way in which 
homophobia energizes that consensus. Ed White points out that “institutional innovations 
. . . emerge not from some functionalist mechanism but from the vernacular tracing of the 
social field. Conspiracies offer perhaps the best illustration of this cultural praxis for in 
many instances they were organizational innovations made in response to an 
unconsolidated institutional field” (26). What White here calls the “unconsolidated 
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institutional field” is essentially Lacan’s imaginary. The conspiracy theorist develops 
theories about government, corporate, and other institutional activities in an attempt to 
consolidate the increasingly sprawling field of the Cold War geopolitical map. And as 
globalization since World War II has spread so has the anxiety about how the world may 
be organized both capitalistically and globally, and how the postwar masculine subject 
may be situated within it. In this way, the psychoanalytic structures of the post-war 
conspiracy theorist intersect precisely with the historical circumstances of the third long 
wave of capitalism. The post-World War II conspiracy theorist is a capitalist and 
psychoanalytic masculine subject in a crisis of history. 
                                                 
End Notes 
 
1 Fredric Jameson discusses the primacy of the image in his chapter on “Diva and French Socialism” in 
Signatures of the Visible, New York: Routledge, 1992. 
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Chapter Two 
Where the Boys Aren’t 
 The Failure of Masculinity in Narrative Accounts of the Bay of Pigs 
In three major American historical fictional accounts of conspiracy—Oliver 
Stone’s JFK and Nixon, and Don DeLillo’s Libra—U.S. relations with Cuba figure 
prominently. Specifically, the U.S. Invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs functions as a 
signal moment for these three narratives. This chapter will undertake three simultaneous 
tasks: first, it will examine historical narrative as a means of political commentary and 
the concomitant epistemological implications inherent in such commentary, focusing 
specifically on how the epistemology of historical narrative is linked to the politics of 
gender. This examination of historical narrative will involve a comparison of several 
genres. In addition to Stone’s and DeLillo’s works, I will include a discussion of Douglas 
McGrath’s The Company Man, which will demonstrate the continuity, across literary and 
filmic genres, of political commentary in historical narrative as satire. Second, this 
chapter will examine the situated position of the Bay of Pigs invasion as a characteristic 
mark of masculine U.S. fantasy regarding Cuba, and especially its revolutionary leader, 
Fidel Castro. The work of Van Gosse, in his important book Where the Boys Are: Cuba, 
Cold War America and the Making of a New Left, contributes to an understanding of the 
idea of Cuba as masculine fantasy and sets Fidel Castro up as reified masculine image. 
Finally, by showing Cuba’s function as fantasy, I will indicate the ways in which 
masculine desire interferes with the potential political agenda undertaken by both Stone 
and Gosse. Necessarily, narrators fail in degrees; accordingly, I will compare Stone’s and 
DeLillo’s works for their relative failure or success in narrating the Kennedy 
assassination.  
20 
 The event that took place in Dealey Plaza in Dallas, Texas on November 22, 1963 
and the months leading up to it is one of the most theorized affairs in American history.1 
Film plays a major role in the discourse surrounding Kennedy’s assassination. An 
otherwise ordinary Dallas citizen, Abraham Zapruder, succeeded in filming the entire 
assassination from his perch near the grassy knoll. Curiously, Zapruder never flinched, 
even as shots allegedly came from behind him. His film has been the centerpiece of the 
debate over what happened that sunny Friday afternoon. We can see the killing, Jackie 
Kennedy’s raw grief and shock, in all of its power, and these images somehow exceed the 
limits of verisimilitude to suggest pure unadulterated truth. And yet the Zapruder film has 
worked, as has no other length of 16 millimeter motion picture, to challenge the 
legitimacy of official narrative to the degree that the Kennedy assassination is 
characterized by an excess of questions with the promise of no answers. In its plenitude 
of truth, the Zapruder film marks the emptiness at the center of human knowledge.  
Above all, the assassination comes self-consciously to us in the form of narrative. 
The Warren Commission Report, the official American government narrative of the 
assassination, even in its purported legitimacy, may be positioned as just one of many 
possible explanations. Even Warren Commission defenders are forced by the very nature 
of epistemic uncertainty to reveal the dubitable position of official narrative, simply by 
virtue of the fact that they must so vehemently defend it. People believe in one narrative 
or another: the Kennedy assassination is less about truth than it is about faith. Less 
prominent in the American memory is Congress’ House Assassinations Committee’s 
1979 conclusion that there probably was a conspiracy in the assassination of John F. 
Kennedy. In this report the American government itself has timidly questioned its own 
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1964 conclusions in the Warren Report. The House Assassinations Committee Report 
does nothing more than foreground the problem of narrative and the way human 
apprehension is formed. Even in attempting to rectify the official record, legitimating 
narrators continue to indicate the postmodern condition of knowledge. The House 
Assassinations Committee’s timidity in its conclusions is a testament to the fact that truth 
is duplicitous, and that any truth claim often declares its own unintended deconstruction. 
For the House Assassinations Committee to assert that there was a conspiracy in the 
assassination also meant that they would in some measure delegitimate the power of the 
American government to construct official narratives—a move that they were reluctant to 
make, for obvious reasons.  
In fact, the assassination does everything to renegotiate the conventional 
distinction between theory and fact. All knowledge about the Kennedy assassination 
amounts to theories—even those narratives that bear the legitimacy of governmental 
office unintentionally join the fray of dispute, with the result that they, too, are nothing 
more than theories. No one ever talks about conspiracy facts, evidence of which is 
abundant regarding the assassination. The notion of conspiracy seems to be connected 
inextricably to the notion of theory, so that any time anyone posits a conspiracy they are 
categorized as nothing more than a theorist. If researchers do find conspiracy, they are no 
longer conspiracy theorists but reporters. Consider the reputations of Watergate reporters 
Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein. Before they discovered the malfeasance of the 
presidential office, it would not have been unfair to consider them conspiracy theorists. 
Conspiracies can and do in fact occur, and not all knowledge about them amounts to 
theory. But in the American mythology, people who posit conspiracies are paranoid; 
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once their theories are proven to be correct, they lose the title “conspiracy theorist” and 
its lay designation of “nuts” and become simply reporters of facts—they don’t become 
“conspiracy reporters.” The opposition between fact and theory, as blurry as it becomes 
in conspiracy narrative, is deferred to an opposition between reportorial—or objective 
and sane—narrative, and conspiratorial—or highly subjective and insane—narrative. The 
notion of “conspiracy,” then, is the lynchpin on which the radical condition of human 
knowledge pivots. Rather than functioning as a site for the interrogation of knowledge, 
conspiracy culture is instead pathologized. Woodward and Bernstein are not thought of as 
nuts, but had they not found Nixon’s conspiracy, we would now think of them as nuts, 
and not just merely wrong. 
The diagnosis that is most often made of conspiracy theorists is paranoia. I have 
shown in chapter 1 that this characterization of conspiracy theorists as clinically paranoid 
is imprecise, that they are often in fact hysterical as well. Nonetheless, the discourse of 
the pathology of conspiracy theorists is tilted in the direction of paranoia. This is 
precisely because the pathology of conspiracy theorists implies that they are masculine 
subjects who are feminized. The conspiracy theorist’s anxiety about feminization is 
displaced onto a reassertion of the Oedipal drama. That is, the conspiracy theorist 
organizes his desire around the symbolic order and so deviates from the pathology of 
paranoia. This Oedipal organization of desire characterizes hysterics, which is a feminine 
category. Paranoiacs tend, by contrast, to disorganize desire and thus resist the assertion 
of the symbolic order. The discursive formation of conspiracy theorists as paranoid is 
perfectly coterminous with Lacan’s discovery that all knowledge is paranoid knowledge, 
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since, as I have shown, conspiracy theory functions as the lynchpin in the study of the 
structure of human knowledge. 
 The discipline of history above all others maintains a claim of privileged 
jurisdiction over the accumulated knowledge of human events. Similarly, governmental 
committees charged with the task of investigating and narrating events have a privileged 
access to legitimacy, by virtue of their institutional status. The status of such works as 
Stone’s JFK and Nixon, and Don DeLillo’s Libra as historical fiction loses traction in the 
struggle for legitimacy, precisely because of their designation as fictional. Historians and 
governmental committees enjoy the privilege of being official, whereas works like 
Stone’s are at best unofficial accounts. The official narratives are categorized as history 
because they have the power of truth behind them. Yet as Hayden White has shown, 
historical writing is similar to fiction. Examining the transparency of the distinction 
between history and fiction yields a model that more adequately approaches the condition 
of official and unofficial narratives.  We see the contours of genre that criss-cross the 
seemingly impermeable boundaries of the categories of history and fiction. The unofficial 
narratives that I will discuss below represent in various ways the historical events 
surrounding the relations between Cuba and the United States in the 1950s and 1960s. By 
looking at the representation of the historical event of the U.S. invasion of Cuba in 1961, 
we can see that history and fiction inhabit the same space.  
Hayden White in his formalist analysis of historical writing in Metahistory 
considers “the historical work as what it most manifestly is---that is to say, a verbal 
structure in the form of a narrative prose discourse that purports to be a model, or icon, of 
past structures and processes in the interest of explaining what they were by representing 
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them” (2 White’s emphasis). His analysis traces the specifically literary forms that 
historical writing takes, and he uses Northrop Frye’s framework to identify at least four 
modes of what he calls emplotment: romance, comedy, tragedy, and satire (7). This 
analysis does not suggest that all historical writing is fiction, but rather that any historical 
account bears the forms of literary discourse. To that extent, historical writing and 
historical fiction fall within the same field. 
It is not so much a matter of distinguishing between fact and fiction as a matter of 
the connections between fact and narrative, and how the two are inextricably linked in 
both historical writing and historical fiction. The problem of knowing is a unique one for 
historical writing, which purports to give a record of “known” facts, in its most 
rudimentary functions. White argues that “the best grounds for choosing one perspective 
on history rather than another are ultimately aesthetic or moral rather than 
epistemological” (xii). While I agree that aesthetic and moral concerns inform any 
historical narrative—I would, in fact, extend “moral” to political, ethical, and 
ideological—more so than epistemological concerns, I think the problem of knowing 
with regard to history must be engaged in order to explore more fully how the historical 
narrative deploys its ideological agenda. 
 Oliver Stone has produced two tragedies that tell the stories of JFK’s 
assassination and Nixon’s resignation specifically to offer the Bay of Pigs invasion as an 
explanation for these events. Another film, Douglas McGrath’s The Company Man, deals 
with U.S./Cuban relations and the Bay of Pigs Invasion in a comedic/satirical mode. In 
each case, the stories are told through what White calls “explanation by formal, explicit, 
or discursive argument” (11). By this he means that the historian attempts to make sense 
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out of the story, “to explicate ‘the point of it all’ or ‘what it all adds up to’ in the end” 
(11). The writer shapes the story into a meaningful piece of narrative. But it is not just for 
sheer understanding that the writer does this shaping: White points out that “[T]here does, 
in fact, appear to be an irreducible ideological component in every historical account of 
reality” (21 my emphasis). In the case of Stone’s historical films, he is trying to suggest 
that the Bay of Pigs is the irreducible trace which links JFK’s assassination with the 
tragedy of Vietnam. His ideological purpose is to show that had JFK not been killed, the 
Vietnam War would never have happened because Kennedy would have de-escalated it. 
Everything that Stone says about the Bay of Pigs Invasion must contribute to this 
ideological assumption. The Company Man is less interested, given the features of satire 
which I will discuss below, to propose an alternative narrative of the Bay of Pigs Invasion 
than simply to critique satirically the American Security State. This is still, though, fueled 
by an ideological assumption, namely that U.S. intervention in Cuba deserves satirical 
critique.   
 In JFK and Nixon, Oliver Stone insinuates that the domestic politics around the 
U.S. invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 largely caused the assassination of 
President John F. Kennedy, Watergate, and ultimately the resignation of President 
Richard M. Nixon. In the introductory credit sequence of JFK, Stone produces a montage 
“of documentary images [with the intention of] setting the tone of John F. Kennedy’s 
Presidency and the atmosphere of those tense times, 1960 through 1963” (JFKBF 1). 
Contained in this documentary montage is imagery from events related to the invasion, 
including scenes of “the beach, the bombardment, the rounding up of prisoners, 
Kennedy’s public apology” (JFKBF 2). The voiceover during these images, which 
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sounds much like documentary voiceover, includes the following claim: “Kennedy, 
taking public responsibility for the failure [of the Bay of Pigs Invasion}, privately claims 
the CIA lied to him and tried to manipulate him into ordering an all-out American 
invasion of Cuba. He vows to splinter the CIA into a thousand pieces and fires Director 
Allen Dulles, Deputies Charles Cabell and Richard Bissell, the top leadership of the 
Agency” (JFKBF 2). Given that the CIA has been rather roundly implicated by Stone in 
the assassination of Kennedy, Stone’s voiceover clearly suggests a prominent motive, 
namely Kennedy’s reaction to the Bay of Pigs failure, as reason for his murder. 
 Similarly, in a scene deleted from the released version of Nixon, Stone places 
Nixon (Anthony Perkins) in Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms’ office for a 
tense confrontation between the two men. Nixon tells Helms (Sam Waterston) that he 
wants CIA leaks to the press to stop and that Helms should stop spying on the White 
House, an accusation Helms smoothly denies. Nixon then tells Helms he wants all the 
documents regarding a “certain phase” of Nixon’s service. Helms replies dryly that 
Nixon must be referring to a “special operations committee” that Nixon chaired during 
his tenure as vice president. The film quickly cuts to a close-up of two documents that 
contain the words “Bay of Pigs”, “assassinate”, and “Fidel Castro”. Nixon agrees feebly 
that he is referring to those documents. Helms then tells Nixon that he, Helms, made 
certain that his own name was never associated with such operations as Trujillo, 
Guatemala, Iran, and Cuba and that “it’s a shame that you didn’t take similar precautions, 
Dick.” Helms secures his power over Nixon in this exchange, and the ensuing 
conversation reveals Nixon’s subordination. Helms makes a disingenuous promise that he 
will search for those “lost” documents, but it is clear that Helms has ensured a more or 
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less solid positioning at the CIA. When Nixon says he wants the documents that place the 
CIA people with the “gangster elements,”—a weak attempt to put Helms in check, Helms 
replies, “Kennedy threatened to smash the CIA into a thousand pieces. You could do the 
same.” Nixon is visibly shaken. This scene, in one sweep, ties together Stone’s separate 
but ideologically related views that, first, the CIA was involved in JFK’s assassination, 
and, second, that the Bay of Pigs was an originary point for both Nixon’s demise and 
JFK’s death. It effectively makes JFK and Nixon two volumes of the same historic and 
ideological work. 
 In a similar way, John Ehrlichman, in his roman à clef The Company, suggests 
that there is a connection between a Bay of Pigs-like operation and the scandalous demise 
of a President. In The Company, the Director of Central Intelligence, William Martin, 
obtained the information about President Monckton’s illegal break-ins in order both to 
retain his position as Director and to force President Monckton to destroy the CIA 
Inspector General’s Primula Report. The Primula Report had to do with the “Rio de 
Muerte Operation,” which implicates Martin in the operation. The Primula Report 
resembles an actual historical government document called informally the Kirkpatrick 
Report. Ehrlichman suggests a quid pro quo exchange between the Director of Central 
Intelligence and the President, that the DCI was actually equally as concerned about his 
position as the President was. In contrast, Stone represents the DCI as having the 
President in a vise grip, by suggesting the President was implicated in the Bay of Pigs 
documents, whereas Helms had ensured that he himself was not. In fact, the CIA 
Inspector General’s Report on the Bay of Pigs, released to the public in 1998, very 
clearly implicates Richard Helms in the conception, implementation, and failure of the 
28 
Bay of Pigs Invasion, during which he served as the Chief of Operations (Bay Of Pigs 
Declassified). 
 Don DeLillo, in his novel Libra, puts the CIA, or at least its denizens, at the center 
of the plot to kill President Kennedy. He puts Lee Harvey Oswald in the position of CIA 
pawn on the assassination chessboard. The CIA agents in the novel who conceive and 
implement the plot in Dallas are the same agents who were involved in the CIA-
sponsored U.S. operations in Cuba. DeLillo suggests an unusual but powerful bond 
between the CIA agents and the Cubans who were involved in the Invasion Brigade—
that they feel they owe it to the Cubans to exact revenge on the President who failed to 
take Cuba back. Naturally, of course, at least one of the agents has some financial interest 
in Cuba as well, in the form of U.S. investments that were seized by Castro after the 
Revolution. President Kennedy’s betrayal of the CIA and the Cubans, by not ordering the 
air strike to support the Brigade, counts as one of the premier reasons the agents organize 
the assassination. However, in DeLillo’s novel, only one of the agents actually intends to 
kill Kennedy—the other two mean for it to be only a scare tactic. 
 Oliver Stone has made the connections between the Bay of Pigs, Nixon’s 
resignation, and JFK’s assassination most visible to the American public, with his high-
profile controversial style. Stone suggests that the 18 minutes of recording that are 
missing from the Nixon tapes have to do explicitly with the Bay of Pigs, and that Nixon 
used the term “Bay of Pigs” as an exact synonym for Kennedy. There is a seamlessness 
between JFK and Nixon with regard to the issue of the Bay of Pigs, such that the 
narration of Nixon in a very clear way picks up from JFK and logically follows from it. 
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Stone is creating an elaborate counternarrative to our received notions of the period from 
Eisenhower’s administration to the end of Nixon’s administration. 
 As a testament to the real power of Stone’s work, former President Gerald Ford, 
who was on the Warren Commission, called for the House to release all records 
pertaining to the Kennedy assassination. On January 30, 1992, George Lardner Jr. of the 
Washington Post reported that Ford “favors disclosure of most records still under seal to 
counter the charges of government involvement in Kennedy’s death and a subsequent 
cover-up made in the movie JFK” (JFKBF 423). The reverberations felt throughout 
American culture after JFK are well documented, but none are as powerful as those 
which prompted Congress to pass a joint resolution to release some of the assassination 
documents.  
 In terms of historical films such as Stone’s Nixon and JFK, knowing is indeed a 
problem because in every case there are competing narratives which assert radically 
different stories. In the case of JFK¸ the film asserts a position that completely debunks 
the conclusion of the Warren Commission. By extension, then, Stone’s film calls into 
question the integrity of the U.S. government. Don DeLillo, in a very discreet author’s 
note at the end of the 1988 edition of Libra, puts it this way: 
 In a case [like the Kennedy assassination] in which rumors, facts, 
suspicions, official subterfuge, conflicting sets of evidence and a dozen 
labyrinthine theories all mingle, sometimes indistinguishably, it may seem 
to some that a work of fiction is one more gloom in a chronicle of 
unknowing. 
 But because this book makes no claim to literal truth, because it is 
only itself, apart and complete, readers may find refuge here---a way of 
thinking about the assassination without being constrained by half-facts or 
overwhelmed by possibilities, by the tide of speculation that widens with 
the years (Libra unnumbered final page).  
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DeLillo eschews the distinction between fact and fiction as a fundamental premise of the 
novel. To do so, he says, is a matter of providing refuge, not gloom. There is, in other 
words, something gloomy about the prospect of knowing, and rather than wildly pursue 
the truth about what really happened, he has chosen to create a space of narrative 
knowledge that is technically not incommensurate with known facts. DeLillo presents a 
more fully developed picture of Lee Harvey Oswald, one which does not necessarily 
compete with the notion that he was involved in the assassination, but does compete with 
the received narrative that he was a “lone nut” who killed the president. About alternative 
narratives, Carl Freedman, in Critical Theory and Science Fiction, says that  
When Doctorow conducts such famous historical figures as Houdini and J. 
P. Morgan through fictional events and in and out of the lives of fictional 
characters, and when DeLillo constructs the Entwicklungsroman of a 
presidential assassin, they are indeed creating “alternative” histories, 
narratives that are complex and plausible but that insinuate in their very 
letter the ideological and epistemological problems in establishing their 
own relationship to historical truth (61). 
 
This is also applicable to the historical film, though Freedman speaks here only of novels. 
The historical film and novel are self-conscious about their own problematic relationship 
to truth and make that problematization part of their agenda. Freedman puts the point this 
way: “For the science-fictional historical novel, historical knowing is the central 
conceptual problem, and the principal cognitive estrangement produced by the form is the 
defamiliarization of historical knowledge, which is shown to be, for determinate 
ideological and political reasons, deeply problematic and the reverse of transparent or 
metaphysically sanctioned” (CTSF 61 Freedman’s emphasis). The notion of cognitive 
estrangement is a term Freedman borrows from Darko Suvin and which he develops 
further in his inquiry into science fiction: 
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[S]cience fiction is determined by the dialectic between estrangement and 
cognition. The first term refers to the creation of an alternative fictional 
world that, by refusing to take our mundane environment for granted, 
implicitly or explicitly performs an estranging critical interrogation of the 
latter. But the critical character of the interrogation is guaranteed by the 
operation of cognition, which enables the science-fictional text to account 
rationally for its imagined world and for the connections as well as the 
disconnections of the latter to our own empirical world (CTSF 17 
Freedman’s emphasis). 
 
 Freedman argues that “cognition and estrangement, which constitute the generic 
tendency of science fiction, are not only actually present in all fiction, but are structurally 
crucial to the possibility of fiction and even of representation in the first place” (CTSF 
22). The historical novel or film is both cognitively accessible to us and also estranged 
from us, and in that dialectic it critiques the culture out of which it arises. The main 
apparatus of critique that the historical novel or film achieves is one of 
defamiliarization—the historical film and novel estrange us from the received narratives 
of our history and yet do so in a way which is cognitively accessible to us—even if 
unacceptable—and they achieve this cognitive estrangement, namely, by narrative forms. 
The epistemological problematic of cognitive estrangement elucidates the political and 
ideological mechanism in narrative form. An analytic of knowledge with regard to 
history, in spite of White’s dismissal of epistemology as a central concern, is useful in 
understanding further how history—and more specifically our consciousness of history—
is structured by narratological forms that shape an ideological agenda. Narrative is the 
means by which we order information into a recognizable, iterable story, so that we may 
communicate what we know. This ordering of information is, however, not neutral. 
Jameson argues that in interpretation “the political perspective [is not some] 
supplementary method, not . . . an optional auxiliary to other interpretive methods today . 
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. . but rather as the absolute horizon of all reading and all interpretation” (PU 17). 
Ordering of information is an interpretive act and, as Jameson argues, it occurs radically 
on a political and ideological horizon.   
 The historical film or novel which produces a counternarrative to the one we have 
received suffers the scrutiny it does—as did JFK—simply because we have been given to 
think we know the truth about its content. The science fictional film or novel does not 
come under the same scrutiny because it is not being presented as counter to some 
received grand narrative. Science fiction’s burden is to be recognized as a legitimate 
object of study for literature, an argument which Freedman makes.2 But if science fiction 
is a privileged generic object for critical theory, what status does the historical film/novel 
maintain as a mode of critical theory? And further, do other genres serve particular 
critical purposes? And finally, do some genres serve a sociopolitical critique better than 
others or at particular moments in history? Freedman’s rendering of cognitive 
estrangement is flexible enough to consider both future-directed texts (speculative or 
science fiction) as well as past-directed (historical fiction) texts; this flexibility depends 
on a linear model of contiguous temporality.  
This conception of knowing through time is essentially right, but fails to allow for 
the possibility that some modes of critique are better than others in particular moments in 
history—in other words, that the critical theoretical apparatuses of science fiction and 
historical fiction ought as well to be historicized. Science fiction might best address 
sociopolitical concerns at one particular historical moment regarding one particular 
historical event; historical fiction might be better suited to address that particular 
historical event in another historical moment. Or, even further, historical fiction may be 
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the only suitable mode for critiquing certain historical conditions. This temporalized 
privilege of historical fiction may very well explain the fiery impact that Stone’s JFK had 
on history itself. Stone’s foregrounding of the problem of historical knowledge in this 
film led to the public release of more classified documents regarding the Kennedy 
assassination, in an attempt to quell the raging public opinion that the government was 
withholding knowledge. Libra, by contrast, had no such effect at all. 
 In contrast to Libra, JFK, and Nixon, The Company Man takes up the subject of 
U.S. involvement in Cuba and makes a sardonic commentary on the CIA and the Bay of 
Pigs Invasion. It is a kind of historical fiction, in the sense that it tells the story of events 
in American history. It tells this story in the mode of satire, which White identifies as a 
legitimate mode of narrative in historical writing. I will look at the film and the satirical 
mode in order to see how it shapes its account of history in order to serve an ideological 
aim. This examination of The Company Man will demonstrate clearly that sociopolitical 
critiques are indeed historically situated, and that certain genres are suited to particular 
historical moments and circumstances. The Company Man centers on a bumbling English 
teacher, Allen Quimp, who inadvertently becomes during 1960-1961 the CIA’s “man in 
Cuba.” The film parodies the CIA’s attempts to assassinate Castro, spur counter-
revolution among the Cuban people, and invade the country at the Bay of Pigs. Woody 
Allen, John Turturro, Sigourney Weaver, Denis Leary, and Alan Cumming star in the 
film. The historical events that the film shapes are all roughly verifiable somewhere in 
the historical record as having occurred. 
 There is an obscure reference to the Yale secret societies at the end of the film in 
an outtake that is not directly related to the narrative trajectory of the film. During the 
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film credits, a scene rolls where a group of older, obviously privileged men are seated 
around a lush room completely naked. Some men are being flogged lightly with whips, 
and an a cappella choir of naked men is singing the Whiff n’ Poof song, a reference to the 
upper-class, all male, Old Yale secret societies. A waiter brings a drink to a naked older 
man in a plush chair. The older man directs the waiter to take the drink to “Mr. Bush, 
who is at the whipping table with Mr. Buckley,” a reference to the Yale Skull and Bones 
secret society of which both George H.W. Bush and William Buckley were members. 
The visual codes are plainly homoerotic. This scene is certainly amusing in itself, but if 
the reference is understood, then the effect becomes instantly satirical. The club where 
this scene takes place may very well be Mory’s Restaurant, where Yale elite congregate. 
But more importantly for the film’s purposes, the Skull and Bones secret society is the 
place from which the Central Intelligence Agency has hired many of its agents. The 
reference to Yale secret societies, while seemingly disconnected from the diegesis, in fact 
extends the critique of the American security state, since some of the members of Yale 
secret societies become agents. 
 Dustin Griffin’s Satire: A Critical Reintroduction is organized around the critical 
issues of satire, rather than around particular satirists or historical trends of satire. This 
organization is particularly suited to the present discussion, since literary forms of 
historical writing are, I argue, in their structure critical modes. Two of the critical 
functions of satire, he argues, are as a mode of inquiry and of provocation. He says of 
satire as inquiry, “Many of the terms we use to describe the formal properties of satiric 
discourse—lanx satura, sermo, farrago, dialogue, essay, anatomy—suggest that the form 
lends itself to open-ended inquiry rather than to steady progress toward conclusion, either 
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predetermined or (as in scientific discourse) predicted” (SCR 41). Satire is intended to 
inquire into a particular problem, but not necessarily to conclude what the 
reader’s/viewer’s particular moral or political stance ought to be. Historical fiction, on the 
other hand, is intended to delve further than inquiry and produce a narrative counter to 
the one our received notions of history provide. Inquiry is a dialectical feature of 
historical fiction, but not its singular aim. Satire aims to explore the possibilities of a 
subject: “the satirist writes in order to discover, to explore, to survey, to attempt to clarify 
. . . [M]any of the traditional features of satiric discourse suggest that the satirist does not 
really know where he is going” (SCR 39).3 At the same time, Griffin tells us, satire is 
also provocation, a mode which is “’negative,’ a critique of false understanding” (SCR 
52). Satire provokes in two ways: by its difficulty and by paradox. Satire “cultivates 
obscurity, using elliptical syntax, cryptic or abrupt allusiveness, brevity, and roughness of 
rhythm” (SCR 52). The reference in The Company Man to the Yale secret societies is 
somewhat obscure, as Griffin argues. The Yale scene is also rough cut in between 
blacktracks where the credits roll. It is abrupt, and the rhythm is rough. If the reference to 
Yale is missed, the scene is simply odd and amusing rather than a source of satirical 
critique. 
 Griffin defines “paradox” not so much as we understand it, a “self-contradictory 
statement,” but rather as it was understood in the 17th and 18th centuries: “. . . as late as 
Johnson [satire] carried within it the notion of a challenge to ‘received opinion,’ as para-
dox challenges ortho-dox” (SCR 53). It is hard to imagine that the Central Intelligence 
Agency of the 1960s planned to administer secretly a depilatory to Fidel Castro in order 
to make him lose credibility with his people by having his hair fall out, but the CIA did 
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do that, and The Company Man both presents this fact and ridicules it in the same stroke. 
The film’s representation of this phase of the “Covert Plan to Overthrow the Castro 
Regime” challenges our received opinion of American governmental institutions as 
rational, methodical, and sensibly administrated. 
 Satire is set apart from historical fiction as a method of critique. Historical fiction 
does not stop at inquiring or provoking: it presents a narrative counter to the one we 
know as “history.” Satire stops short of this presentation. But historical fiction and satire 
may not be that far apart from one another. Griffin argues that we need 
to define more precisely the nature of satire’s relation to history. To do so 
[we] would have to recognize that the events and persons in satire are raw 
historical data that are given some shape, just as they would be in a 
historical narrative. It is naïve, we can now see, to declare either that 
satirists simply use preestablished historical “facts’ or that they 
“transform” events and people into “fictive” creations. Satirists do not 
simply name names and point fingers. Satirists, no less than historians, 
must construct their characters, in the sense that they must decide what 
attitudes and responses they wish to evoke, what aspects they choose to 
bring into focus. To assume that a satirist or a historian is simply referring 
to “truth” or to “history” is to be persuaded by that writer’s version of 
events (SCR 132, note deleted, Griffin’s emphasis). 
 
Griffin places history and satire on the same horizon. His take on satire’s relation to 
history is in tandem with the idea that history and historical fiction fall somewhere in the 
same field because of their reliance on literary forms.  
 Satire and historical fiction, then, have a good deal in common.  Given that 
Griffin has placed satire and history in the same field, in much the same way that we have 
placed history and historical fiction in the same field by way of narrative, thus we can 
imbricate Griffin’s theory of satire rather neatly with Freedman’s theory of science 
fiction. Recall that Freedman’s theory of science fiction relies on the notion of cognitive 
estrangement—the dialectic of what we know against what is strange. In the movement 
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of this dialectic is a historical materialist critique of culture. Recall also that estrangement 
is a feature, Freedman argues, of all fiction. Satire, since it falls on the spectrum of 
narrative, estranges us even as it is cognitively accessible to us. Satire is cognitively 
accessible because it works off of features of the political and ideological landscape that 
we know. It estranges us from these landscapes, not by way of the future as science 
fiction does or by countering received narratives as historical fiction does, but by way of 
the comically absurd. 
 We have essentially arrived at a theory of satire which explains within our present 
register how satire works as a sociopolitical critique. Satire takes "raw historical data” 
that is familiar to us and brings that raw data to an absurd and comic extreme, thus 
making the dialectically estranging move. We need to explore, now, whether satire is 
more appropriate at a given historical moment to critique culture than historical fiction. 
As Lukács has shown, genres have emerged out of an age’s particular sense of history 
itself (HN 20). In fact, Lukács eschewed the exploration of comedy in his Marxist 
account of genre in favor of a discussion of tragedy: “We have only have the problem of 
[the totality of] tragedy to deal with here (In comedy the problem is somewhat different 
for reasons which cannot be explained here.)” (HN 91). According to Lukács, the tragedy 
must attempt to represent reality in its totality, even as it cannot actually do so. It must 
appear to represent the totality of the life process. Comedy does not attempt to represent 
life as a totality. We will find that comedy as political commentary in the form of satire 
does not work as totality, but rather as an open-ended ideological suggestion.  
 We can understand the open-endedness of satire by looking at how satire and 
jokes differ. Griffin turns to Freud’s discussion of jokes in Jokes and Their Relation to 
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the Unconscious in order to understand what he calls the pleasures of satire. Jokes, for 
Freud, which have a purpose “bring pleasure by enabling us to evade obstacles to our 
expression of hostility” (SCR 162). But it is also that jokes reduce the amount of energy 
we require to prevent hostility. Griffin ultimately concludes that Freud’s reading of jokes 
does not apply to satire fully, because of the fundamental differences between a joke and 
a satirical work. Jokes, Griffin argues, are concise whereas satirical works (Griffin is 
referring only to literary texts) are often lengthy and elaborate. Griffin says that for Freud 
jokes must be clear and obvious and not arouse “‘conscious intellectual interest’”; satire, 
by contrast routinely arouses intellectual interest. Further, for Freud, the jokemaker is 
concealing her own hostility from herself in the process of making a joke, whereas 
satirists do not. Griffin does grant that “Freud . . . can probably tell us something about 
the pleasure we take in reading” satire (SCR 163 Griffin’s emphasis), since Freud does in 
some way demonstrate that jokemaking is a kind of triumph over an objectionable 
person, place, or thing. He concedes that “when we simplify Freud’s complex description 
of the way wit overcomes our inhibitions against aggression, we recognize that there is 
probably something very satisfying to most of us in satire’s power to hurt” (SCR 164). 
 But Griffin is speaking here of the pleasure of satire. If the discourse is shifted to 
the politics of satire, then Griffin’s critique of Freud in relation to satire is not really 
necessary. It is true that Freud is speaking principally of an economy of pleasure in his 
discussion of jokes. Freud says of jest that “It is now a question of prolonging the yield of 
pleasure from play, but at the same time of silencing the objections raised by criticism 
which would not allow the pleasurable feeling to emerge” (JRU 158). But he concludes 
by pointing out that “what stands in the foreground is the satisfaction of having made 
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possible what was forbidden by criticism” (JRU 158 my emphasis). Griffin himself 
grants in his discussion of the politics of satire that “satirists would seem to prefer 
indirection to frontal attack . . . As Freud said, comparing the satirist and the dreamer, 
‘the stricter the censorship the more far-reaching will be the disguise and the more 
ingenious too may be the means employed for putting the reader on the scent of the true 
meaning’” (SCR 139 Griffin’s emphasis). Satire as a political mechanism is 
fundamentally an avoidance tactic—the text avoids objection while still making its 
meaning known. 
 Moreover, Griffin’s argument that satire and jokes in the Freudian view are 
different doesn’t really hold. Griffin argues that for Freud jokes do not arouse conscious 
intellectual interest. This is not exactly Freud’s point about the simplicity of jokes. 
Rather, it is that the interest in a joke ceases usually because of the passage of time and 
the changing of circumstances, and “the business in question [the subject matter of the 
joke] is settled” (JRU 150). It is not that jokes do not arouse conscious intellectual 
interest, but that they are situated historically---a joke transported from one historical 
moment to another may lose its pleasurable feeling because the joke is no longer relevant. 
Jokes thus historically displaced are “difficult for us to use now because they would call 
for long commentaries and even with such help would not produce their original effect” 
(JRU 150). Historically displaced jokes get all the fun sapped out of them, in other words, 
because they have to be explained elaborately in order to be even marginally funny. The 
reverse, then, ought to hold: if a joke is funny, it is because it occurs in its appropriate 
historical moment. Jokes, like satire, are radically historically situated---a joke that 
“arouses intellectual interest” is simply one that is out of place historically. Thus, 
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Griffin’s hairsplitting over the differences between satire and jokes disintegrates in the 
face of the political discourse of satire. 
 Satire works as sociopolitical discourse in several ways. It stops short of 
presenting a counternarrative by limiting itself to inquiry and provocation; it challenges 
received opinion; it avoids objection by indirectness; and it is its own case of cognitive 
estrangement. Satire is different from historical fiction mainly because it does not 
produce a counternarrative to the story it is telling. Satire stops short of producing a 
counternarrative because it is avoiding objection—as we have seen, historical fiction does 
not avoid criticism and scrutiny precisely because it foregrounds the problem of knowing 
our history. Satire estranges us from the narrative that we have received and achieves a 
measure of sociopolitical critique by way of the comically absurd, while it avoids putting 
the problem of historical knowing in the foreground. Instead, satire puts in the foreground 
the satisfaction obtained from expressing precisely what is forbidden. Thus, in spite of—
or perhaps because of—the starkness of its ridicule, satire passes under—or directly 
through—the radar of criticism more or less undetected. 
 The Company Man is a Freudian joke, in that it attempts to express an 
unconscious aggression without confronting either our own hostility about its subject 
matter or resistance from authority. It’s not that the details of the Cuban Plan are funny. It 
is that the Bay of Pigs Invasion calls for sociopolitical critique, and for this particular 
sociohistorical moment satire, because of its indirectness and its ability to critique 
without foregrounding the problem of knowledge, is the best way to engage it. The 
failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion is more than just a lost war: it is a symptom of the 
deeply recessed American security infrastructure, and to that degree the invasion reflects 
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a failure in that infrastructure. This failure is not especially funny—but in a sense we 
need in this moment of history for it to be funny.4 In this case, comedy works not as 
verisimilitude but as an unclosed ideological suggestion about how the viewer/reader 
should interpret historical facts. 
 By contrast, the historical film takes up a particular role as sociopolitical critique 
and confronts decisively what has been given over as “the facts” about our history, by its 
own narrative trope foregrounding the narrative trope of history as we have come to 
receive it, and doing so in a way that both science fiction and satire cannot. The historical 
film’s ability to present a counternarrative to our received grand narrative makes it a 
particular kind of sociopolitical critique apart from science fiction. Oliver Stone and 
Zachary Sklar compiled a collection of 100 articles, essays, and editorials that spoke to 
the film JFK in a collection entitled JFK: The Book of the Film. In it they present 
commentary from such disparate voices as Gerald Ford, Norman Mailer, Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Jimmy Breslin. In nearly every case, the issue 
was how well or poorly, usually poorly, Oliver Stone represented the assassination.
 The historical fictional novel or film has control over the information that it 
foregrounds—it foregrounds what it will in the interest of its ideological purpose. Oliver 
Stone stops short of telling the Bay of Pigs Invasion directly because to do so would 
foreground the problems of the Kennedy administration. Stone asserts that both John F. 
Kennedy’s and Richard M. Nixon’s administrations hinged significantly on the 1961 
Invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. According to Stone, although Kennedy was initially 
committed to removing Castro, within three months of his taking office had demonstrated 
a reluctance to be openly involved in an invasion of a tiny country, and to violate the 
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sanctity of the United Nations and the Organization of American States. When he orally 
agreed never to invade Cuba after the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was clear his thinking on 
Cuba was beginning to change. According to Stone, when Kennedy gave his Pax 
Americana speech at George Washington University on June 12, 1963—where he made 
clear his commitment to global peace (“we all breathe the same air”)—he sealed his 
destiny at Dallas, Texas on November 22, 1963. Stone postulates that Central Intelligence 
Agency denizens who had been involved in the Bay of Pigs Invasion, radical anti-Castro 
Americans and Cubans, American business interests, and organized crime members all 
converged in the assassination plan because of Kennedy’s policy on Cuba. This assertion 
serves Stone’s ideological purpose in explaining why the Vietnam War ever happened. 
His answer to that question is because Kennedy was killed. The Bay of Pigs story, as he 
has constructed it—that is, in an oblique way—serves that end well. To tell the story 
directly, however, would call into question some of the failures of the Kennedy 
administration---the Bay of Pigs Invasion would logically end up in thorny patches that 
would muddy Stone’s vision of Kennedy. Stone has constructed this version of history as 
a double tragedy: the tragedy of the JFK assassination and the tragedy of Vietnam. 
 In the alternate ending of JFK that was deleted from the theatrical and the DVD 
releases of the film (Stone includes the scene on the DVD but as a deleted scene), X, who 
is fashioned after Colonel Fletcher Prouty, gives his reflection on the few days after the 
assassination. He refers to the 26 of November, 1963 when President Lyndon Johnson 
signed National Security Action Memorandum No. 273 which effectively started, 
according to Stone, the Vietnam War. Stone uses grainy, black and white film to depict 
Agent X’s reflections. President Johnson is seated with top advisors in the Oval Office 
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and he tells them that he is not going to de-escalate the Vietnam War and have it “go like 
China did.” He states that he is “personally committed” and that he is “not going to 
remove one soldier until they know we mean business.” The scene is voiced over by 
Agent X’s voice, who says, as Johnson picks up a pen to sign the NSA memorandum, 
“And that was the day Vietnam started.” After Johnson signs the memo, he tells the 
advisors, “Just get me elected. I’ll give you your damn war.” The face of the actor who 
plays Johnson is always cast in shadow, never completely visible at any point during the 
film. Stone constructs these scenes so that they resemble the documentary genre in some 
way. Agent X is constructed as the man with the truth; his narration of the NSA memo 
scene lends it a narrative plausibility. This scene is what JFK is singularly working 
toward, and yet Stone chooses to keep it out of both the DVD and theatrical releases of 
the film. It is almost as if both the Bay of Pigs story and the implication of Johnson in the 
coup d’etat are too direct for Stone’s explanation of the Vietnam War. He must deflect 
them, mediate them through the documentary filmic technique in order to represent them. 
To do otherwise would be to call his pat explanation of the Vietnam War into question. 
 Stone’s exclusion of the scene where Johnson states he escalates the Vietnam War 
in order to get reelected may be traced to a dispute over National Security Action 
Memorandum 273. At the beginning of production Stone relied largely on Colonel 
Fletcher Prouty’s accounts and interpretations of documents and events in order to shape 
his story. But late in the production of JFK, another source emerged, an active-duty 
military man named John Newman (who insisted on anonymity), who called into 
question the key element of Prouty’s explanation of NSAM Memo 273. Newman found 
that National Security Memorandum 273 did not entirely repudiate President Kennedy’s 
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goals of de-escalating Vietnam: “[T]he draft NSAM represented no real change in 
Kennedy policy” (JFKBF 226). This late breaking development in the historical 
information Stone was receiving was deeply troubling. Stone was largely basing his 
theory of Vietnam on Prouty’s interpretation of NSAM 273. But rather than substantially 
rework the film or alter the trajectory of his explanation, he simply deleted the troubling 
suggestion about NSAM 273 and left the substance of the film intact. As Hayden White 
shows, the discursive argument of a historical tale is shaped by the historian’s take on 
“what it all means.” For Stone, the assassination, the Bay of Pigs, and America’s 
perverted national security state all add up to how we got into the Vietnam War. Any 
suggestion to the contrary must simply be left out, and the narrative remains intact. 
 Stone manages by way of the second film to pick up the narrative logic of JFK 
and explain for him a third American tragedy, Watergate and the resignation of Nixon. 
He postulates in Nixon that Nixon was in some way involved at the inception of the Bay 
of Pigs operation, before it even became an invasion, during his tenure as vice president 
in Eisenhower’s administration. Stone has suggested that even though the CIA had 
briefed Kennedy on Cuba and Kennedy subsequently used that information against Nixon 
in a televised debate, Kennedy essentially knew nothing about the Cuban plan. Stone also 
postulates that whatever it was exactly that Nixon did not want revealed about his 
involvement in the Bay of Pigs, Nixon was prepared to sell himself to Richard Helms for 
it. Stone has Nixon tell Haldeman that there was a “Track 1,” which was the Bay of Pigs 
Invasion, and a “Track 2,” which was apparently a plan to assassinate Castro, in which 
he, Nixon, was involved. Nixon tells Aldermann that when Kennedy found out about 
Track 2 after the fact, he called Nixon a “two-bit grocery clerk from Whittier.”  Stone 
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makes it clear in this scene that Kennedy was not informed by the Central Intelligence 
Agency of its plans and operations in Cuba until the plans could no longer be concealed. 
 Stone funnels most of his vision of the Bay of Pigs influence through the scene in 
Nixon where Alexander Haig brings Nixon the resignation letter. Nixon is huddled 
unshaven in the Lincoln Room when Haig gently but very firmly convinces him to sign 
the letter. He tells Nixon that the Congressional committee heard him, Nixon, mention 
the Bay of Pigs several times before the blank 18 and a half minutes of tape. Nixon 
dismisses Haig’s concern about the blank tape, saying that Congress will never know 
what’s missing. Haig then leans in very closely to Nixon and tells him “I know for a fact 
that it’s possible” that there is a second set of tapes somewhere. Nixon asks Haig as a last 
gasp effort if there is any way out of resignation; Haig says no, of course, so Nixon 
snatches the letter out of his hand and signs it. This scene suggests very strongly two 
things: that Nixon had something very dark to hide about the Bay of Pigs, and that 
someone besides himself may have been taping him. Whether this is true and if so who it 
was is of course not known, but in the scene between Nixon and Helms discussed above, 
Stone suggests that Helms was taping Nixon. In any event, it is, for Stone, Haig’s 
suggestion that the Bay of Pigs matter might come out that finally and certainly tips 
Nixon’s mind in favor of signing the letter. 
 Stone’s works rely heavily on his narrative of the Bay of Pigs invasion, and he 
can offer his version at least in part because we don’t have much of an established 
narrative of it, in the way that we have a received narrative of the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
for instance. Robert Kennedy did not write a narrative of Operation Zapata, or Playa 
Giron, or Brigade 2506---all aspects of U.S/Cuban relations. He wrote a narrative of the 
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thirteen days of October 16 through October 28, 1962 because they resulted in the 
peaceful resolution of a development between the United States and Cuba which, 
according to received notions, and Castro himself, brought us very near to the brink of 
nuclear war. The Cuban Missile Crisis, as told by Robert Kennedy, has a relatively 
definitive beginning, middle, and end—an end which tells the story of a Kennedy 
administration that was gaining a vision of a foreign policy which included global peace. 
It is a good story to tell, and indeed the film Thirteen Days (2000) tells this story in pro-
Kennedy style.5 The Bay of Pigs Invasion, on the other hand, was a cataclysmic failure, 
which would explain its not being a story that we tell and retell in films and on television. 
It is not, however, just that we lost the invasion that makes this a bad story to tell. The 
Bay of Pigs Invasion at its heart is about the post-World War II United States security 
infrastructure. Our relation to this story of the Bay of Pigs, moreover, highlights the 
epistemological slipperiness of history. 
 To tell the story of the invasion is to air out the laundry of a republic turned 
empire. As Gore Vidal points out, on July 26, 1947, the National Security Act “without 
national debate but very quiet bipartisan congressional support, replaced the old 
American Republic with a National Security State very much in the global-empire 
business” (LE 315). The Bay of Pigs Invasion is that illumination, as Walter Benjamin so 
eloquently articulates in “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” that flashes up out of the 
past and tells us something about our present and our future and, for that matter, our past 
as we have come to know it. Vidal’s connection of the security state with empire shows 
how the Bay of Pigs invasion is entirely symptomatic of American imperialism. Stone is 
not interested, though, in the flash of the Bay of Pigs as a symptom of empire. Rather, he 
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reifies the Bay of Pigs in the service of his ideological agenda. Stone apparently sees this 
illumination of American imperialism, as he has referred to it repeatedly in Nixon and 
JFK, but he has stopped short of telling the story. If Stone were to tell the story of the 
Bay of Pigs invasion, he would be confronting not just a grand narrative of our received 
understanding of that event, but rather a much grander narrative of our understanding of 
the American government and what we believe its fundamental functions and 
assumptions to be. But it is not just this confrontation that Stone is avoiding. If Stone tells 
the story of the Bay of Pigs invasion, his vision of Camelot, of a Kennedy administration 
that would have stopped Vietnam, would disintegrate. Stone has seen the flash of 
illumination, but because of his own ideological agenda with regard to Vietnam, he must 
tell the story of the Bay of Pigs not as a security structure out of control but as a 
perversion of an American security system which explains Vietnam. He must leave out 
questions of how Kennedy failed to control American bureaucratic institutions, and other 
sticky issues like why Robert Kennedy did not pursue prosecution for the assassination as 
Attorney General and how the Kennedys were connected to the mafia. He needs Camelot 
to remain intact—otherwise his explanation of Vietnam does not work. JFK and Nixon 
are shaped by this ideological imperative. In the process, the flash of the Bay of Pigs 
invasion flickers and dies. 
 But there is more than just the preservation of Camelot that is at work in historical 
literary and filmic fascination with the Bay of Pigs. Van Gosse, in his study of 
U.S./Cuban relations entitled Where the Boys Are, gives a compelling explanation of the 
bonding that occurred between Americans and Cubans before, during, and after Castro’s 
revolution. Gosse argues that Castro and his men, in the late 50s and up to the revolution 
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in 1959, represented for American males a paradigmatic machismo, and gave shape, 
however apolitical at times, to the “rebel without a cause” condition of such American 
icons as Jack Kerouac and the Beats. After Castro failed to keep his pre-Revolutionary 
promise not to go Communist and nationalized U.S. assets, the anti-Castro Cubans, both 
exiled in the United States and still on Cuban soil, then came to represent raw masculine 
power in American popular culture. Gosse says, “The path that leads from the cult of ‘the 
rebel’ (whether the book by Camus or Nick Adams in his Confederate Army cap on the 
TV Western of the same name) to the beginning of a cult of Fidel begins with ‘desire’ in 
its rawest form, and both its politics and its lack of politics” (53). American fascination 
with Cuba is specifically about masculine desire. Gosse gives ample evidence of this 
American fascination most prominently in the form of Herbert Matthews, who while 
reporting for the New York Times in February 1957 broke the story that Castro was still 
alive and well after the Cuban government had claimed that he was dead in December 
1956.  
Both Matthews and the New York Times became the American megaphone for 
the Cuban revolution after Matthews’ series of stories ran, and they both significantly 
influenced events surrounding Cuba from that point on. Aside from the astonishing show 
of media power engendered by Matthews and the Times, what is most fascinating is 
Matthews’ positioning of himself in relation both to Cuba and his own reporting. Gosse 
says, “It is most notable now that, from the first, Matthews wrote nearly as much about 
the significance of his reporting, with himself cast as another protagonist, as about Cuba 
itself” (WBA 72). Gosse then gives an exemplary quote from Matthews’ series of reports: 
“’Fidel Castro, the rebel leader of Cuba’s youth, is alive and fighting hard and 
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successfully in the rugged, almost inpenetrable [sic] fastnesses of the Sierra Maestra. … 
No one connected with the outside world, let alone with the press, has seen Senor Castro 
except this writer. …’” (WBA 72); and again, Matthews says of himself, “The articles on 
Fidel Castro and the Cuban situation which I did in February have literally altered the 
course of Cuban history” (WBA 73). Matthews’ alliance with the Cuban leader clearly 
had as much to do with personal prowess as politics. Gosse shows further that Matthews’ 
interest in placing himself at the scene of the Cuban Revolution was characteristic 
throughout his reportage of the events. Matthews often “found evidence of his own 
agency everywhere, and duly put that evidence on the front page” (WBA 73). Matthews’ 
reportage is a site where we may see clearly the overlap of politics and masculine desire 
with regard to U.S./Cuban relations in the 1950s. 
 The politics of U.S./Cuban relations, however, must be examined a little more 
closely in order to understand the unusual phenomenon of U.S. interest in Cuba. 
Doubtless Castro’s ultimately broken promises of democratic, anti-Communist revolution 
and overt shift to socialism in 1960 traced clear political contours in the United States. 
Cuba became after that yet another global chess piece in the geopolitics of the Cold War. 
However, because of its complex pre-revolutionary relationship with the United States, 
Cuba never quite figured neatly into Cold War politics. As Gosse shows, “the solidarity 
[between Americans and Cubans] of 1957-58 was constructed, not as a conspiracy, but 
by often uncoordinated responses to serious political contradictions affecting a wide 
range of North Americans and Cubans” (WBA 62). Gosse’s title, Where the Boys Are, 
refers to a 1960 novel of the same name by Glendon Swarthout that chronicles the 
phenomenon of “Cuban Revolution as spring break” that overtook many college students 
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in the 1950s. Gosse documents several cases where college students expressed interest in 
fighting for Cuba over the summer, as long as they could return for fall semester. The 
Cuban Revolution appeared to many young American males in the late 50s as a viable 
alternative to the restlessness of being rebels without causes, an opportunity for 
adventure. On the whole, radicalism was not a primary motive for many of these young 
men. As long as Castro professed a democratic revolution, his cause needed no further 
qualification.  
In fact, in the late 50s Castro’s cause resembled, at least in rhetoric, the American 
revolution, in that a small, outnumbered group of people were dedicated to the overthrow 
of tyranny and the establishment of a government built on democratic principles. The 
Left, as Gosse shows, had been entirely decimated by the Cold War consensus between 
liberals and conservatives, and was not in any meaningful way organized into action. 
American fascination with Castro’s movement did not follow the contours of ordinary 
geopolitics. Rather, American obsession with Cuba in the late 50s amounted to a very 
structured instance of cultural politics. Gosse points to the “uncoordinated responses” of 
Americans to Cuba, but this assertion should be clarified to say that there was no 
coordinated geopolitical, national, and institutional response. As Gosse himself amply 
shows, the cultural politics of American response to Cuba, while not necessarily 
coordinated by any overt political movement, nonetheless has within its structure easily 
identifiable landmarks of gender politics. In his defense, Gosse is attempting to show the 
origins of the “New Left,” and so is interested precisely to show the uncoordinated 
political tides at work in the late 50s. I argue that while U.S. fascination with Cuba was 
not radicalized and coordinated in the late 50s, it was nonetheless part of a structural 
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political agenda of gender, the coordination of which is maintained largely by cultural 
logic and did and still does not need an overt political movement in order to thrive.  
 As I have shown in chapter one, a crisis of agency—both personal and 
institutional—came to dominate the American cultural landscape in the 50s and 60s.6  
This crisis is best seen in the 1955 publication of Kerouac’s On the Road, where the 
restless Sal Paradise and Dean Moriarty set off on American highways in pursuit of the 
elusive American dream. Discovering that the American dream may not be all that it 
promises, Sal and Dean nonetheless try to make the most out of their subjective 
experiences. Their experiences rush in and rush out with little staying power in much the 
same way that the American dream fails to obtain. It is almost as if Sal and Dean have no 
history with which to organize their subjectivity. They are “free” to roam the country, but 
there is no sweeping force of history to give their wanderings any meaning.  
Published in 1955 and re-copy righted in 1957, On the Road was on the same 
cultural horizon as the Herbert Matthews articles that appeared in the New York Times in 
February of 1957. At this time, Cubans both in Cuba and the United States were talking 
of their country and their cause, and they had a distinct sense of their participation in their 
own history. The Cubans, then, had something North Americans males were searching 
for: agency. Gosse points out that “it was the rebels’ insistence on themselves as the 
subjects of their own history, even in the streets of North America, that made them so 
magnetic to their would-be cousins and compaňeros in the North” (61). It cannot be 
stressed enough that this cultural shift was not a radical movement. Rather, it was a 
culturally logical development of solidarity based on a politics of gender. U.S. interest in 
Cuban revolution was political, but not in the sense of overt radical organization, at least 
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during the 50s. Instead, the development of a perpetually mobilized United States 
together with a newly developed secret security infrastructure sparked a crisis of agency 
in post-war American males. The Cuban revolution magnetized American masculinity to 
the robust leader of the Revolution and his band of macho freedom fighters. This cultural 
political development was less an organized activism and more a politically unconscious 
act. As Jameson says, “we never really confront a text immediately, in all its freshness as 
a thing-in-itself. Rathers, texts come before us as the always-already-read; we apprehend 
them through sedimented layers of previous interpretations, or—if the text is brand-
new—through the sedimented reading habits and categories developed by those inherited 
interpretive traditions” (PU 9). The Cuban Revolution, in the late 50s, was destined to be 
read by North Americans with the interpretive lenses afforded them.  As it was, the 
Cuban Revolution in its early phases was a North American fantasy of virility, 
machismo, and, most importantly, meaningful historical agency.  
 But, of course, Cold War politics and this “apolitical” beatnik sympathy for Cuba 
would clash in 1959 when Castro nationalized U.S. assets in Cuba. Commensurate with 
Cold War politics, Castro’s Agrarian Reform played to North America as the first step to 
Communist dominance. More realistically, nationalization was a betrayal of nervous 
American elites whom Castro had promised he would not socialize assets in Cuba; more 
precisely, a few financially and politically powerful people lost an enormous amount of 
income and assets and they were murderously angry about it. While Gosse makes a 
strong case that the New Left was born out of U.S./Cuban relations, the fact remains that 
the preponderance of policy on Cuba was dominated by Cold War imperatives. The 
“apolitical” North American sympathizer with Cuba, whose appearance is grounded in a 
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cultural logic of gender, was rushed inexorably into the political. Stone, for his part, kept 
his fascination with Castro silent until 2003, when he produced the documentary 
Comandante for HBO. Unsurprisingly, HBO elected post hoc not to air it, on the grounds 
that it appeared too pro-Castro. Subsequently, Stone made a rushed trip back to Cuba to 
interview Fidel for a second, less polemical documentary entitled Looking for Fidel that 
HBO aired on April 14, 2004. Stone’s retreat may be seen in the respective titles, where 
initially Stone’s approach was from the point of view of the revolutionary leader, but 
finally he settles on a reference to his own position of being at a distance, “looking” for 
the man who would be his hero. We can thus see to this day a residue of Cold War 
politics that in some measure both trumps and reinforces a politics of the masculine rebel. 
 There is a rough comparison in the mythologies of Castro and Kennedy, as Mailer 
so adroitly identified. They both signaled “new eras” in their respective countries: Castro 
brought a revolutionary vision with his commanding and enigmatic persona; Kennedy, 
young and attractive, asked Americans to consider what they might do for their country, 
and as Mailer put it, “[Kennedy was] handsome as a prince in the unstated aristocracy of 
the American dream” (PP 6). Stone, in a submerged politics of gender, has valorized both 
of these myths. Stone holds fast to his belief that Kennedy would have directed the 
United States into an entirely different history had he not been killed by agents embedded 
in the secret world of American government. Most recently, Stone has indicated his 
admiration for Castro in his more cautious second documentary. While questioning 
Castro about human rights abuses in Looking for Fidel, Stone blusters, apparently bearing 
in mind that he is not to appear too “pro-Castro,” that no major human rights organization 
has found any evidence of abuses. Castro has little to say to Stone’s question as Stone has 
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already answered it positively for him. For Stone, it is of paramount importance, 
however, that both the mirroring of Kennedy and Castro and the fragmentation of that 
image reflection not be overtly stressed, for the reason of Cold War politics, even in this 
post-Cold War era. Hero worship of Castro was submerged as the result of Cold War 
politics; in its place, for Stone, was put the myth of Kennedy. More important than fears 
of red-baiting, though, is the fact that, for Stone’s project, between the politicized 
reflective images of Kennedy and Castro is the specter of the Bay of Pigs invasion.  
 The cultural, domestic, and global politics surrounding the Bay of Pigs invasion is 
extremely complex. In order to understand how the Bay of Pigs Invasion is a lynchpin for 
American cultural politics as well as a turning point for domestic politics, we must try to 
apprehend as much of the discourse around it as possible. As it is, the Invasion is a highly 
overdetermined and charged issue, with an absolute plethora of opinion coming from a 
multitude of positions that often do not coincide with their own conventional political 
camps. For instance, Van Gosse, while remarkably reasoned in his study of the origins of 
the New Left, becomes vitriolic in his criticism of Kennedy in his final chapter on the 
Bay of Pigs, claiming that “There is a strong element of apologetics to this writing [on 
the Bay of Pigs], as if the unannounced invasion of a small country with which the 
United States was not at war by the greatest military power in history somehow ‘just 
happened’ through bureaucratic inertia, confusion and bad advice” (WBA 212). While I 
agree with Gosse that Kennedy’s excuse for the Bay of Pigs was weak, nonetheless 
Gosse minimizes the truly powerful inertia of permanent government. The Bay of Pigs 
invasion is a cultural return of the repressed, and in its flash we see the inexorable and 
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inseparable overlay of the politics of gender, the culture of secrecy, and American 
domestic and foreign politics.  
 Gosse’s indictment of Kennedy for the Bay of Pigs invasion is an example of the 
way in which polemics and the desire for certain historical narrative come to interrupt 
political critique. Gosse’s view, naïve at best and reactionary at worst, fails to take into 
account the real power of the culture of secrecy that was in full swing by the early 
1950s.7 On the heels of a fantastically articulated critique of gender politics, Gosse 
abandons his critical acuity and elects to oversimplify the American executive position in 
1961. It is reasonable to assume that Gosse’s vitriol for Kennedy and his Cold Warriors 
stems from his fundamental sympathy for Castro and the Cuban Revolution. This is the 
first case I present of a meaningful political critique being interrupted by a trenchant 
masculine fantasy.  
There is no doubt that, beyond any mitigating factors, Kennedy was the President 
of the United States and as such had the authority to call off the Invasion and he did not. 
For what reasons he chose this path are less clear, but what is clear is that there were a 
number of critical factors that may not be dismissed as mere apologetics. To begin with, 
the counterinsurgency in Cuba upon which the CIA embarked began in 1959 during 
President Eisenhower’s administration. By all accounts, Eisenhower preferred to know as 
little as possible about the CIA’s plans, and to give the appearance of a minimum of 
involvement on his part. As it was, Eisenhower chose to send Vice President Richard 
Nixon to meet with Fidel Castro on April 19, 1959, who later concluded that “Castro is 
‘either incredibly naïve about Communism or is under Communist discipline . . . I 
became a leading advocate for efforts to overthrow Castro” (BOPD 267). Regardless of 
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appearances, late in October of 1959, President Eisenhower approved a program to 
support anti-Castro elements in Cuba. The CIA and the Department of State were jointly 
involved in the implementation of this program. This original plan to overthrow Castro 
involved the implementation of CIA-sponsored covert guerrilla operations and, 
subsequently, in March of 1960, the CIA began training 300 anti-Castro Cubans. On 
March 17, 1960, Eisenhower approved a CIA document entitled “A Program of Covert 
Action Against the Castro Regime.” On this date Eisenhower essentially authorized the 
CIA to initiate and conduct the Cold War, however hot and however doubtful Castro’s 
affiliation with the Soviets at that time, in the western hemisphere. The March 17 
document delineated a plan to conduct secret—not overtly associated with the United 
States government—operations in Cuba designed to agitate resistance from within Cuba. 
During this March 17 meeting, Eisenhower stated that he “is concerned about leakage 
and breach of security. He argues that everyone must be prepared to deny its existence 
and only two or three people should have contact with the groups involved, agitating 
Cubans to do most of what must be done” (BOPD 269).  Brigade 2506 member Haynes 
Johnson, in his narrative of the Bay of Pigs Invasion from the point of view of the 
Brigade leaders, observes that “Eisenhower chose a method of accomplishing his goal [of 
overthrowing Castro] that was alien to the American past. Instead of taking his decision 
to the people, enlisting their support, and then acting on it, or acting openly out of 
historical precedents, he relied on a secret agency to achieve good ends by dubious 
means. His decision was implemented, not in the public arena, but in the shadows of the 
CIA” (TBOP 29).  The culture of secrecy in which the Bay of Pigs plan was hatched was 
thriving fully before Kennedy ever took office.  
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In spite of Eisenhower’s insistence that Cubans do the work, some time between 
September and November 1960, the CIA decided to transform the “program” from a 
covert guerrilla operation into a military assault force.8 CIA Inspector General Lyman 
Kirkpatrick, in his internally conducted analysis of the Invasion, observes that  
 Between the plan approved by President Eisenhower on 17 March 
1960  . . . and the invasion plan actually carried out on 17 April 1961  . . . 
there was a radical change in concept. Originally, the heart of the plan was 
a long, slow, clandestine build-up of guerrilla forces, to be trained and 
developed in Cuba by a cadre of Cubans whom the Agency would recruit, 
train and infiltrate into Cuba. 
 But thirteen months later the Agency sponsored an overt assault-
type amphibious landing of 1,500 combat-trained and heavily armed 
soldiers. Most of them were unversed in guerrilla warfare. They were 
expected to maintain themselves for a period of time (some said a week) 
[on the beachhead at the Bay of Pigs] sufficient to administer a “shock” 
and thereby, it was hoped, to trigger an uprising (BOPD 48). 
 
Because Eisenhower was concerned about presidential plausible deniability and his final 
term as president was coming to an end, he became increasingly less interested to know 
what the CIA was doing. During this time, Stone has repeatedly suggested, the CIA’s 
Cuban operation grew “appetites,” as CIA Director Richard Helms says in Nixon, and 
developed more or less on its own without much meaningful administrative guidance. 
Official documents corroborate that in order to facilitate this transformation, the CIA had 
to give the State Department and the White House the impression that the CIA-operated 
military invasion would succeed. The CIA reported to both organizations that the 
guerrilla ops-turned-military invasion had a “fair” chance of success and that even if it 
proved not to be a success on the beachhead it would ultimately result in an uprising on 
the Cuban island—that desire would, in other words, be infectious.  
In actuality, the CIA’s intelligence from Cuba was decidedly mixed—the Agency 
was not entirely certain that the “psychological climate” of the Cuban island was ripe for 
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uprising against Castro. In spite of the fact that the “United States Intelligence Board, 
Office of National Estimates, and Office of Current Intelligence studies on Cuba 
available at the time provided clear warning that a calm reappraisal [of the Bay of Pigs 
Invasion] was necessary,” the CIA pressed on (BOPD 54). The CIA Inspector General 
concludes of his colleagues that they “had been subjected to such grueling pressures of 
haste and overwork for so long that their impetus and drive would have been difficult to 
curb” (BOPD 54 my emphasis), and that “Cancellation [of the Invasion] would have been 
embarrassing” (BOPD 55) to the United States because the 1,500 Cuban men of Brigade 
2506 had been working very hard under American auspices for almost a year to take back 
their country. The Inspector General’s comment supports the idea that the Cuban 
Invasion Plan had “appetites” of its own, as Stone has Helms say in Nixon. The Bay of 
Pigs, then, is as much about desire as it is about foreign policy. While Gosse argues that 
bureaucratic inertia is an insufficient explanation, his claim fails to account for the sheer 
force of desire. Moreover, he misses the opportunity to link the desire for masculine 
subjectivity with the Bay of Pigs, however well he does so in his critique of fidelismo.  
Even more significantly, Gosse’s indictment of Kennedy signals the need to find a 
singular and unified subject on whom to place the blame for events. It is far less 
comforting to realize that the subject is inexorably split—perhaps for Gosse between 
Kennedy and Castro—and that desire is a cultural phenomenon predicated on the illusion 
of wholeness. Fragmented subjectivity is the object petit a, which for Lacan is that which 
causes desire (for unified subjectivity) and that which remains (fragmented subjectivity) 
after the symbolic order (Gosse’s blame, Stone’s history) has been introduced into the 
real. In the case of Gosse, the Bay of Pigs interrupts his critique of U.S./Cuban relations 
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to the detriment of his argument. Indeed, he says, “Patently, Cuba lessened as an issue 
because of the likelihood that the US, having failed once, would not intervene directly 
again” (WBA 241). This assertion is simply wrong: Kennedy agreed, for better or worse, 
never to invade Cuba as a result of the negotiations during the Cuban Missile Crisis, in 
spite of hawks encouraging him otherwise, a move that some assassination researchers 
have said was reason for the plot against Kennedy. In any case, Gosse conspicuously 
ends his book at the Bay of Pigs Invasion, for, aside from book length concerns, to extend 
his discussion to the Cuban Missile Crisis and beyond would be to complicate his view of 
Kennedy as nothing other than a Castro-hating Cold Warrior. 
 While of the obverse idealizing orientation, Stone’s critique of American history 
is likewise interrupted by his fantasy of Kennedy as the king who would save the world. 
Stone’s monumental film about the JFK assassination and Garrison’s trial to prosecute 
some of those involved is no doubt an ingenuous search for the truth. And to some 
degree, Stone is closer than Gosse to a genuine embrace of the Maileresque parallel 
mythologies of Castro and Kennedy, however much and for whatever reasons he effaces 
his admiration of Castro. The Bay of Pigs marks in both of Stone’s films, however, the 
tear in the symbolic order that even the sheer monumentality of his work cannot 
overcome. Like Gosse’s importune and abrupt ending of his text before his discussion of 
the Bay of Pigs ever really begins, Stone cannot represent the Bay of Pigs without 
destroying his carefully constructed myth. It is important to note that in either Gosse’s or 
Stone’s case a detailed representation of the Bay of Pigs could and would serve either a 
radical left or a radical right perspective. As they both no doubt realize at some level, 
however, the culturally irruptive nature of the Invasion disrupts their political projects 
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before they ever start. In Gosse’s case, it fragments his blame of Kennedy and at the same 
time undoes his critique of masculinity; in Stone’s case, it fragments his adulation of 
Kennedy which would in turn fragment his explanation of the Vietnam War. The Bay of 
Pigs, in other words, is a perniciously uncategorizable event. It at once serves no political 
agenda and every political agenda. It is the unsymbolizable real, the objet petit a that 
always remains after symbolization is introduced into the real. As I have shown in 
Chapter One, attempts in the annals of conspiracy literature are always to symbolize, and 
they are always predicated on masculine desire. But as this examination of the Bay of 
Pigs in literature and film shows, something unsymbolizable always remains. Patrick 
McGee, in an unpublished article on the JFK assassination, puts it this way: “From this 
breach [of the assassination], which makes visible a hole in the real, a discourse has 
emerged; or perhaps one should say that millions of words have been written and spoken 
in the attempt to fill the hole and to reconstitute the fabric of what must have existed 
before the hole appeared.  But there is another way of looking at this strange cultural 
production [of literature on the assassination], one that students of psychoanalysis and 
cultural studies can hardly ignore.  Perhaps the discourse that tries to close the gap and to 
bring back an earlier state of things has invented the hole” (“Purloined President”). 
McGee quickly indicates that he is not suggesting the assassination itself is invented, but 
that it has “left its irrefutable traces in the historical record,” and “has a double, a shadow, 
a symbolic counterpart.” The Bay of Pigs is at least one instance of that symbolic 
counterpart. Rather than cast the discourse of the assassination as an “inventor” of the 
hole, I would suggest that the discourse manifests a cultural space wherein the random 
irruptions of the real may appear. 
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 Don DeLillo comes closer than any of these commentators to articulating the 
crisis of male subjectivity that is characteristic of U.S./Cuban relations and the 
assassination, as well as the discourse around these historical events. In Libra, male 
subjectivity in crisis comes in the form of Nicholas Branch, a retired CIA senior analyst 
who has been working for fifteen years on the CIA’s official secret narrative of the 
assassination. He is utterly paralyzed by the sheer mountain of books, documents, notes, 
and evidence that has colonized a room in his house. In contrast to the image of the 
conspiracy researcher searching for the missing document, Branch has every imaginable 
document available to him. He need in fact only ask the archivist for anything and it is 
promptly sent to him. Branch, in all of his privileged access to the historical proof for 
which conspiracy theorists hunger, suffers from the agony of plenitude. Branch’s 
circumstance indicates the degree to which history, rather than a blank page to be filled, 
is instead an irreducible excess, a plethora of unsignifiable remainders. In the face of it, 
he often falls asleep, in “the room of growing old” (14). There is no recognizable order to 
all of these papers, “no formal system to help him track the material in the room” (14-15). 
Nonetheless he knows intuitively where everything is, by memory, color, and shape. He 
tracks everything not by the symbolic order, but rather in the blind way that an infant 
intuitively knows its mother’s form. He is, in this room, in a maternal plenitude. At the 
same time, he dwells in the conspiracy theorist’s fantasy: a room full of evidentiary 
documents that tell everything there is to know about the JFK assassination, with 
supporting access to all things CIA. And yet, he feels old and tired, and somewhat 
impotent in the face of this avalanche of history. That Branch dwells in this fantasy place 
articulates yet again the degree to which the conspiracy theorist is feminized, even at his 
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allegedly most powerful. DeLillo indulges this fantasy in order to situate history 
properly—that is, history does not hold a unified, singular truth out and away from us for 
only the enterprising researcher to discover. It is, rather, the nature of history to be 
narrated, and always to leave something unsymbolizable, even in the fantastic case of full 
and unrestrained access to “proof.”  
At the end of the book, Branch begins to suspect that the curator is beginning to 
hold information back, not filling requests promptly or ignoring them. At this moment 
when Branch begins to wonder whether the CIA can ever represent its own self to itself, 
the curator “begins to send fiction, twenty-five years of novels and plays about the 
assassination. He sends feature films and documentaries. He sends transcripts of panel 
discussions and radio debates. Branch has no choice but to study this material. There are 
important things he has yet to learn. There are lives he must examine. It is essential to 
master the data” (442). While this shift to fiction and other obviously mediated narrative 
seems to indicate an evasion on the part of the curator, Branch’s resolve to study the 
material suggests that there is no neat or distinct line between “official” documents and 
fictional accounts about events connected to the assassination. DeLillo does not suggest 
that history is fiction or the reverse. He suggests, rather, that history and fiction, as 
Hayden White demonstrates, are of the same formal structure. The distinction between 
truth and fiction is a product of the symbolic order, the attempt to organize things into 
metaphysically discrete categories. However, both history and fiction arise only in 
language—and as language is the symbolic order, they both always leave behind an 
unsymbolizable remainder, an objet petit a. In the countenance of this real, Branch 
embodies the crisis of masculinity. It follows, then, that the irksome inapprehensibility of 
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history, and its resistance to totalizing symbolization, is also a crisis of masculinity. 
DeLillo, better than Gosse or Stone, interrogates this condition. 
 DeLillo structures Libra as alternating narrative, between the viewpoints of 
Branch, Lee Harvey Oswald, the three key figures in the assassination plot—Mackey, 
Parmenter, and Everett, and several other participants in the affair. These characters walk 
onto the stage of Libra from both historical documents and DeLillo’s imagination. 
Perhaps the most enigmatic and overdetermined figure in all of 20th century American 
history comes in the form of Lee Harvey Oswald, the simultaneously maligned and 
exonerated alleged assassin of JFK. The question of assassination history comes down 
always to whether Oswald shot the president by himself—to answer no to this question 
necessarily implies conspiracy by definition. With this much historical implication staked 
on him, it is no wonder that Oswald’s enigma has persisted. In the spirit of history as 
form, DeLillo chooses to give as much voice to this enigma as he possibly can. Oswald is 
a principal character in the story, and DeLillo culls from biographical data and 
imaginative speculation to complete this complicated portrait of the accused assassin. As 
if to underscore the inexorably seamless horizon of history and fiction, DeLillo has his 
fictional plotter Win Everett literally construct Lee Harvey Oswald, who is of course an 
historical figure: “Win Everett was at work devising a general shape, a life. He would 
script a gunman out of ordinary dog-eared paper, the contents of a wallet” (50). DeLillo 
gives much time to how exactly the plotters manage to create a gunman and the neatness 
with which Oswald steps into the construction. There is, of course, much speculation in 
the historical record about whether there were two or more “Oswalds” in the months 
leading up to the assassination. DeLillo’s point is to show how his “fictional” narrative 
64 
formally resembles the accounts of facts that support this theorized counterespionage 
doubling. Whatever the case with Oswald, it is a certitude that we will never hear his 
story and because of this he remains an objet petit a, both the cause of much desire to 
know and the frustrating, unsymbolizable remainder of the attempt to symbolize the 
assassination.  
 DeLillo frees us from the drive to know the truth about Oswald, as he says on his 
unnumbered final page of the book, by deliberately avoiding any pretense to historical 
fact. In doing so, we are freed of the frustration of that which is unsymbolizable in all of 
the historical facts about the assassination. This freedom is a mark of the success of 
DeLillo’s work. Stone, by contrast, has an interesting relationship to his representation of 
Oswald in JFK. In the theatrical release of the film, Stone included a fantasy sequence of 
Oswald in a courtroom alone, speaking to the camera. In the DVD released on January 6, 
2001 Stone deleted the fantasy sequence from the version of the film compiled there. 
Stone put the 2001 DVD release through a number of permutations, deleting some scenes 
and including others that had not been included in the theatrical release. Stone’s reasons 
for deleting the Oswald fantasy sequence, while not altogether clear, cannot be because 
of time concerns. He otherwise adds a featured seventeen minutes to the DVD version. 
Moreover, deleting the fantasy sequence was undoubtedly technically involved, because 
it was imbricated deeply into the scenes of Garrison’s closing arguments and actual 
footage of JFK’s funeral. His reasons for eliminating Oswald’s voice from the grave, 
therefore, must be at least narratological and therefore ideological. Oswald’s voice in the 
fantasy sequence is not diegetically embedded; he is speaking directly to the camera from 
the grave, and as such it is the only scene like it. In only one other instance does any actor 
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look directly at the camera: Kevin Costner at the end of Garrison’s closing arguments 
looks directly into the camera, in a move that feels as if Costner is speaking and not 
Garrison, as he says to both the jury and the viewing audience, “It’s up to you.” 
Narratologically, however, the Oswald sequence is vastly inconsistent with the rest of the 
film’s strategy. Stone envisions secret meetings in Johnson’s Oval Office in black and 
white, where he speculates about what might have been said. But these scenes are not 
diegetically from the grave; they are embedded in the progression of the plot. While 
Stone may have felt the narratological inconsistency was too striking to leave in the DVD 
version, the ideological implications of both the inclusion of it and the subsequent 
deletion are profoundly more resonant.  
Because Stone was attempting to present another historical account, for which he 
was deeply criticized, any element that contributed to an overt commitment of “fictional 
extrapolation” would have undermined his goal. Oswald’s emphatic insistence on his 
innocence in the fantasy sequence, however plausible, is not part of the evidentiary 
record, which Stone was quite concerned to represent. The Oswald fantasy sequence and 
its place on the cutting room floor therefore shows up the degree to which Stone is 
invested in the distinction between the form of history and fiction. Stone was obviously 
well aware of the interpretivity of his work, and arduously defended his interpretation. 
However, the Oswald fantasy sequence goes directly to the heart of the condition of 
history and fiction as of the same form; and while Stone and his critics were acutely 
aware of history’s being subject to interpretation, nowhere would it have served Stone’s 
ideological agenda to interrogate the formal similarities of history and fiction. His agenda 
was to present a revelatory history, the history that lies underneath the layers of received 
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history, and in that regard was always intended to be the “truth.” Much more radical than 
accusing the United States Government of committing and then covering up the 
assassination is the claim that history and fiction are formally the same. Stone can 
maintain his fantasy of symbolic order in the celluloid on which JFK is stored. Stone’s 
fantasy interrupts the more powerful critique of history for which his work has potential. 
Even more tellingly, Stone’s deletion of the Oswald fantasy sequence expresses the 
degree to which the human subject desires to eradicate the pernicious objet petit a, that 
remainder which marks indelibly the failure of any introduction of the symbolic into the 
real. 
 Above all, DeLillo successfully interrogates the American crisis of masculinity in 
the prominence he gives not only to the Bay of Pigs but also to the Cubans and the North 
American men who were involved in the Invasion as well as the assassination. Gosse 
argues that the significance of this “male bonding” cannot be overlooked: “[the 
American] degree of determination [for solidarity with Cuba] would have been 
meaningless without the coming together of a radical shift in the subjectivity of one 
sector of North American society with the Cubans’ own agency, which, like all impulses 
to self-determination remained also a highly contingent, subjective ‘human’ factor” 
(WBA 61). While such arguments of “personal” and individual determinations appear to 
be apolitical, they are in fact highly determined political conditions. I have attempted to 
make a meaningful distinction here between the politics involved in foreign and domestic 
relations and the politics that shape cultural discourses. This distinction is provisional, 
because all politics inform and influence one another; but the provisional distinction is 
necessary so that the politics of masculinity can be seen for all of its effect on the national 
67 
and international developments that evolved around the relation between the United 
States and Cuba. The personal attachment between Cubans and Americans that DeLillo, 
Gosse, and historical documents articulate cannot be dismissed as mere 
sentimentalization. 
 Don DeLillo explores the unusual bond between CIA agents and anti-Castro 
Cuban fighters in Libra, suggesting that it might be a significant if partial explanation for 
the anti-Kennedy sentiment which resulted in his murder. Brigade 2506 member Haynes 
Johnson reports that “From the beginning, the Cuban counter-revolutionists viewed their 
new American friends with blind trust” (TBOP 27). From the very beginning the men 
were told that these were not CIA agents and that the U.S. Government did not have 
anything to do with their training. Business interests were financing their revolt, they 
were told. But the men all knew that it was CIA and the United States. Johnson quotes 
Manuel Artime, Brigade leader: 
 “I don’t know why, but in the bottom of my heart I believed those 
people [the CIA agents] would help me. I was impressed by the way they 
got me out of Cuba and took me through immigration with no problem at 
all. And I thought about that lie detector---you couldn’t buy that in a ten-
cent store. And besides that it came to my mind that they were obviously 
more than a group of rich men. The kind of questions they asked me, and 
what they said, indicated a big organization. And there was always their 
preoccupation with my trustworthiness. Even though I didn’t have 
anything concrete, everything indicated that these were people who could 
help me a lot” (TBOP 28). 
 
It is this aspect of the Bay of Pigs Invasion where things like “heart,” “help,” and 
“betrayal” become a part of the story. Johnson gives Pepe San Román’s observation, 
another Brigade leader: 
 When Carl [a code-named CIA operative] finished [explaining 
what to expect in their training] it was nearly two o’clock in the morning. 
For a moment there was silence, and then Pepe San Román asked the 
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question in every man’s mind: “What help is the United States going to 
give?” 
 “We are here to help Cuba, and if you are here for that reason we 
will get along well,” Carl replied. Evasive as it was, Carl’s answer 
satisfied the eager Cubans. . . 
 “We were taught how to fight as guerrillas,” Pepe said. . . “There 
was the danger of getting lost, and there were snakes. It was a very deep 
jungle [at the training camp in Guatemala]. The equipment and living 
conditions were poor, but we did not really mind. At that point we 
believed that we were going to train a large number of Cubans for 
guerrilla war, that we were going to Cuba, and that we would always have 
what we had then---organization and control, good control. We knew we 
might die in Cuba, but we were doing something organized by people who 
really cared. Those instructors did a good job with us. We never thought 
things were going to be handled the way they eventually were” (TBOP 
39). 
 
It is clear that the Brigade leaders were not well-informed about the status or the nature of 
the operation they were involved in. They had to settle for speculation about who was 
backing them. But one thing is painfully clear: the Cubans trusted both the agents that 
worked with them and the United States explicitly. Johnson observes: 
. . . virtually all of the Cubans involved believed so much in the 
Americans---or wanted so desperately to believe---that they never 
questioned what was happening or expressed doubts about the plans . . . 
To Cubans the United States was more than the colossus of the North, for 
the two countries were bound closely by attitudes, by history, by 
geography and by economics. The United States was great and powerful, 
the master not only of the hemisphere but perhaps of the world, and it was 
Cuba’s friend. One really didn’t question such a belief. It was a fact; 
everyone knew it. And the mysterious, anonymous, ubiquitous American 
agents who dealt with the Cubans managed to strengthen that belief 
(TBOP 27). 
 
This part of the narrative of the Bay of Pigs Invasion helps to explain DeLillo’s 
speculation that the CIA agents involved in JFK’s assassination felt terribly guilty about 
what had happened to the Cubans that they had come to know and respect during the 
training and invasion. For their part, DeLillo speculates, the CIA men, Parmenter, 
Mackey, and Everett, felt angry about Kennedy’s betrayal and the difficult position he 
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put them in with the Cubans, and feel personally guilty for the enormous disappointment 
the Bay of Pigs was for the counterrevolutionary Cubans. Assassination plotter T. J. 
Mackey reflects on his stint at the Bay of Pigs. No Americans were supposed to be 
directly involved, but he was nonetheless on one of little boats with the Cubans. He is 
angry with the CIA and the administration for the betrayal: “He’d seen too many evasions 
and betrayals, fighting men encouraged and then abandoned for political reasons . . . This 
was the only war story he knew, the only one there was or could be, and it always ended 
the same way, men stranded in the smoke of remote mediations” (69). Mackey is acutely 
sensitive to the fact that he had made promises to these men; his presence at the Invasion 
itself gave him a firsthand look at the profound disappointment and injustice of the whole 
affair. It is as if above all else his word and his honor have been besmirched—a grave 
fate for masculinity to suffer. Mackey is ashamed: “It was the grimmest, most godawful 
thing, to be ashamed of your country” (73). To underscore the depth of Mackey’s sense 
of betrayal, DeLillo outlines a plot within a plot—while Parmenter and Everett expect 
only to stage an attempted assassination, Mackey instead surreptitiously plans and 
executes the actual assassination, against Parmenter’s and Everett’s less ambitious 
wishes. Where Parmenter and Everett want mainly to influence U.S. policy on Cuba by 
scaring the president with a fake assassination attempt, Mackey is truly and deeply angry 
with the president about Cuba and wants to kill him. 
 The story that the Cuban Brigade members tell in their memoir is a betrayal 
story—a tragedy of a particular kind. The Cubans who “believed” in the United States 
were betrayed by the great colossus of the North. DeLillo picks up on this theme in Libra:  
“I thought about it a lot,” Raymo said, “and I’ll tell you my beliefs. I 
believed in the United States of America. The country that could do no 
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wrong. It was bigger than anything, bigger than God. With the great U.S. 
behind us, how could we lose? They told us, they told us, they promise, 
they repeat and repeat. We have the full backing of the military. We went 
to the beaches thinking they would support us with air, with navy. 
Impossible we could lose. We are backed by the great U.S. What happens? 
We find ourselves lost in the swamps, lost and hungry, we are eating tree 
bark by this time, and the radio is saying, ‘Attention, brigade, the owl is 
hooting in the barn’” (294). 
 
It is not only a betrayal of the Brigade Cubans, but a reversal of the U.S.’s original intent 
to recognize Cuba’s new government in 1959. Stone tells the story of a coup d’etat, a 
Caesarian tragedy, but he does so without shattering the myth of Camelot. To tell the 
betrayal tale is to put the Camelot myth at risk, and it is here that the ideological 
difference between Libra and JFK becomes manifest. In November 1991, Robert Sam 
Anson reported in Esquire that Oliver Stone had taken aim at an effort to produce a film 
version of Libra that A&M Films optioned around the time Stone was working on JFK. 
Stone denied the charge, claiming that the Libra film “was rejected on the basis of its 
quality, or lack thereof” (Stone, letter, Esquire, December 1991). Whatever the case, it is 
unfortunate that Libra was never made, because it presented a new and compelling 
narrative of events around the assassination. It is more than economic factors like 
competition and market flooding that would have put a film version of Libra at cross 
purposes with JFK. A film version of Libra would have presented a narrative which 
challenged Stone’s pristine vision of Camelot because of its representation of the anger 
men felt toward Kennedy about Cuba. Both Libra and JFK are interested to explain the 
JFK assassination, and both do so by shaping narrative and by foregrounding the problem 
of historical knowing. But they do not share the same ideological purpose or the same 
epistemology. Libra’s goal is not to preserve Camelot in order to explain Vietnam. Libra 
is more interested to explore the epistemological implications of sifting through all the 
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historical knowledge of the assassination, through the character of Nicholas Branch, the 
CIA writer charged with narrating the events related to the assassination. 
 
 Because Libra’s ideological centerpiece is the formal similarity between historical 
fiction and history, it is less afraid of the residual objet petit a that remains after the 
attempt to symbolize the truth. The introduction of the symbolic order is a masculine 
enterprise, circumscribed ultimately by the realm of fantasy. In this regard, DeLillo’s 
work exemplifies an ideological work that is not disrupted by a masculine fantasy; that 
Branch dwells in a world of maternal plenitude is a mark of DeLillo’s attempt to 
interrogate the feminization of conspiracy culture rather than suppress it. Stone and 
Gosse, by contrast, representing both historical critical and historical fictional works, 
typify the degree to which ideological projects that attempt to represent the truth 
ultimately fail to interrogate the politics of masculinity and thus undermine their own 
ideological missions. It is thus clear, then, that the epistemological stakes in these works 
are much higher than simply “the truth” versus “the lies”; also at stake are the 
implications of a politics of masculinity and its dangerously disruptive nature in any 
critical project. 
                                                 
End Notes 
 
1The events of Watergate, the other major conspiracy in American history, are not theorized in the same 
way, simply because “what happened” has been made to seem more clear in the public record. 
 
2We will leave the discourse of science fiction running in the background because its issues and its 
privileges, which Freedman points out, will be brought to bear on the following discussion and in Chapters 
Four and Five. For Freedman, “science fiction functions as a privileged generic object for critical theory” 
(CTSF 86 my emphasis). Freedman puts into play a theory of genre in his discussion of science fiction, 
arguing that because, principally, of science fiction’s cognitive estrangement, it is uniquely situated as a 
critique of capitalism. The subtleties he traces through fantasy fiction, historical fiction, and science fiction 
all depend on a notion of genre as an ideological categorization. 
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3 By contrast, the historical fiction writer/director has a very clear understanding of the trajectory she or he 
wants to present. In the case of Oliver Stone, he based his story of the assassination heavily on both Jim 
Garrison’s and Colonel Flectcher Prouty’s accounts. He was not just exploring: he was actively countering 
the received narrative of the Warren Commission. In this regard, Stone’s work is far more effective in its 
ideological aims than The Company Man. 
 
4 There is a sense in which both the American Security infrastructure and aggravating symptoms like the 
Bay of Pigs is the unconscious. Lacan says that “The unconscious is that part of the concrete discourse, in 
so far as it is transindividual, that is not at the disposal of the subject in re-establishing the continuity of his 
conscious discourse” (Ecrits 49). In other words, the subject cannot access the deep recesses of her 
unconscious in the milieu of the analytic method even though the unconscious is inevitably a part of the 
concrete discourse of the analytic method. The unconscious is the real, which in Lacan’s view from which 
we are always already split off from the moment we obtain language. While we may talk about the Bay of 
Pigs Invasion, we do not have at our disposal the discourse of the Security State. We are, in a sense, split 
subjects with regard to understanding our own cultural and political unconscious. Still, speech is the 
material of the analytic method, and it is the means whereby we “reorder past contingences by conferring 
on them the sense of necessities to come” (Ecrits 48). I think of narrative as being Lacanian speech. 
Therefore, insofar as narrative may reorder past contingencies---that is to say, that we might lay on the 
couch and talk and get better---should we continue to tell stories about our past. I think, too, of Lacan’s 
notion of the real as something like Benjamin’s illumination, of which we periodically obtain a glimpse. 
Benjamin sees the illumination as something which reorders our sense of the past and of the future. To 
glimpse it, and to tell what we can of it, is a success, even as we are doomed to fail. Oliver Stone’s work in 
this regard is both a success and a failure. 
 
5 For a review of the film Thirteen Days by the historian who transcribed the Kennedy tapes of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, see Ernest R. May’s “Thirteen Days in 145 Minutes,” in National Forum: The Phi Kappa 
Phi Journal, Spring 2001, v 81 n 2, 34-37. I might add here that Ken O’Donnell’s son was involved in the 
financing of the film, which could explain his otherwise historically unfounded prominence in the film. 
Robert Kennedy mentions O’Donnell three times in the entire book on which the film is based. 
 
6Timothy Melley argues the case for agency panic in his book Empire of Conspiracy. 
 
7 Indeed, that culture of secrecy has reached well into the 21st century, as Kevin Phillips has adequately 
demonstrated in his 2004 book American Dynasty, and for which the younger Bush’s administration is 
being heavily criticized. 
 
8 Cf. The Perfect Failure: Kennedy, Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bay of Pigs, Trumbull Higgins, New 





On Being Re(a)d: Narrative, Gender, and Cold War Discourse 
 
Beyond the pleasure principle we encounter that opaque surface which to some 
has seemed so obscure that it is the antimony of all thought–not just biological but 
scientific in general–the surface that is known as the death instinct (Lacan, Ethics 
21). 
 
[T]he essential point to remember here is the link of the sexual drive to death . . . 
(Lacan, “Phallic Phase” 120). 
 




American discourse from the 1950s to the 1980s, from cultural productions to 
political dialogue, articulates the terror of the story of total nuclear destruction and the 
inability to resist telling it. Narrating the story of cold war only ends in one thing, and we 
can’t resist telling the unthinkable. Countless films emerge out of Cold War American 
discourse, which are both productive of and contiguous with the politics of the Cold War. 
This chapter will examine two of these films for the ways in which the discursive 
formations of gender, conspiracy, and Cold War narrative overlap, intersect, and shape 
one another: The Manchurian Candidate (1962) and Fail Safe (1963). Taken together, 
these two films mark the trajectory of the pleasure principle of Cold War discourse, and 
the ways in which narrative and gender are imbricated in the production of political 
agendas. The Manchurian Candidate does not deal directly with total destruction. Instead, 
this film demarcates the boundaries of conspiracy in Cold War discourse. By examining 




drama and also a drama of psychoanalytic dialogue. Fail Safe will then reveal how the 
pleasure principle plays out in narratives where the Cold War shifts politically to a hot 
war. 
According to Freud, the pleasure principle is that process whereby the tension of a 
given circumstance is resolved by the avoidance of pain or production of pleasure. The 
path to this resolution is always the only one the subject will choose. This chapter will 
argue that the conspiracy narrative, on which much Cold War discourse is based, is the 
gateway through which we may design a theoretical apparatus that will map a site for the 
intersection of narrative, Marxist theory, and feminist theory. Before we may pass 
through that gateway, we must establish a Lacanian reading of Cold War discourse. 
Because Lacan’s model is optical, we are able to see into the theoretical gateway. 
However, Lacan’s model is in the main an optical one and as such does not truly render 
reality in three dimensions. Two dimensional images—such as a film—may give the 
impression of space but are not themselves articulated in space. In spite of Lacan’s 
insistence on a topology, we need Jameson’s model of cognitive mapping in order to 
render the apparatus in space. Jameson’s discussion of conspiracy films both opens the 
gateway to the crossroads of Lacanian psychoanalysis and Marxist theory, and at the 
same time closes the gateway to feminism; this chapter will reopen that gate. Before we 
begin articulating the special relationship conspiracy narrative has with theoretical 
discourse, we must first trace a working theory of narrative. This chapter will begin with 
a discussion of Cold War narrative using Lacan’s theory of narrative and art, and then 






 The Cold War concept of deterrence as a global military strategy has at its center 
the maintenance in tension of a consummate drive toward total destruction. Freud’s 
discussion of pleasure and death as being in the realm of drives helps to enunciate the 
perversions of Cold War discourse. We still live with the possibility of nuclear 
destruction. Even though the Cold War ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the nuclear 
weaponry that made the concept of “mutually assured destruction” possible still exists, 
and is in the hands of various countries. Cold War discourse is distinct from the post-
1989 world in part because total annihilation was made specifically, as a matter of policy, 
a central element of the discourse. The nuclear capability on the globe today is roughly 
the same as it was during the Cold War, but we don’t speak of it anxiously as though 
global destruction could happen at any minute. What gave Cold War discourse its real 
impact was the possibility of total annihilation; the idea of total annihilation is still 
possible today, at least in the sense that if all existing nuclear materiel were used in a 
simultaneous detonation the majority of humanity would be destroyed or significantly 
impacted; but it doesn’t frame cultural and political discourse today as it did during the 
Cold War. Cold War rhetoric is plausible enough to create the fear of total annihilation. 
Why, then, were we so anxious about total nuclear destruction then, and are hardly 
concerned about it now?  
In fact, the post-Cold-War discourse of total annihilation has transmogrified into a 




advent of tactical nuclear warheads has generated the military idea of “controlled” 
nuclear attack. In this regard the development of technology not only coincides with but 
also in fact determines political discourse. What is militarily possible (massive nuclear 
detonation—even if not politically likely—or tactical accuracy) and what comes to 
determine the contours of cultural discourse (the totalizing destruction of Cold War 
discourse or the limited tactical destruction of post-Cold-War global terrorism discourse) 
are two entirely different things. Both massive destruction and tactical or “surgical” 
nuclear destruction are presently possible in the 21st century. What determines the 
discursive usage of either is their political significance. It is now politically untenable to 
discuss massive nuclear destruction, and more useful to foreground the tenability of 
surgical nuclear attack. The sheer totalizing power of nuclear weapons is now largely 
forgotten, or better said, unremembered. Indeed, worldwide simultaneous nuclear 
detonation to destroy all of humanity has been noteworthily modified by military analysts 
on CNN. In fact, nuclear weapons technology has come on occasion to be represented in 
film as the only thing that will save the human race. Post-Cold-War films like 
Armageddon (1998) and The Core (2003) present nuclear technology as the only thing 
powerful enough to stop the inevitable destruction of humanity by some natural event. In 
the case of Armageddon, astronauts plant and detonate a nuclear device inside of an 
asteroid that is heading directly for the earth. In The Core, a team of scientists drills into 
the core of the earth to detonate several nuclear devices that will jumpstart the rotation of 
the earth’s core. During the Cold War, however, the idea that nuclear weapons 





 Certainly, the political terrain shifted post-Berlin Wall, and the Communist Soviet 
Union transformed into capitalist Russia, which explains the evaporation of the military 
and political concept of mutually assured destruction. But there’s more to the story than 
that. The concept of mutually assured destruction, on which deterrence is based, is that 
self-imposed limit that appears at the surface to be an ethical paradigm—that total 
destruction of humanity is obviously an outcome to be avoided. But in reality, deterrence 
is the limit we placed on ourselves during the Cold War in order to sustain the painful 
pleasure of the idea of total destruction. While deterrence was rhetorically situated as a 
policy by which the American government responsibly avoided hot confrontation with 
the Soviets, it is in fact that structure which imbued the idea of America with a sense of 
restrained power. Without the limit of deterrence, the idea of total destruction would not 
have been so awfully fascinating. The real and unequivocal limit, one may suppose, is 
death; but enjoyment is, one may also suppose, not possible in the non-existence of death. 
Deterrence as a preemptive device is indeed the pleasure principle of the Cold War. 
Narrative sustained the Cold War in the field of political significance. From 
Truman’s campaign in the late 40s to Reagan’s administration, the Soviet Union was the 
godless communist oppressor and the evil empire that sought to destroy freedom and 
democracy and all humanity. The Soviet Union, however, in reality was hardly a 
significant threat to the United States until around the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 
1962. The U.S.S.R. was devastated after World War II. Militarily, the effects were 
staggering: around 26 million Soviet troops died in the second world conflict. By 
 
contrast, about a half a million American troops died. The Soviets were in no position to 
match the growing military power of the United States immediately after the war. And 
yet, the fear of communism only grew in the United States in the latter 1940s and the 
1950s. The likes of Richard Nixon and Joseph McCarthy made themselves household 
names by propagating the Red Scare.  While it is perhaps possible that the Communist 
ideology could have spread without Soviet government sponsorship (and thus without the 
financial and military support necessary to maintain such subversion), it can hardly be 
said that the United States was under a significant military threat in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s. Nonetheless, in Cold War rhetoric, the Soviet Union was a gigantic nation of 
heretical demons, Communism was taking hold of this country through government 
infiltration, and the cinema industry was propagating pro-Communist ideology—all of 
these notions were propagated by narrative. They are easily told and easily iterable. 
Whether or not these stories are true begs the question, for it is the discursive field of the 
Cold War itself where the analysis begins. 
 Lacan comments in 1959-1960 on the advent of total annihilation: 
I don’t want to indulge in overdramatization. All ages have thought they had 
reached the most extreme point of vision in a confrontation with something 
terminal, some extra-worldly force that threatened the world. But our world and 
society now bring news of the shadow of a certain incredible, absolute weapon 
that is waved in our faces in a way that is indeed worthy of the muses. Don’t 
imagine that the end will occur tomorrow; even in Leibnitz’s time, people 
believed in less specific terms that the end of the world was at hand . . . confront 
that moment when a man or a group of men can act in such a way that the 
question of existence is posed for the whole of the human species, and you will 
then see inside yourself that das Ding is next to the subject (Ethics 104-5). 
 





common to every generation. The death drive is a feature of Western culture, and as such 
the evidence of it is as clear in today’s world as it is in Cold War discourse. What is 
different is the narrative. Whether or not totalizing annihilation is probable does nothing 
to the fact that the narrative of it frightens people. Lacan himself seems awed by it in this 
passage. And yet he knows that the real issue here is not total annihilation but the very 
question of the drive toward death itself. Terrorism is what frightens people in the early 
21st century. Fear, for Lacan, is the mechanism through which we are “purged, purified of 
everything of that order [of tragedy]” (Ethics 247). The narrative with which we frighten 
ourselves will change, but the structural necessity of fear remains. We have no grand 
narrative but only small ones, which emerge only in the conversation as we speak. 
Lacanian psychoanalytic dialogue is a means through which we might approach it. 
 Laura Mulvey makes the point that “Sadism demands a story, depends on making 
something happen, forcing a change in another person, a battle of will and strength, 
victory/defeat, all occurring in a linear time with a beginning and an end” (35). Teresa de 
Lauretis adds to Mulvey’s point that “[Medusa and the Sphinx] are obstacles man 
encounters on the path of life, on his way to manhood, wisdom, and power; they must be 
slain or defeated so that he can go forward to fulfill his destiny—and his story” (de 
Lauretis 110). Lacan points out that “Sade lays out for our benefit the theory that it is 
through crime that man collaborates in the new creations of nature” (Ethics 210). 
Narrative is sadistic; Sadism, as Lacan identifies it, is in part the theory that new histories 
are written through criminal acts. Crime is that thing that reminds us we have the limit of 
the law to exceed. The discursive contour of Cold War deterrence is marked by its 
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function as the law that we may exceed in order to imagine our own destruction. Our 
destruction is unimaginable without it; more importantly, our destruction is not 
sadistically pleasurable without the law of deterrence. Desire arises out of limits; if there 
were no limits there would be nothing to desire. Deterrence is that limit that makes the 
narrative of Cold War destruction pleasurable. 
 One of the reasons we may never have seen the total nuclear destruction of the 
Cold War in films is the impossibility of totality. As Lukács has shown, art is a “relative, 
incomplete image,” and it must “appear like life itself, indeed in a more heightened, 
intense and alive form than in objective reality” (HN 91-92). The problem of totality is a 
formal one, for the form of art, as relative, must somehow represent life in its entirety. 
Frederic Jameson has made this point in The Geopolitical Aesthetic. In his discussion of 
the film All the President’s Men (1976), Jameson notes that “it is the impossible vision of 
totality—here [in the Library of Congress scene in All the President’s Men] recovered in 
the moment in which the possibility of conspiracy confirms the possibility of the very 
unity of the social order itself—that is celebrated in this well-nigh paradisal moment” 
(GA 79). Conspiracy narrative posits the possibility of totality, but it cannot sustain that 
vision.  Totality, and the impossibility of it, implies the epistemological limits of human 
apprehension. We apprehend information successively, taking in only those perceptual 
fields that acquire our attention. In terms of Jameson’s critical category of cognitive 
mapping, we always only apprehend a portion of the total perceptual field so that at any 
given time the space we inhabit is always only partially represented. Film, Jameson 
argues, is made up significantly of the aural and the visual, and these two perceptual 
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fields add up to the illusion of totality. This illusion is what makes conspiracy film 
especially effective, because it promises a vision of the total social and political field. 
However, the representation of totality is always an unrealized promise; Jameson points 
out that the conspiracy film attempts the view of totality, “and yields a brief glimpse of 
the providential, as what organizes history but is unrepresentable within it” (GP 79). 
What Jameson here calls “providential” I call the real. Lacan established the category of 
the real as that which it is impossible to symbolize or mediate in any way. The conspiracy 
film represents an attempt to symbolize the real—it is the ultimate fantasy.  
 Jameson shows us that the conspiracy film maps out postmodern space and time 
by manifesting the shifting grounds of the social and political fields underneath the 
narrative characters’ feet. For Jameson, the paradigm is the film Videodrome (1983), 
where the lead character’s status shifts from detective to victim to murderer based on the 
spatial and temporal circumstances that the diegesis sets up. The totality of conspiracy is 
thus mapped at least partially in the filmic universe. Based on Richard Condon’s 1959 
novel of the same name, John Frankenheimer’s 1962 film The Manchurian Candidate 
maps the postmodern landscape in much the same way, by articulating conspiracy and 
counterconspiracy. The film tells the story of Sergeant Raymond Shaw (Laurence 
Harvey), a veteran of the Korean War. While a prisoner of war in Manchuria, Shaw is 
made the subject of a mind-control experiment; upon his return stateside, Shaw has no 
recollection of his treatment in Manchuria nor is he aware that he is programmed to be a 
dangerous assassin for the Communists. Shaw lives a fairly ordinary if uninspired life 
when he has control of his own faculties. However, when he sees the Queen of Diamonds 
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from an ordinary deck of playing cards he slips into a trance of unconscious origin. After 
this trigger, Shaw acts on the very next suggestion he hears, from whatever source. Shaw, 
then, is an American war hero unwittingly under the control of the Communist menace. 
He represents the perfect subterfuge—a trusted American icon that secretly carries out on 
American soil under perfect cover the will of a Communist government. Shaw’s mother, 
Mrs. Iselin (Angela Lansbury), is married to John Iselin, a McCarthy-like character 
whose career is dedicated to accusing American officials of being Communist. While, 
unlike Raymond, he has control of his faculties, John is nonetheless largely under the 
influence of Mrs. Iselin, who professes a rabid anti-Communism. In truth, Mrs. Iselin is a 
secret Communist operative who is in charge of handling her son Raymond and directing 
his missions. Under the cover of her husband’s anti-Communist program in the U.S. 
senate, Mrs. Iselin works to undermine the American government from the inside. Her 
ultimate goal is to secure the presidency for her husband by whatever means necessary in 
order to bring the United States under the control of the Communists. Major Bennett 
Marco (Frank Sinatra), who served with Raymond in Korea and who was also a subject 
of the Manchurian mind control experiments, is back stateside and plagued with 
disturbing dreams about his experience in Manchuria. Marco was evidently not selected 
by the Communists to be an agent. Because of his troubling dreams, Marco becomes 
convinced that something is fishy about Raymond Shaw. Once the Army begins to take 
Marco’s claims of foul play in Manchuria seriously, he is appointed intelligence officer in 
charge of decoding the mystery of Raymond Shaw’s unconscious. 
Marco becomes, then, a reader, both of Raymond Shaw and of himself. He 
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functions in the film as both analyst and analysand because he knows that he is both 
responsible for unlocking Raymond’s unconscious and implicated in the effects of 
Raymond’s unconscious. When Marco finds out Thomas and Jocie Jordan have been 
killed, he holds up a newspaper with the headline of the incident, which does not indicate 
a suspect, and says to Rosie, “Raymond Shaw shot and killed his wife early this 
morning.” Rosie says that she doesn’t see that fact in the headline, but Marco has to read 
past the headline–he has to analyze the paper for its meaning effect, and as analyst he 
makes an accurate reading. But he also has to analyze himself simultaneously in the 
process. By letting Raymond go on his honeymoon instead of holding him in custody, 
Marco releases his hold, his control. He tells Rosie, “It wasn’t really Raymond that did it. 
In a way it was me” (MC ch. 30). He has to analyze himself as a collaborator in the 
meaning effects of the Queen of Diamonds. Marco knows he is stupid. The Queen of 
Diamonds is the film’s representation of the real, that effort to symbolize the 
unrepresentable source of the conspiracy. In the face of the Queen of Diamonds signifier, 
Marco recognizes his own stupidity, his own inability to assimilate its significance. 
 For Lacan, stupidity is the place where analytic discourse begins, the place where 
the analysand says things that do not make sense: “It’s stupidity because I myself 
obviously collaborate in it” (Encore 12). Marco uses a forced deck to reappropriate the 
meaning effect of the Queen of Diamonds for Raymond. When Marco realizes Raymond 
is not going to call him to tell him the plot of the conspiracy (his mother’s desire to kill 
the presidential candidate), Marco questions himself for thinking he could accomplish 
this goal. He doesn’t yet know that Raymond has reappropriated the signifier for himself. 
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While waiting for Raymond’s call Marco exclaims, “Okay, Milt, I blew it. I blew it! My 
magic is better than your magic. I shoulda known better. Intelligence officer. Stupidity 
officer is better! Pentagon ever wants to open up a stupidity division they know who they 
can get to lead it. Ya know, Raymond was theirs, he is theirs and he’ll always be theirs” 
(MC ch. 33). It is as Lacan says: “My sole presence–at least I dare believe it–my sole 
presence in my discourse, my sole presence is my stupidity” (Encore 12). 
 The spatiotemporal universe of conspiracy shifts and orbits around Marco. First, 
in Manchuria, Marco is a subject in Communist mind-control experiments, a fact about 
which he is unaware for the first half of the film. As he begins to attain the ability to read 
his and his unit mates’ dreams, he grasps the reality of the Communist conspiracy to 
develop assassins. It then becomes his task to crack the code of Raymond Shaw’s 
unconscious in order to understand the Communists’ intentions. In the spatiotemporal 
universe of the film, then, the Communism of Manchuria is relocated physically—and 
physiologically—onto American soil and inside American bodies. Simultaneously and 
diametrically, John and Mrs. Iselin as quintessential American icons work to subvert the 
democratic process of American presidential elections by murdering the presidential 
nominee for which John is serving as vice-presidential hopeful. Marco is unaware until 
the very end of the film that the Communist conspiracy has resided all along inexorably 
in Raymond’s mother, Ellie Iselin. And yet, even while Marco gives a eulogy for 
Raymond Shaw at the end of the film that expresses the impossibility of Raymond’s 
position as an American soldier and hero, Marco represents that ability of the 
psychoanalyst to glimpse, if only temporarily, the unrepresentable real. 
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 The Manchurian Candidate, released November 10, 1962 in America, arises out 
of a complicated history of American anxiety over Communism, geopolitics, and 
domestic political subversion. It does not exploit fear of total nuclear annihilation, but it 
does articulate fears of Communist intrigue and the ever-shifting terrain of Cold War 
politics. McCarthyism raged in America in the decade prior to the release of the film; the 
film industry felt the effects of the Red Scare acutely during HUAC hearings, with 
blacklistings ending careers and ruining lives. One of the executive producers of The 
Manchurian Candidate, Howard Koch, had himself been blacklisted in the early 1950s. 
McCarthyism was symptomatic of a very real fear that somehow the evil of Communism 
could infect unseen the American infrastructure and debilitate it. Eisenhower’s agencies, 
the CIA and the FBI, were the unseen antibiotic, but the fact that the cure itself could not 
be seen caused at least a modicum of uncertainty–the CIA and the FBI were no D-Day 
Normandy invasion. 
 So how can a film like The Manchurian Candidate arise out of these conditions? 
Although McCarthyism was over by 1962, the Cold War was in full swing. Manchurian 
suggests not only a subversive Communist element in America. It also suggests that the 
McCarthy-like figure, Johnny Iselin, was influenced by, if not himself, a Communist. To 
suggest in a work of art that a central American political figure is subversive, during the 
historical peak of the Cold War, seems a radical, even if liberal, idea. And yet, Lacan sees 
this radicalism as perfectly part of the structure of art: “The relation of the artist to the 
time in which he appears is always a contradictory one. It is against the current, in 
opposition to reigning norms–including, for example, political norms, or indeed, systems 
 
 87
of thought–that art attempts to operate its miracle once more” (Ethics 142). So, in the 
same stroke that film attempts to imitate its object it also attempts to subvert it; imitation 
is utilitarian in that it is part of the apparatus of film/art, but it is not film’s aim or end. 
This is film’s jouissance: “[G]iven the equivocation between faillir and falloir, the 
jouissance that should be must be translated as the jouissance that shouldn’t be/never 
fails” (Encore 59). Lacan is referring to the linguistic intersection of the verbs faillir and 
falloir, which mean, respectively, “to fail” and “must”, in the third person singular 
present tense. They both conjugate to faut, which also sounds like faux–false, forged. 
This conjugation of the two verbs is a pivot point in the articulation of jouissance: it must 
be and it must fail and it resonates as false. Film should not be imitation but it never fails 
to be imitation. The same may be said of the other side: film should not be subversion but 
it never fails to be subversion. Film must not, but it never fails.  
 Film in this sense has a double vision of a sort. Lacan articulates this double 
vision in art as anamorphosis. Generally defined, anamorphosis is “any kind of 
construction that is made in such a way that by means of an optical transposition a certain 
form that wasn’t visible at first sight transforms itself into a readable image. The pleasure 
is found in seeing its emergence from an indecipherable form” (Ethics 135). He refers 
specifically to the artistic movement at the beginning of the seventeenth century, using 
Holbein’s Ambassadors as an example, where the skull emerges in the painting only as 
one is leaving the room (Ethics 160). For Lacan, what is interesting about anamorphosis 
in art is precisely that from within the act of art as representative, art deploys the illusory 
in a move to encircle the Thing. Film works in precisely the same way; in some ways it 
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approaches the real even more closely than art simply because the medium looks so much 
like the real, in spite of the dimensional shift from three- to two-dimensions. When film 
subverts, does what it shouldn’t do, it deploys the illusory to encircle the Thing. The trick 
to reading film, it seems, is to hold the plane of the image at such a distance from one’s 
vision so as to see the readable patterns emerge from the unreadable. Film is an optical 
puzzle. The Manchurian Candidate articulates, by showing us the way the conspiratorial 
world shifts around Marco, the manner in which politics occur in a spatiotemporal 
universe. Manchurian attempts to show both a liberal and conservative idea, namely that 
Communists are taking over American government. Manchurian enunciates the shifting 
terrains, in other words, of the Cold War liberal consensus. 
At the Gateway of Conspiracy Theory 
 Lacan theorizes that mapped location called the cognitive, and articulates the way 
in which film approaches the unsymbolizable real. Lacan wants to articulate a topological 
model rather than an optical one, and “replaces optical images with topological figures 
which are intended to prevent imaginary capture . . . Nevertheless, as Freud said of his 
own optical models, ‘we need the assistance of provisional ideas’” (Evans 130). 
Jameson’s model more adequately explains the topology of the social and political fields 
with which film is contiguous, thus amplifying Lacanian politics in the service of a useful 
film theory. Jameson’s model of cognitive mapping gives filmic diegesis the three-
dimensionality that is lost in the transfer from reality to celluloid. He places the 
cognitive—that is, the perceiving human—onto the map of the filmic experience.  
Examining conspiracy film foregrounds the need for this topology, and only by looking at 
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conspiracy film may we render this theoretical problematic into an apprehensible idea. 
Jameson brings us to the theoretical gateway of the conspiracy film. 
 In The Manchurian Candidate, as in Conspiracy Theory, ideologies of gender 
actually work with the structure of the conspiracy narrative to coordinate an image of 
masculinity that is threatened and then reconstituted. Jameson fails to map adequately the 
way in which gender is woven into the social and political fields. Put simply, the 
theoretical problem is whether to privilege capital or gender as the organizing category of 
the social and political fields. Feminists interested in socialism almost immediately 
perceived the seeming incommensurability of Marxist theory and feminism. Not least is 
the historical fact of the sexism in the resistance movements of the 60s and 70s. Situating 
the position of women in the day-to-day efforts of revolution amounted to secretarial 
work and coffeemaking (Sargent xiii-xviii). And while nearly 40 years have lapsed since 
the 60s revolution, Marxists still have a tendency to marginalize the category of gender in 
their theoretical work. Jameson, as late as 1995, still emphasizes capital as the organizing 
category of postmodern society. In his review of a scene in Videodrome “in which males 
are feminized by the insertion of organic cassettes (if not revolvers) into a newly opened 
dripping slot below the breast bone,” Jameson observes that “[c]orporeal revulsion of this 
kind probably has the primary function of expressing fears about activity and passivity in 
the complexities of late capitalism, and is only secondarily invested with the level of 
gender itself, which however knows a separate or semi-autonomous figuration elsewhere 
in the plot [in the traditional feminine triad of the bad mother, the insatiable wife, and the 
vestal virgin]” (GA 30-31, my emphasis). Gender is on the second tier for Jameson; and 
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while I am uncertain what it means exactly to be “semi-autonomous,” I assume that 
gender figures more prominently for Jameson in areas of the film where gender is more 
overtly addressed. The “semi-autonomy” of gender seems to mean that gender is a 
contingency in Jameson’s theoretical paradigm. Jameson rightly identifies late capitalist 
fears about activity and passivity in the bodily insertion scene; but it is hard for me to see 
how Jameson can give gender a secondary place in the genesis of these fears. 
 The theoretical problematic involved in any discussion of Marxism and feminism 
must necessarily include an examination of how we view critical categories. Socialist 
feminists responded to the trivialization of gender in Marxist theory by calling for a 
paradigm that “sees women first”. In 1983, Mia Campioni and Elizabeth Grosz pointed 
out that “socialist feminism remains locked in a paradox as a feminist position unless it 
can somehow develop a radically woman-centred version of ‘socialism’ which entails 
‘seeing women first’, conceptualizing a space which allows women to be considered 
autonomous shapers and creators of meaning” (367). This position, while addressing the 
failure of Marxist theory to register sexism, essentially inverts the opposition that has 
been identified by critics between Marxism and feminism. The critical conversation about 
the “unhappy marriage” fell early on, and still dwells in, the mire of phallogocentric 
thinking. bell hooks as early as 1984 perceived the fallacy of this theoretical problem and 
expressed her disappointment in socialism and feminism for not addressing it: “Much 
socialist-feminist writing has focused on a feminist critique of socialism rather than on 
the imagining of a liberatory radical theory of socialism that would more adequately 
address interlocking systems of domination like sexism, racism, class oppression, 
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imperialism, and so on” (28). hooks sees the radical potential of a socialist-feminist 
project; she understands that being feminist and being Marxist are not mutually exclusive 
propositions. And while the critical community has taken much of French feminist theory 
and assumed it as fairly unproblematically true, the critical work in Marxism and 
feminism still tends toward prioritizing one theoretical paradigm over the other. 
 hooks calls for an address of “interlocking systems of domination” that would 
leave behind discussions of “who/what comes first.” The challenge is to articulate clearly 
how those systems of domination interlock. Marxist feminists have addressed a number 
of ways in which capitalism and sexism intersect: the household as a site for gendered 
capitalist domination; the commodification of women’s bodies; the value of women’s 
labor in the marketplace.  It is, however, still easy to imagine structural analyses that 
abandon either a Marxist or a feminist critique in favor of the other. Jameson’s excellent 
analysis of conspiracy film is just one example. The hegemony of capitalism is not prior 
to the hegemony of sexist domination. Discussions about whether capital or gender 
historically came first fail to render the way in which gender and other forms of 
oppression are imbricated inextricably in the system of capital. One way to clarify a 
theory of hegemony that would articulate how these systems interlock is to turn to a 
theory of subjectivity. The subject that in Jameson’s paradigm expresses late capitalist 
fears of activity and passivity is the same subject of Lacan’s psychosexual structure.  
Where Lacan’s theory reaches for a topology on which the postmodern subject may 
appear, Jameson renders it in three dimensions more fully; and when Jameson’s critique 
abandons gender, Lacan registers gender as inescapably a part of the human 
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psychosexual structure. And as Jameson shows, the conspiracy film is the site where we 
may bring these interstices of the postmodern subject into view.  Conspiracy theories 
bring into the brightly lit foreground the problem of agency and subjectivity in 
postmodern culture; agency and subjectivity is the site of the capitalist paradigm as well 
as the problem of gender discrimination. 
 Jameson’s observation of the dichotomy of activity and passivity in late capitalist 
culture is indeed accurate. He argues that the capitalist subject suffers anxiety as the 
result of being made passive in a consumer culture. What Jameson’ analysis fails, 
however, to perceive is that conspiracy culture is an expression of fears about the 
feminization of the American white male. The insertion of a technological device into the 
chest cavity of a white man who finds himself at the crossroads of a conspiracy and 
counter-conspiracy highlights the way in which anxiety over agency, which Timothy 
Melley calls agency panic, weaves inexorably with fears of demasculinization. Fear of 
demasculinization is not incidental, or “secondary” as Jameson identifies the status of 
gender, to the conspiracy narrative but rather constructive of it. Repeatedly, gender 
figures not only prominently but also preeminently in conspiracy narratives of post-
World War II America. In the film Conspiracy Theory, Jerry’s diagnosis as hysterical, as 
I showed in Chapter 1, is resolved by the reenactment of the Oedipal story. Fears of the 
status of male subjectivity are also well represented in The X Files, as I will show in 
Chapter 5, even as the series works to complicate the issue of gender. 
 The principle gender ideology at work in The Manchurian Candidate is the 
ideology of motherhood. The Communist conspiracy to gain control of the minds of U.S. 
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soldiers is realized on American soil in the form of Ellie Iselin, Raymond Shaw’s mother. 
In de Lauretis’ model, she is the Medusa, the obstacle “man encounters on the path of 
life” that he must overcome in order to “fulfill his destiny—and his story” (110, see 
above).The Communists choose her as an operative presumably because of her proximity 
to Washington and her potential for ending up in the White House as First Lady. It is 
made fairly clear that Johnny Iselin’s McCarthy-like project to accuse vast numbers of 
politicians and government officials of being Communist is engineered by Ellie in order 
to accelerate Iselin’s path to the White House. Ellie’s plan to assume control of the 
United States takes two paths that are to converge at the White House: gain the vice 
presidential nomination for Johnny Iselin, and at the same time direct her mind-controlled 
son, Raymond Shaw, to kill the presidential nominee so that Johnny may assume the 
position. All of this is done under cover of the patriotic Americanism of the Red Scare. 
The vectors of conspiracy and counter-conspiracy intersect entirely at the site of the 
woman’s, and specifically the American mother’s, body.  
As both Michael Rogin and Robert Corber have shown, “momism” offers a clear 
picture of the way in which ideologies of gender and Cold War politics intersect. Women 
participated actively in the labor effort during World War II; when American troops 
returned home, women were expected to return to the space of domesticity. Promises to 
women of independence and personal productivity were rescinded in the interest of 
prevailing gendered capitalist ideology. In the 1950s women were growing restless and 
discontented; as a response to that, motherhood became a glorified occupation, in order to 
give women the sense of a privileged position in culture. And yet, at the same time, 
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“many Americans resented the glorification of motherhood because it supposedly gave 
women too much power over the domestic sphere. For example, Philip Wylie, who 
coined the term momism in his bestselling book Generation of Vipers (1942), argued that 
American society was rapidly becoming a matriarchy in which domineering and overly 
protective mothers disrupted the Oedipal structure of the middle class nuclear family by 
smothering their sons with ‘unnatural’ affection” (Corber 197).  
The domineering mom and the subversive Communist become one and the same 
in The Manchurian Candidate. The Oedipal drama in The Manchurian Candidate is 
indeed disrupted. Johnny Iselin is Raymond Shaw’s stepfather, who functions in much 
the way Claudius does in Hamlet, as a sort of substitute for the father. However, Johnny 
Iselin is essentially directed by his wife. The absence of Raymond’s real father as well as 
Johnny Iselin’s passivity serves better to highlight his mother as uncastrated. The 
ideology of the film is that the uncastrated mother is un-American, and indeed functions 
as a part of the conspiracy to overthrow the American government. Marco functions as 
the stable subject to which a totality of understanding will be attributed at the end of the 
film. Marco’s stupidity in the face of the signifier is only a temporary threat: his position 
as the stable masculine subject is reasserted when he gives the “final” words on Raymond 
Shaw’s life in the eulogy. He is military officer and priest in this scene, both powerful 
symbols and figures of patriarchal culture. In addition, he is recently married to Rosie, 
and so presumably will figure in his newly formed family as the only stable father figure 
the film ever represents. Further, Sinatra’s off-screen persona of hypermasculinity works 
in the final scenes of Manchurian to resolve the Oedipal drama. Jameson’s paradigm fails 
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to map the way in which ideologies of gender both inform and instruct cultural ideas of 
conspiracy. Taken together, Lacan’s optical model and Jameson’s model of cognitive 
mapping are a powerful theory of film. Both models manifest the filmic phenomenon in 
space and time. 
Like The Manchurian Candidate, Fail Safe (1964) is an excellent example of Cold 
War narrative, and it too imbricates ideologies of gender with Cold War discourse. The 
film is less about conspiracy, however, and more about the results of nuclear detonation. 
Fail Safe opens with a dream sequence that Brigadier General Warren Black (Dan 
O’Herlihy) experiences in New York at 5:30 in the morning. In it, he watches passively a 
traditional bullfight, which is post-Hemingway a reified symbol of masculinity. The 
matador stabs the bull with several swords. Blackie (General Black’s nickname) closes 
his eyes as the bull collapses, closes his eyes, and dies. Blackie wakes up drenched in 
sweat, and he tells his wife, “I had the dream again. Always ends at the same place. . 
.Some time I’m going to see that matador, find out who he is. When I do, that’s it! That’s 
the end of me.” It is not until the end of the film that Blackie discovers that he, indeed, is 
the matador. At the end of the film, after he has deployed the nuclear weapons which 
destroy New York, he takes the military-issue suicide injection and as he dies says, “The 
matador. . . the matador . . . the matador . . . is me!” In the end, Blackie must be the one 
who raises his hand in sacrifice—he must take Abraham’s position in the narrative, 
another powerful patriarchal symbol—but unlike Abraham, Blackie does actually drop 
his hand in murder. 
 The film immediately cuts to a dinner party scene with Professor Groeteschele 
 
(Walter Matthau) that is taking place at the same time in Washington D.C.—5:30 in the 
morning. Dr. Groeteschele has been holding forth most of the night about his thoughts on 
policy. The scene opens with him and another dinner guest arguing about “acceptable 
losses” in a nuclear confrontation. The dinner guest, Mr. Foster, invokes the argument 
that there is no winner in total annihilation, but Dr. Groeteschele maintains tenaciously 
that the U.S. will have to use nuclear weapons—there is no escaping that fact. For Dr. 
Groeteschele, it is possible ensure that nuclear destruction is deployed in such a way that 
America wins. Dr. Groeteschele seems to understand the inevitability of the death drive. 
His strategy is to try to defeat it, or to anticipate it so that his side wins. He also knows 
that there is no end—cold war narrative is designed to tell the story of the end. But Dr. 
Groeteschele points quite clearly to the fact that nuclear confrontation does not 
necessitate the end of the story. In fact it is precisely that story that he knows will go on 
over which he wants to ensure America has control. In an exchange with Mr. Foster 
Groeteschele elucidates his point about (hi)story: 
Mr. Foster: War isn’t what it used to be. 
Groeteschele: It’s still the resolution of economic and political conflict. 
Mr. Foster: Oh, what kind of resolution with a hundred million dead? 
Groeteschele: It doesn’t have to be a hundred million. 
Mr. Foster: Even sixty! 
Groeteschele: Same as a thousand years ago, sir. When you also had wars that 
wiped out whole peoples. The point is still who wins and who loses, the survival 
of a culture. 
Mr. Foster: A culture! With most of its people dead, the rest dying, the food 
poisoned, the air unfit to breathe? You call that a culture? 
Groeteschele: Yes, I do, Mr. Foster. I am not a poet. I am a political scientist, who 
would rather have an American culture survive than a Russian one. 
 
It is quite clear that Dr. Groeteschele does not assume total annihilation in the nuclear 
confrontation. In fact, he quite plainly assumes the continuation of a culture, albeit a 
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rewritten culture that is decidely in the favor of his own political inclinations. His view here 
is not entirely untenable, in a Lacanian analysis—for Lacan, there is no end. In this scene, 
Mr. Foster is invoking the narrative of the Cold War scenario in order to make his point for 
nuclear disarmament. Dr. Groeteschele, on the other hand, assumes quite completely the 
drive toward destruction. He says as much later in the car with Elsa Wolf. He wants only to 
control the narrative in the aftermath. It is important to point out that this scene foregrounds 
the fact that Mr. Foster is invoking a narrative that does something: it scares people. 
 In this film, rather than the ideology of motherhood, the ideology of the whore is taken up 
and used as a political symbol for the desire for death. Immediately following the exchange 
with Mr. Foster, who throws up his hands and walks away, the film cuts to a long shot of Dr. 
Groeteschele in the background and the posterior profile of a woman in the foreground. The 
scene is framed fully on the left with her image. She is clearly in a seductive posture. Her 
image frames the scene in which Dr. Groeteschele discusses who would survive nuclear 
deployment. As he ponders, the camera cuts to a medium frontal shot of the woman, who is 
quite clearly feeling erotic about Dr. Groeteschele. After a pause, he says: 
I would predict . . . convicts and file clerks. [As someone laughs, Dr. Groeteschele 
shoots the laugher a serious look to indicate there is nothing funny. The laugher 
abruptly stops.] The worst convicts. Those deep down in solitary confinement. 
And the most ordinary file clerks. Probably for large insurance companies. 
Because they would be in fireproof rooms, protected by tons of the best insulator 
in the world—paper. Then imagine what will happen. 
             
The woman whose body frames the scene is eroticizing the topic. And one would expect Dr. 





is male) and the file clerks (assumed to be female) will procreate and carry on the species. 
But he does not, and it is plainly in contrast with the woman’s eroticization of it. Dr. 
Groeteschele continues: 
A small group of vicious criminals will fight the army of file clerks for the 
remaining means of life. The convicts will know violence. The file clerks will 
know organization. Who do you think will win? [He looks around at the silent and 
serious dinner guests, then laughs.] It’s all hypothesis, of course, but fun to play 
around with.  
 
Groeteschele does not eroticize the post-apocalypse narrative at all. In fact, he sets up the 
scenario as a scene of struggle and conflict. He does not foreground a narrative where 
sexuality is reduced to a matter of procreation, absent of pleasure. He does foreground, 
though, a world where need prevails. Pleasure just simply doesn’t figure into it. In fact, 
Groeteschele does not make the biological distinction between sexes. The only distinguishing 
feature of these two groups is their unique situation of survival. Jacqueline Rose points out 
that “when Lacan himself did refer to biology, it was in order to remind us of the paradox 
inherent in reproduction itself, which, as Freud pointed out, represents a victory of the 
species over the individual. The ‘fact’ of sexed reproduction marks the subject as ‘subject to’ 
death” (35).  For Lacan, the sexual drive “determines the limits within which we experience 
our sexual life. If there is no straightforward biological sequence and no satisfaction of the 
drive, then the idea of a complete and assured sexual identity belongs in the realm of fantasy” 
(Rose 35). Groeteschele neither identifies the biological sexes of the two groups nor does he 
assume there is a straightforward biological sequence. In fact, the file clerks form in his 
 
scenario an army with the advantage of organizational skill. In any event, he laughs at the 
place his narrative has taken the guests—he does take pleasure in “playing around with” 
them. The subsequent scene bears out Dr. Groeteschele’s relation to pleasure. 
 The party breaks up, and as Dr. Groeteschele approaches his convertible, he finds the 
seductive woman from the dinner party sitting in the passenger seat of his car. She tells him 
her name is Elsa Wolf and that she would like him to take her home. Groeteschele is 
skeptical, but gets in the car and says, “You’ll have to give me directions.” She replies, “Just 
stay on this road.” She does not give him a specific address or a specific location toward 
which to travel. It is clear that she wants to go for a drive with Groeteschele. For his part, 
Groeteschele is quite practical about the matter, as he is already aware of the end result and 
not interested in ends, but rather renewals. During this directionless drive, Wolf says, “You 
make death an entertainment. Something that can be played in a living room,” to which 
Groeteschele replies, “As good a place as any.” At this, Wolf gives a direction, toward 
jouissance: “No. No, there’s an even better place. Turn there.” She desires the power of 
nuclear destruction, of ending it all, and her desire is directed toward Groeteschele. When she 
tells him to turn, she is turning him toward the field of sexual desire, which is a remove from 
her desire for death. Groeteschele is, for Wolf, objet a. He turns onto a quiet country road 
and stops in the middle of a gently wooded area. He steps on the emergency brake, cuts the 
engine, and turns to her and says, “This where you live?” As she looks down and reaches for 
his crotch, Groeteschele slaps her hard across the face and says menacingly, “I’m not your 
kind.” Groeteschele does not sublimate the drive toward death. He is not the “kind” that 
occupies the space where death and sexual desire intersect. He is interested only in who wins 
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and who loses and in the culture that will persist after destruction has occurred. 
 But before Wolf reaches for her objet a, Groeteschele’s penis which constitutes her desire for 
the Real, Groeteschele analyzes Wolf’s psychosexual order: 
I am the joker. I make death into a game for people like you to get excited about. I 
watched you tonight. You’d love making it possible, wouldn’t you? You’d love 
pressing that button. What a thrill that would be. Knowing you’d have to die, to 
have the power to take everyone else with you, a mob of them, their plans [Wolf 
begins to breathe heavily as Groeteschele says this], their little hopes. Born to be 
murdered, turning away from it, closing their eyes to it. And you could be the one 
to make it true. Do it to them [Her finger moves in and out of the opening 
between Groeteschele’s index finger and thumb]. But you’re afraid, so you look 
for the thrill someplace else. And who better than a man who isn’t afraid? 
 
Groeteschele is lucidly calling attention to Wolf’s displacement of desire onto himself. Even 
his words are highly eroticized for Wolf. It is in fact his language that arouses her to take his 
handkerchief out of his breast pocket and wipe her lipstick on it—it also looks as though she 
is breathing (her life) into it as well.  
 Although Wolf is set up here as the intersection of desire and death, Groeteschele, too, is 
implicated in this intersection. He permits this seduction so that he can lure her into the 
ultimate prohibition. He is seducer, as well, but he seduces her into the limit of the Law, 
which he enacts by slapping her hard and violently across the face. He freely submits to take 
the drive with her, to dare to go to “the even better place” with her, if only so he can engage 
the prohibition. His desire is to de-eroticize the drive toward death, to position himself as the 
rational political scientist intent only on making the absolute best of nuclear annihilation—to 
ensure that America and its way of life comes out on top. He is positioning himself here as 
the master of culture, the master of the drive toward death that he understands in advance. 




the death drive from the field of pleasure. He takes his pleasure in rationality, in 
understanding in advance, and indeed playing with people (at the dinner party) as he 
enunciates the scenario he himself knows to be bleak. Thus, Elsa Wolf’s name—there are 
only two choices in jouissance: either Groeteschele, or else a wolf. 
 This narrative of desire is one “small narrative” that is told in Fail Safe, but there is 
another powerful narrative that is invoked as the President (Henry Fonda) is negotiating the 
terms of this disaster with the Premier of the Soviet Union. The narrative of Abraham at 
Moriah is invoked in this film as a way of making some sense out of the terms of the 
negotiation. Once it becomes clear that the Soviet Union will not be able to get all six of the 
American Vindicator jets, which are carrying nuclear bombs toward Moscow, the President 
begins making arrangements. He is arranging it in advance that if the Vindicator gets through 
to Moscow, General Black will be in position to drop an equivalent amount of nuclear 
tonnage on New York as a sacrificial lamb for the Moscow bombing. His plans are not clear 
during the negotiations—this is left out in order to build suspense. All the same, he is making 
plans to exact the eye of his own country should the eye of Moscow be plucked. But instead 
of quoting this passage of the Bible, which refers to the ethical paradigm of an eye for an eye, 
he calls for General Black in the War Room and says: “Blackie? Remember your Old 
Testament? . . . Remember the story of the sacrifice of Abraham, old what’s-his-name used 
to use it in chapel at least twice a year.” General Black replies, “I remember, sir.” The 
President continues: “Keep it in mind the next few hours. Blackie, I need your help. Get out 
to Andrews Field right away. Orders will be waiting for you there. Blackie, are Catherine and 
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the kids in New York?” Blackie replies quizzically that his wife and children are indeed in 
New York, to which the President replies, “I may be asking a great deal of you.” 
 Why, then, if the spirit of the act is actually from Leviticus 24:13-24, which enunciates 
God’s order to give an eye for an eye, does the President refer to Genesis 22:1-18, God’s call 
to Abraham to sacrifice his son? The Leviticus passage suggests that there is an equivalent 
exchange—“fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth; as he has disfigured a man, he 
shall be disfigured. He who kills a beast shall make it good; and he who kills a man shall be 
put to death” (Oxford 153). This story suggests there is no excess in the exchange. But the 
annotations for this passage from Genesis refer back to Exodus 21:22-25, where the eye-for-
eye law is also invoked fairly seamlessly. In Exodus 21:26-36, however, the system of 
exchange is not closed: “When a man strikes the eye of his slave, male or female, and 
destroys it, he shall let the slave go free for the eye’s sake” (Oxford 95). In other words, the 
slave gains his/her freedom for an eye. The eye does not translate into an exact rendering of 
another eye for itself—something else is gained or lost. Later, intention is also accounted for: 
“When an ox gores a man or a woman to death, the ox shall be stoned, and its flesh shall not 
be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be clear. But if the ox has been accustomed to gore in 
the past, and its owner has been warned but has not kept it in, and it kills a man or a woman, 
the ox shall be stoned, and its owner also shall be put to death” (Oxford 95). Things outside 
the economy of the exchange of the eye-for-eye law come into play in Exodus. Derrida calls 
this excess the “mechanism of debt” in Christianity (Gift 114). There is a fundamental 
incommensurability in any ethics of obligation. 
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 It is the similar with the story of Abraham and Isaac at Moriah. God asks Abraham to 
give his only son in order to prove his love for God. There is an incommensurability in the 
exchange. But there is a fundamental difference between the eye-for-eye law, even in its 
incommensurable formulations, and Abraham’s sacrifice. As Derrida calls it, it is a gift of 
death. Abraham does not exchange anything with God. It is a gift of love, which is also a gift 
of death. What is essential to Abraham’s gift is that he keep it a secret. He cannot tell his 
family, and he is wholly other from God since God must exact this request in order to know 
Abraham’s mind. “Abraham is the other, and another, God as the other, as wholly other. 
Abraham himself is in secret, cut off both from man and from God” (Gift 79). When Isaac 
asks him from where will the sacrificial lamb come, Abraham’s answer is a non-answer, both 
the truth and an evasion—God will provide. Derrida notes, “This is a strange responsibility 
that consists neither of responding nor of not responding. Is one responsible for what one 
says in an unintelligible language, in the language of the other” (Gift 74)? The President’s 
negotiation with the Soviet Premier is not a gift; it is in the idiom of the eye for an eye law. 
The President’s hand is raised over New York, but it will only fall if Moscow is destroyed. 
The President’s act is not an act of ultimate faith. So why does he invoke the Abraham story 
instead of the eye-for-eye law?  
 First, it is because, at the surface, Abraham’s story looks like a story of sacrifice. But in 
fact, the story of Abraham is not at all about sacrifice. Abraham is in the Real—caught 
incommensurably between man and God in a place from which he cannot speak, or rather, 
where he can only speak the most undecidable of signifiers. What Derrida calls Abraham’s 
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secret is Lacan’s language of the Other. The President invokes the story of the Father of 
Judaism, the signifier of the Law of the Father, in order to make sense of the radical situation 
at hand, even as it does not apply; the President is engaging an ethics of obligation under the 
rubric of a story which really about a gift: Abraham’s gift of death to God. This is the 
President’s lie: “Things are such that this man [someone like Abraham] would surely be 
condemned by any civilized society. On the other hand, the smooth functioning of a society, 
the monotonous complacency of its discourses on morality, politics, and the law, and the 
exercise of its rights . . . are in no way impaired by the fact that . . . because of the 
mechanisms of external debt and other similar inequities, that same ‘society’ puts to death or 
allows to die of hunger and disease tens of millions of children . . . Not only is it true that 
such a society participates in this incalculable sacrifice, it actually organizes it” (Gift 86). 
The President invokes that grand narrative, the master signifier, of Abraham as the ordering 
principle of what are essentially the workings of a capitalist regime. Five million New 
Yorkers must die because it is the right thing to do—much the same as Abraham was right to 
raise his hand to Isaac. What gets lost in this invocation is this: Abraham raised his hand to 
Isaac out of love—love for God—not out of obligation. For Lacan, obligation is the limit of 
the Law. 
  Second, the Abraham narrative is above all a narrative of the Father. The discursive structure 
of the eye-for-an-eye paradigm does not register the law of the father but rather the law of 
capital exchange. While the negotiation scene is in fact constructed as barter, a gentlemen’s 
agreement, it is discursively formulated to appear as a narrative of “fatherly love.” The 
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president must not function as a capitalist subject but instead as a paternalized figure who is 
prepared to and indeed does make the ultimate sacrifice. The U.S./Soviet negotiations are a 
conversation between fathers. The discourse of the Law of the Father must eclipse the law of 
capitalist exchange. And while no women figure significantly in the U.S./Soviet negotiations 
scene (Blackie’s family, who are to perish in New York when the president gives the order to 
drop a nuclear bomb, are never even seen after the opening sequence of the film), the 
discursive work is done. Gender ideology serves to mask the ethics of capital.  
Conclusion 
 It is impossible to say which came first—gender difference or the difference inherent in a 
system of exchange. Such a project is purely archaeological; but even more importantly it is 
unnecessary for understanding the ways in which gender and capitalism work discursively 
both in culture and in theoretical discourse. Conspiracy culture is situated as one possible 
intersection for understanding the theoretical problematic of subjectivity, precisely because 
conspiracy culture arises out of the condition of the instability of the poststructural subject. 
The subject of conspiracy culture is synecdochal for the post-war subject in principally two 
ways: the condition of the conspiracy theorist’s knowledge is the same as that of the 
Lacanian subject; and the discursive contours that shape conspiracy culture fall inexorably 
along the lines of gender. These discursive contours of gender work dialectically to both 
conceal and reify capitalist ideology. The study of conspiracy culture and its narratives gives 
us a way—but not necessarily the only way—to see and articulate these ideological systems. 
 
Chapter Four 
Masculinity in the Novels of Philip K. Dick 
 
My wish is that . . . the typical male subject, like his female counterpart, might 
learn to live with lack (Silverman Male Subjectivity at the Margins 65). 
 
 
The quintessential Dick character is the paradigm of masculine subjectivity in 
crisis: he is uncertain in his job, his interpersonal relationships, and in his own sense of 
himself. Carl Freedman has noted that Dick’s “stature [as the greatest of all science 
fiction authors] can be at least partly explained by his preeminence in the production of 
paranoiac ideology, his uniquely rigorous and consistent representations of human 
subjects caught in the web of commodities and conspiracies” (Incomplete Projects 157). 
Dick’s most meaningful representations of subjectivity are almost exclusively of a 
masculine subject in crisis. When Dick represents women, if they are not essentially 
irrelevant or reactive, they figure as integral components of the conspiracy webs in which 
the main male characters are netted. The one exception is The Transmigration of Timothy 
Archer, where the main narrator is a woman who makes all the observations.  
Rather than consider in detail Dick’s representation of women, I will instead 
consider Dick’s representation of men in Martian Time Slip and Dr. Bloodmoney as a 
way of suggesting that within Dick’s larger critique of American hegemony is the 
beginning of an analysis of gender in post-atomic culture. It will become clear that 
atomic detonation is a reified image, to the degree that it functions as the organizing 
symbolic in Cold War ideology. In this way, atomic detonation functions as the desired 
phallus. This is so much the case that I will show the way in which Fredric Jameson’s 
critique of Dr. Bloodmoney also reifies atomic detonation to the degree that he forecloses 
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some of the abundant possibilities of the novel. Dick works to dereify atomic detonation 
in Dr. Bloodmoney; because of this, his novel begins an analysis of gender, even if it 
does not finish that analysis or maintain a self-consciousness about doing so. In fact, we 
will see that Dick articulates, rather than a trafficking in women’s bodies, an unending 
tradeoff in men’s bodies. 
It may certainly be argued that Dick’s record of representing women is the result 
of a virulent misogyny. The important point to notice, however, is that even Dick’s male 
characters, who emerge squarely in the Cold War era between the 50s and the 70s, are as 
equally in crisis as is the 90s, post-Cold War SF/conspiracy character Fox Mulder of the 
Fox Network television show The X Files.1 Mulder emerges as the paradigmatic 
conspiracy theorist of the 90s. Here Mulder is paired with Dana Scully, an intelligent and 
independent woman who in addition to being an FBI investigator is also a medical 
doctor. The X Files may properly be thought of as post-second-wave feminist, to the 
degree that it represents an independent woman functioning in a traditionally male 
profession. It is possible to think that this “post-feminist” historical moment is the cause 
of masculine crisis, and thus explains Mulder’s particular paranoia. Dick’s novels 
demonstrate, however, that the masculine American subject has been in crisis for much 
longer, and not as a reaction to any substantive change in the status of women. There are 
a number of similarities between Fox Mulder and Dick’s characters, such that in a sense 
Mulder is indeed an heir to some of Dick’s most famous subjects. 
 Any serious study of Dick’s work will show preeminently two things: that Dick’s 
accomplishments were remarkably uneven, and that Dick felt generic pressures in nearly 
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every direction. The former is, no doubt, causally related to the latter. Dick wrote several 
realist novels, only one of which was published during his lifetime. Dick began to write 
science fiction mainly because of economic pressures: he couldn’t make money writing 
his realism, but when in 1952 Dick published his first science fiction story, he knew that 
generic demands necessitated his writing SF in order to support himself. Generic 
pressures, in other words, show themselves here for their material reality. However, as 
Kim Stanley Robinson notes, Dick was not satisfied to produce the kind of SF that was 
characteristic of the Golden Age; he preferred instead to pursue his goal of sociopolitical 
critique. SF magazine Astounding editor John W. Campbell had throughout the 1940s 
demarcated and effectively controlled the parameters of the genre of science fiction with 
his strict editorial limits on the content of the stories he published. He was essentially 
conservative in his editorial tendencies. The period of the 40s, under Campbell’s control, 
is considered the Golden Age. But by the early 1950s two new magazines had come into 
existence that were more open to the idea of a SF that engaged a sociopolitical critique. 
Anthony Boucher, editor of The Magazine of Fantasy and Science Fiction, published 
Dick’s first SF short story. When Dick began critiquing American society, he broke 
decisively from the Golden Age of science fiction (Robinson 8-12). In this regard, Dick 
became, given the material conditions, a genre bender. There is a sense in which, then, 
Dick both conforms and transgresses in the same move. In order to be published he 
conformed to the necessity of writing science fiction, but once associated with that genre 
he chose to push its boundaries. 
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 There is much to be said for an author who challenges the limits of a genre. It is, 
indeed, as Derrida has shown in “The Law of Genre,” precisely the limits of genre which 
make possible those violations that result in new and innovative literature. One of the 
principal ways in which Dick implemented his sociopolitical critique was in the mode of 
satire. Regarding satire, Dustin Griffin notes that “Satirists, no less than historians, must 
construct their characters, in the sense that they must decide what attitudes and responses 
they wish to evoke, what aspects they choose to bring into focus. To assume that a satirist 
or a historian is simply referring to “truth” or to “history” is to be persuaded by that 
writer’s version of events” (SCR 132, note deleted, Griffin’s emphasis). As we saw in 
Chapter One, satire as a literary form is structurally very similar to historical fiction. And 
the mark of science fiction is its inexorable connection to history; for, if we follow Darko 
Suvin’s model of cognitive estrangement, the defining feature of SF is its connection to 
this world. The estrangement from our current circumstances is only meaningful if the 
narrative events present themselves as becoming a possible history. Therefore, one of 
Dick’s extraordinary accomplishments is the way in which he connected science fiction 
formally to the critical possibilities of satire. Dick extended the continuum of history and 
science fiction to include satirical discourse. 
 But Dick’s achievements in the bending of genre are limited. One of the more 
recent developments in genre theory has been the feminist critique of genre. Feminist 
deconstruction of genre has taken mainly two turns. It has noted the history of the notion 
of genre, and has made special use of its violability. Anne Cranny-Francis has noted that 
after the romantic period, with its valorization of the individual, inspired, original work, 
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genre came to have a pejorative sense because genre marks precisely the opposite of the 
romantic notion of the creative self: genre, in other words, marks commonness. In truth, 
however, all fiction, including romantic fiction, is generic. It’s just that many genres 
work to hide their conventionality, and “When the conventions became invisible, so did 
their social and ideological function” (93). Second, and following from the first, feminists 
have used this specificity both to mark masculinist texts and to find a literature that 
expresses an exclusively feminist voice. While Dick’s turn toward sociopolitical critique 
in his SF is a clear and visible bending of the genre, he has made no such turn toward a 
critique of gender. In fact, it may be said of Dick’s work that the conventionality of his 
characters is obscured by just that invisibility that feminists have indicated. And while 
gender in Dick’s oeuvre is, in the face of his otherwise sometimes incisive sociopolitical 
critique, remarkably conventional, it is my goal here to make the masculinism of his work 
visible, and to articulate the structure of that masculinity. 
 To begin with, several patterns of character development emerge in Dick’s work 
that may be summarily articulated. Kim Stanley Robinson has noted that for a majority of 
his novels, Dick relies on a fairly stable character system that features, in Dick’s own 
nomenclature, a “Big Protagonist” and a “Little Protagonist.” The big protagonist and the 
little protagonist are always in meaningful relation to one another within the structure of 
the plot. And there is always, Robinson comments, a “Mistress” that somehow figures 
and occasionally mediates between the big and little protagonists (17-18). These 
protagonists are of course always male. This pattern is so consistent that its absence in 
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other novels, like The Man in the High Castle and Dr. Bloodmoney, makes for profound 
shifts in the structure of Dick’s sociopolitical critique. 
 The fictional worlds that these characters inhabit in this pattern are worlds that 
most often situate women only in relation to men. Eve Sedgwick has called this 
phenomenon “the male trafficking of women” (16). Sedgwick argues that “changes in the 
structure of the continuum of male ‘homosocial desire’ were tightly, often causally bound 
up with the other more visible changes; that the emerging pattern of male friendship, 
mentorship, entitlement, rivalry, and hetero- and homosexuality was in an intimate and 
shifting relation to class; and that no element of that pattern can be understood outside of 
its relation to women and the gender system as a whole” (1).  Dick’s big and little 
protagonists relate to one another in a variety of ways, and in every sense Sedgwick’s 
model describes these relations. The little protagonist “is little in the sense that he is poor 
and powerless . . . Usually the little protagonist is employed by the big protagonist, and 
usually the action of the plot revolves around the opposition between these two figures, 
although they may begin as allies” (Robinson 17). The relation between Dick’s big and 
little protagonists is always constructed around class distinctions. The little protagonist is 
described as such not because he is a minor character—in fact, he is almost always the 
main character or hero—but rather because he is always inferior to the big protagonist 
within the character relations that are inscribed in the narrative. He is in fact usually the 
hero of the novel. In spite of his hero status, the little protagonist always finds himself 
answering to a man to whom he is subordinate.  
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In Martian Time Slip, for instance, Arnie Kott, the provincial, wealthy, and 
corrupt union boss hires Jack Bohlen, a working-class skilled tradesman, to be his 
personal repairman. Jack is the hero of the novel, although Arnie is a vaguely 
sympathetic character. The class relations between Arnie and Jack exacerbate Jack’s 
renascent mental illness. At the same time, fitting Sedgwick’s model, Arnie’s mistress, 
Doreen, becomes involved with Jack. When Jack asks Doreen if their sleeping together is 
okay with Arnie, Doreen says, “Yes. Don’t worry about Arnie; he’s not possessive, if you 
know what I mean” (119). In a sense Arnie and Jack share Doreen; Arnie is always 
concerned mainly with what Jack can do for him. He is far less possessive of Doreen than 
he is of the objects that he has hired Jack to repair. If anything, Doreen is just one of so 
many objects to Arnie. Doreen is, as Sedgwick notes, precisely “between men.” At the 
same time, Jack is the more powerless in this triad. Arnie is his employer, so everything 
that Jack does is mediated by this relationship. While Jack is the hero of the novel he is 
always in a position of taking directions from the person who controls his livelihood. 
Dick’s heroes, in this way, are not the sine qua non of masculinity; a more powerful male 
figure in the class hierarchy always dominates him. In this scene with Doreen, Jack is, 
even as he is having sex with Doreen, anxious about his class position. Sedgewick’s 
model allows for this class mediation; and even though Doreen is trafficked, that does 
nothing to mitigate the masculine anxiety that emerges in Dick’s triad. 
 One of Dick’s primary concerns throughout his work is the draining effect that 
business relationships have on personal life in 20th century America. In Martian Time 
Slip, as in so many of his novels, he puts a fine touch on his critique of this condition of 
 112
 
capitalism. So it seems somewhat odd that his rendering of gender relations would persist 
in such a conventional way. While one may be tempted to suggest that, after all, Dick 
was merely reflecting the gender ideology of the time, this temptation should be resisted. 
Much of Dick’s work resisted the hegemonic ideology of the time in other regards, most 
notably capitalist human relations; so his failure to resist gender ideologies is 
inconsistent. Dick may or may not himself have been intimately acquainted with 
Marxism, but in any case his study of class, modes of production, and hegemonic 
ideologies certainly attests to some familiarity with its contributions. I contend that 
Dick’s work is an instance of the failure of critiques of class relations to encounter and 
somehow account for gender in the structure of American society. Admittedly, Dick 
altered his positioning of his women characters somewhat in The Transmigration of 
Timothy Archer, where the main character is a woman and from whose first person point 
of view the story is related. But for a majority of his works he involves two men in a 
specifically defined class relation, and between them, often as negotiator, stands a woman 
who is almost invariably more two-dimensional in development than the men. 
 However, Dick does not maintain this pattern consistently throughout his novels. 
Most prominently, he alters this pattern in the novel Dr. Bloodmoney, to which I will turn 
shortly. It is not enough to say that Dick is sexist, because there are moments in his 
novels where he exhibits an almost prophetic vision of non-linear subjectivity. When in 
Martian Time-Slip Jack, Doreen, and Arnie all experience varieties of the time slip, Dick 
has them all experience a period of time over and over; the experiences overlap, such that 
it is impossible to tell who is experiencing the slip during any given viewpoint. This 
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deconstruction of subjectivity resembles the work of (dis)unified subjectivity in Joanna 
Russ’s extraordinary 1975 feminist novel The Female Man. In that novel, Russ has four 
women from alternate timelines gather together in our present (of 1975)—however, they 
are all the same woman. That is, they are the same woman as she would be in each of 
these alternate timelines. Like Lacan, Russ challenges the teleological notion of a linear, 
unified subjectivity, which the French feminists furthered by challenging Lacan’s 
privileged signifier. French feminists took Derrida’s critique of logocentrism and 
modified it to account for the priority of the phallus in western culture; their work 
resulted in yet another neologism, phallogocentrism. The French feminist argument rests 
on the understanding that all too frequently western culture and its critics fail to 
acknowledge the integral place the phallus enjoys in western hegemony.  
Dick engages a deconstruction of linear subjectivity in Martian Time Slip, and he 
does so by means of time manipulation, much like Russ. It seems unfair to suggest that 
Dick is incapable of making the connection of gender; what is more probable is that the 
connection simply did not present itself as structurally necessary. Jameson notes in 
“Pleasure: A Political Issue” that political agendas that wish to critique the hegemony 
often come up against gender because gender is so decisively coded as pleasure, 
regardless of the fact that gender may be plainly distinguished from pleasure. It is clear 
that for Dick gender means nothing other than heterosexual desire—romantic love. In any 
event, Dick never explored gender as a category separate and apart from pleasure; 
because of this, his sociopolitical critique suffers. Nonetheless, Dick’s critique of 
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American culture comes terribly close to a critique of gender if for no other reason than 
because he represents masculinity as a subject in crisis. 
 The critique of phallogocentrism does not stop with the author of fiction. Critics 
as well often fail to make the connection of gender. Whereas Dick explores masculine 
subjectivity in crisis, Jameson in “Character Systems in Dr. Bloodmoney” forecloses on 
this important component of Dick’s novel, and he does so by reifying atomic detonation. 
He notes Dick’s remarkable ability to blend, or complicate, the distinction between 
subjective and objective reality: “Dick’s force lies in the effort to retain possession and 
use of both apparently contradictory, mutually exclusive subjective and objective 
explanation systems all at once” (27). However, as Jameson notes, in Dr. Bloodmoney 
we have an unusual narrative circumstance, one which does not appear often in Dick’s 
oeuvre: we see the actual mushroom clouds and bombs going off. Because atomic 
detonation, Jameson tells us, is the ultimate collective experience, Dick must assimilate 
this collective reality into his deconstructed paradigm. I argue that we need to stop and 
consider how atomic explosion figures into the drama of masculine crisis. Jameson seems 
to think, and he is writing in 1975, that atomic detonation is indeed totalizing; therefore, 
the imagery of the mushroom signifies for Jameson, and for the whole Cold War 
ideology, the ultimate real. Atomic explosion erupts both as the real and as the symbolic 
into the real. Atomic explosion is both inarticulable and the ultimate articulation. 
Jameson sets up the atomic detonation in Dr. Bloodmoney in his schemata as the final 
totality against which Dick must situate his aesthetic problematic.  
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I challenge Jameson’s enunciation of the problematic in Dr. Bloodmoney, simply 
because Dick finally does not express atomic detonation as totalizing in this novel. The 
post-atomic world in Dr. Bloodmoney is neither collective nor especially coherent. The 
communities sustain themselves after a rural fashion and they rudimentarily communicate 
amongst themselves. In fact, Stuart McConchie resembles an early 20th-century 
entrepreneur in his plan for developing a transport system for Andrew Gill’s cigarette 
products; the humans in Dr. Bloodmoney are reinstituting capitalist enterprise. The 
communities have, in other words, survived, a fact that the notion of totalizing 
destruction does not allow, and they have survived precisely not in a collective or 
totalizing way. The final line of the novel emphasizes this point: “The business of the day 
had begun. All around her the city was awakening, back once more into its regular life” 
(298). While Dick’s work is thoroughly an artifact of Cold War ideology, his schema in 
Dr. Bloodmoney is not as simple as Jameson’s theory suggests.  
In fact, Dick is working actively to deconstruct the notion of total destruction as 
actively as he is the notion of subjective versus objective reality. But before we consider 
Dick’s articulation, we need to stop and explore the implications of a notion of total 
destruction. Admittedly, I am writing from a post-Cold War perspective, whereas 
Jameson is writing in a decidedly Cold War ideological moment. Twenty-first century 
denizens are more likely to imagine such a device as a “tactical nuclear warhead,” which 
means essentially that nuclear detonation may be conceived as a non-totalizing event. 
Nonetheless, it is useful to remember that in 1975 Jameson is himself, as are we all, 
writing in a post-atomic age: Truman ordered the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and 
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Nagasaki in 1945. And while that detonation was certainly massively destructive to those 
communities, there is no sense in which we can really understand those events as 
totalizing. It is the ideology of the Cold War that imposes the notion of totalization, and 
for that reason we should be especially suspicious of it. I would in fact argue that 
totalization is a kind of fantasy; in this vastly decentralized, global, late capitalist, image-
dominated world, the idea of totalization, even total destruction, works as a kind of hope 
for a final, collective, unified human experience.  
I am not suggesting that total destruction is not possible. I imagine, as anyone 
would, that enough nuclear bombs detonated at exactly the same time, or even the 
resultant fallout, would destroy the planet as we know it. But this speculation is not 
substantively different from other possibilities of total destruction; therefore, speculation 
of total destruction is not uniquely the result of the nuclear age. In fact, speculation about 
total destruction is most often charged politically: in the cases of both nuclear destruction 
and global warming, the notion of total destruction is propagated by the opposing faction. 
The question is this: does the existence of nuclear detonation necessitate the historical, 
practical feasibility of total destruction? I am not saying it doesn’t. I am suggesting that 
this question has not been, and cannot be, answered, whereas Cold War ideology gives us 
to think that it has been answered. The question of the practical feasibility of true total 
destruction cannot ever be answered because, quite simply, if it can indeed be 
accomplished there will be no one to know about it. The ideology of total destruction is 
the death drive par excellence.2 If anything, nuclear detonation problematizes in a very 
special way the intersection of possibility, politics, reality, and history and uniquely 
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foregrounds the function of ideology. Moreover, atomic detonation foregrounds the 
desire for a unified, cohesive human subjective experience. 
The atomic detonation in Dr. Bloodmoney functions as an important site for an 
exploration of the masculine subject in crisis. Since histories as well as ideologies (and 
the history of ideologies) are at issue here, Jameson’s articulation of the aesthetics of 
atomic explosion is no less relevant for my disputing it. Jameson’s schema of atomic 
explosion in Dr. Bloodmoney accurately represents Jameson’s effort to reintroduce the 
symbolic into the real of the post-atomic world of the novel.  
For unlike the time warps and the times sags, the hallucinations and the 
four-dimensional mirages of the other books, atomic holocaust is a 
collective event about whose reality the reader cannot but decide. Dick’s 
narrative ambiguity can accommodate individual experience, but runs 
greater risks in evoking the materials of world history, the flat yes or no of 
the mushroom cloud (27, my emphasis, Jameson’s emphasis).  
 
But whereas Jameson effectively reasserts the symbolic in his theory, Dick’s relation to 
the symbolic in Dr. Bloodmoney is more complicated. Lacan understood that the primary 
process in all psychoses is foreclosure, which involves primarily the exclusion of the 
symbolic father. Because in 1975 nuclear detonation was situated ideologically as the 
ultimate collectively understood utterance, for Jameson it is then the final assertion of the 
symbolic. He therefore forecloses the possibility that the articulation in Dr. Bloodmoney 
is not in fact a totalizing one. By contrast, Dick profoundly and uncharacteristically 
asserts the image of the mushroom clouds in Dr. Bloodmoney, but he does not finally 
accept it as a totalizing event. There are, in fact, three overwhelmingly destructive events 
in the novel: the first destruction of 1972, the subsequent event known in the novel as 
World War III, and the final nuclear explosions at the end of the novel. Dick may very 
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well be thought of as a true paranoid, unlike Jerry in the film Conspiracy Theory (as we 
saw in Chapter One), because he does not order the events of the novel around the drama 
of the Oedipal complex. The assertion of the phallus in the Oedipal drama effectively 
brings it to a close. Dick does not allow atomic blast to function as closure; in fact, the 
characters in Dr. Bloodmoney all function in a complex post-atomic community, albeit an 
altogether reorganized one. The paranoiac resists the symbolic; he remains in the realm of 
the imaginary and so rejects the symbolic order of the father. The net result of Dick’s 
novelistic nightmare amounts to a vision of a subject without the symbolic power of the 
phallus.  
Dick does not privilege nuclear detonation as the singular organizing event; in 
fact, the novel explodes into a complicated schema of masculine subjects who have a 
variety of proficiencies and deficiencies. I agree with Jameson’s observation that Dick 
presents “a whole constellation of peculiar characters” to deal with atomic blast (28, 
Jameson’s emphasis). However, I don’t think, as Jameson does, that Dick has 
orchestrated this series of characters in spite of or even because of the narratological 
problems of nuclear destruction. Rather, Dick has cast the unusual host of characters in 
Dr. Bloodmoney as structurally inherent to the problematic of nuclear destruction. These 
characters are “peculiar” for Jameson because in 1975 the overt and explicit 
representation of masculinity in crisis was indeed quite “peculiar.” Jameson 
acknowledges that very often in Dick’s novels there are no pure heroes. They are 
typically, as in most post-Romantic narratives, anti-heroes with flaws, shortcomings, and 
not too clear a sense of themselves as heroes. This is even truer in Dr. Bloodmoney, 
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where there is not a central figure from which events are observed or actions taken. Dick 
does not have just one anti-hero in this novel; he has disseminated the masculine subject 
into four primary male figures, all of which have special powers and special deficiencies, 
a schema which Jameson articulates very well. It is precisely because Dick figures atomic 
blast as non-totalizing that these characters emerge in the post-atomic world of the novel. 
Since in the Dickian landscape no singular event can function as the organizing symbolic, 
the characters cannot arrange and define themselves as subjects adequately against it. In 
fact, Dr. Bloodmoney is unique among Dick’s novels for precisely this reason, because in 
this novel we have four main male characters instead of Dick’s usual characterology of 
Big Protagonist/Little Protagonist.  
 The four principal characters essential to the structure of Dr. Bloodmoney, as 
Jameson argues, are Hoppy Harrington, Bill Keller the homunculus, Walt Dangerfield, 
and Dr. Bruno Bluthgeld. Hoppy Harrington appears first, and while this fact might 
suggest he is at the center of the novel, Dick works actively to situate Hoppy within a 
structure of relations. Hoppy is a phocomelus; he perambulates by way of a device that is 
both a wheelchair and a prosthesis (provided to him by the American government). He is 
a thalidomide child from 1964, so his physical disabilities are not the result of the 1972 
destruction. Hoppy, while he has no arms or legs, has kinesthetic power: he can 
manipulate objects at a distance. Walt Dangerfield is an ordinary human who, as the 
result of a failed mission to Mars, is orbiting the earth endlessly in a spaceship. He is in 
the privileged position of receiving communications from all areas of the globe and 
transmitting whatever information he thinks is interesting or necessary. He does not relate 
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every piece of information he receives, so while he has the capability of being a 
centralizing unified source of information he does not in fact provide that for earth. Very 
often, he transmits music or readings from W. Somerset Maugham novels; he sees 
himself as the guardian of what remains of human culture. Dr. Bruno Bluthgeld is the 
man responsible for the science that leads to the 1972 meltdown as well as the 1981 
destruction of World War III. He has psychotic visions, and in characteristic Dickian 
style, it is never clear whether Bluthgeld’s psychotic delusion of planetary control is 
nothing more than hallucination, or whether Bluthgeld does in fact have mental control 
over events. Finally, Bill Keller is a homunculus who lives inside of his sister Edie 
Keller’s body. He can speak and hear, but he cannot see. He has a body, but it isn’t until 
the end of the novel that we see how exactly he takes corporeal form. He can also hear 
the dead, which gives him a privileged position at key points in the narrative. 
 All of these characters are male and all of them enjoy certain privileges and suffer 
certain deficits. Jameson notes that these four characters roughly oppose one another, 
where Hoppy and Dangerfield are one rough opposition and Bill and Bluthgeld the other. 
However, Jameson is quick to note that these characters do not work meaningfully in 
opposition to one another. Rather, “these beings, taken together, organize themselves into 
systematic permutations of a fairly limited complex of ideas or characteristics which 
turns around the notion of organisms and organs, of mechanical contrivances, and (in the 
case of the phocomelus) of prostheses” (29). Dick situates these characters as integral 
components of a structure, the basis of which is a displacement of the opposition between 
subject and object (or narrating hero and bad guy) onto the opposition between organisms 
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and organs. And yet again, Jameson notes that this opposition is not any neater than any 
other of Dick’s configurations. None of these four male characters are purely organic or 
mechanical but rather varying degrees of both. The important point is that they are 
structurally related to one another: when Hoppy attempts to overtake Dangerfield 
remotely, he sets in motion a shift in the relations between these four characters such that 
it is structural and systemic that none of these characters will ever emerge as a unified 
subject. Rather than turning on a single male subject, the novel turns, as Jameson points 
out, on a structural relation between organisms and mechanical contrivances. The 
condition of any one male character will change given certain narratological 
circumstances involving the other male characters: in the case of Bill the homunculus, he 
takes corporeal form as Hoppy’s oppositional relationship to Dangerfield shifts and fails. 
Hoppy’s prostheses can do nothing to resist Bill’s propensity to “steal” bodies. In fact, 
Bill has no body on which Hoppy may act kinesthetically. 
 Jameson is arguing, although he doesn’t put it this way, that these four characters 
are in relation systemically and so, therefore, it is meaningless to speak of any one of 
them as central or singular. Their respective ontological conditions cannot be understood 
apart from one another. I think Jameson is right; this characterology is essential to 
understanding the infrastructure of the novel. This “constellation of peculiar characters” 
is analogous to Dick’s deconstruction of linear subjectivity in Martian Time Slip, and it is 
similar to Joanna Russ’s feminist critique of linear subjectivity in The Female Man. 
Jameson’s strength is his ability to tease out structures; what he fails to note is the way in 
which these structures are specifically gendered. Because Jameson fails to distinguish 
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total nuclear destruction as ideological, he is consigned to assert it as the organizing 
symbolic phallus—and in doing so he effaces its mark as phallus. As I noted above, Anne 
Cranny-Francis points out that when conventions become invisible, so do their social and 
ideological function. In Jameson’s theoretical analysis, the ideology of total destruction 
as ideology becomes invisible. This analysis oversimplifies Dick’s critique of hegemony 
in Dr. Bloodmoney.  
Dick does not represent total destruction; his narrative of the day of nuclear 
explosion revolves around the disunified enunciation of the experience of several of the 
survivors and no one experience is prioritized over the other. Andrew Gill and Bonnie 
Keller have a sexual encounter during the chaos, indulging themselves as though, indeed, 
there were no tomorrow. But there is a tomorrow; Bonnie has twins (Bill the homunculus 
and Edie) as the result of the encounter with Andrew, and their story does continue. It 
seems that Dick is aware of the problem of conceiving total destruction, since it 
necessitates a supererogatory oppositional schema, something to which Dick is resistant. 
That Dick must then orchestrate a specifically masculine characterological system, even 
one that is in crisis, in order to stabilize the narrative is something that Jameson entirely 
misses. What is significantly different about Dr. Bloodmoney is the way in which the 
male characters are differently organized specifically as the result of the problematic of 
nuclear detonation. In Martian Time Slip, Dick figures the main male characters in 
opposition to one another as Big Protagonist and Little Protagonist with a woman 
mediating between them. This characterological schema diverges radically in Dr. 
Bloodmoney to include two more male characters, none of which are opposed 
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meaningfully to one another, and have no mediating woman, but rather work within in a 
complex morphology of masculine structures as a response to the problematic of the post-
atomic age. There is no hierarchical relation between the four characters. 
We can understand the substantive difference between the male characters in Dr. 
Bloodmoney and Martian Time Slip if we return to Eve Sedgwick’s model of male 
trafficking in women and explore how the women are positioned in Dr. Bloodmoney. All 
four male characters are involved not in the exchange of women but rather in an 
unending tradeoff of male bodies. Hoppy Harrington, the phocomelus, has no primary 
relationship with a woman. He has no arms or legs and so must peregrinate in a 
government-issue wheelchair that is outfitted with mechanical arms. In this sense he 
lacks the typical virility associated with the masculine hero. He manipulates objects, 
however, not only by the prosthesis but also with his mind. He desires more than 
anything else at the beginning of the novel to prove his mettle to Jim Fergesson, the 
owner of the TV repair shop, by repairing a phonograph, and he does so using his 
kinesthetic powers. He uses his incorporeal ability to establish himself as a viable laborer 
in the workforce hierarchy, but he is not subordinated to his employer Jim Fergesson, 
who is killed in the blasts of 1981. This represents a profound break in Dick’s 
characterological schema. By the end of the novel he has developed this unusual skill to 
extreme personal advantage. Hoppy is not in any hermetic oppositional relation to any 
one of the other men, and his relations with the other characters in the novel are not 
mediated significantly by a woman character. Hoppy, thus, compensates for his lack of 
body parts by a literally disembodied talent. Both Hoppy and Walt Dangerfield function 
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by means of mechanical prosthetics: Hoppy has his wheelchair, and Dangerfield has his 
spaceship with its communications system. Dangerfield’s wife Lydia dies not long after 
their journey in the spaceship begins, so for the majority of the novel he orbits earth in 
the spaceship by himself. At the end of the novel Hoppy tries to overtake the 
communications system on the ship and pose as Dangerfield (Hoppy has a remarkable 
ability to mimic voices), but he fails. Jameson notes the opposition between Hoppy and 
Dangerfield; what is significant about this masculine interaction is that there is no woman 
who mediates this rivalry. The unwitting Dangerfield is vulnerable to this attack; and 
Hoppy ultimately fails to overtake the ship and its systems. There is a perpetual exchange 
of male bodies between Hoppy and Dangerfield: Hoppy has no organic appendages, but 
he compensates with his mind. He tries to assume Dangerfield’s voice and identity, but 
cannot finally because Bill the homunculus stops him. In every sense, these male rivalries 
play out on a stage that is absent of any mediating female character.  
The other two main male characters, Bluthgeld and Bill, do have relationships 
with significant female characters. Bonnie Keller has been Bluthgeld’s apologist for a 
very long time, since at least the first nuclear accident of 1972. Bluthgeld had gone into 
hiding after the war of 1981. He lives in the Marin County community under the 
pseudonym Jack Tree, where Bonnie Keller also lives. She keeps concealed his identity 
until very late in the novel. Bluthgeld has similar powers as Hoppy, or at least it is never 
made clear whether Bluthgeld is psychotic or actually controlling events. At the end of 
the novel more nuclear explosions occur (for the third time in the novel’s world) and 
Bluthgeld either imagines himself setting them off or actually does set them off by mind 
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control. That the novel leaves this unclear goes precisely to Dick’s deconstruction of the 
distinction between objective and subjective reality. In any case, Bluthgeld succumbs to 
Hoppy’s far superior kinesthetic powers; Hoppy sends Bluthgeld far up into the air and 
lets him drop to the ground—and he does this all from a distance. Bonnie does not 
mediate this rivalry. Bluthgeld stands as possibly the most powerful threat to Hoppy’s 
ever-growing powers; this male rivalry is firmly resolved without the destruction or 
exchange of any women’s bodies. 
The relationship between Bill Keller and his sister Edie is perhaps the most 
troubling of all the relationships. Bill is a homunculus; the theory of the homunculus is a 
residue of the 18th century medical theory of preformation, where a fully formed human 
was thought to reside in the original sperm cell and only increased in size. Dick is 
therefore working with an antiquated biological theory in his story of the future. Bill 
resides in his sister’s body for the majority of the novel. He is somehow able to exit her 
body when there is another creature near enough for him to enter, and at one point she 
does “give birth” to Bill by bringing him close to an earthworm. The symbolism is eerie, 
and Edie’s menacing plan to put Bill in an earthworm is plainly Dick’s misogyny 
presenting itself. Edie mediates sight for Bill—he can hear and feel but he cannot see 
anything. At the end of the novel, Bill leaves Edie’s body of his own will and ends up 
trading bodies with Hoppy. Bill “becomes” Hoppy, and Hoppy dies as a barely formed 
homunculus. Edie mediates the world for Bill, and she nurtures him for a majority of the 
novel. And while Bill can only function as part of Edie, his ultimate rivalry with Hoppy is 
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resolved at the expense of Hoppy, and not at all at Edie’s expense. Edie is not exchanged 
in the relationship between Hoppy and Bill.  
All of these four male characters interact with one another on their own terms, 
without trafficking in women. Most importantly, these four characters experience 
profound exchange in male bodies rather than female bodies. In the end, Bill and 
Dangerfield survive, but with compromised bodies: Bill is phocomelic and Dangerfield is 
very sick, although he may very well recover from his illness. These characters must 
negotiate their masculinity under the extreme duress of partial male bodies. Jameson 
argues that Bluthgeld and Hoppy lose in this epic struggle because they are associated 
with physics—Bluthgeld being the mad scientist and Hoppy being mechanically 
inclined—and that this is because Dick is denigrating science and its “progress.” I argue 
that Bluthgeld and Hoppy’s fates are by themselves less significant than the fact that all 
four of the male characters suffer the effects of radically mediated bodies. After Bill 
assumes Hoppy’s body he says, “I have to get used to this body; it’s heavy. I feel gravity 
. . . I’m used to just floating about” (286). Even though Bill now has a body with which 
he may see and interact with the world, he is still in no sense really whole. Similarly, 
while Dangerfield may very well recover from his illness, he is still stuck in the orbiting 
spaceship with no promise of ever being released from his lonely trajectory. 
Because Dick must situate these characters in relation to the aesthetic problematic 
of nuclear destruction, his male characterology must then shift to accommodate it. Dick is 
aware of the reification of atomic detonation and destruction, and as is his tendency he 
avoids positing it as the unifying, totalizing event. In doing so, Dick divests the atomic 
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explosions of their position as phallus; once he displaces the phallus in this way, his male 
characterology is destabilized. None of the male characters possess the phallus in Dr. 
Bloodmoney and, in fact, none of the male characters ever emerge as superior or supreme 
even in the end. Most importantly, the phallus is never stabilized by the sacrifice or 
destruction of a woman. Rather than trafficking in women, the characters in Dr. 
Bloodmoney traffic in male bodies, all of which are compromised in one way or another 
not as the direct eventual result of nuclear destruction, but rather as part of the inherent 
structural condition of the dereification of the atomic explosion as phallus. Jameson’s 
analysis of the characterology in Dr. Bloodmoney is entirely accurate until he reifies 
atomic detonation and thus forecloses on Dick’s abundant study of male subjectivity in 
crisis. As Kaja Silverman has shown in Male Subjectivity at the Margins, the discourse of 
war is at the center of the construction of masculinity. In her study of the film The Best 
Years of Our Lives, she points out how World War II constructed that masculinity only to 
leave it completely destabilized in the post war period. Best Years represents the 
returning veterans in varying stages of mutilation. Dick’s work does much the same, for 
in the post-atomic ages of Dr. Bloodmoney, the four main male characters are also in 
varying stages of mutilation. Dick goes a step further in dereifying the atomic blast itself 
as phallus. 
 As is often the case, masculinity is rendered invisible both in primary literary 
texts as well as the secondary theoretical discourses about those texts. In the case of the 
primary text, the invisibility often results from a particular mode of representation; in 
secondary critical discourse the invisibility comes in the form of effaced theoretical 
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paradigms. Silverman suggests that the horror of seeing representations of mutilated 
masculinity causes commentators to blind themselves to its reality. She says, 
“[Commentators’ reactions] . . . closely approximate the reactions attributed by Freud to 
the male subject at the sight of female genitals” (Male Subjectivity 89). I have been 
discussing simultaneously in detail Jameson’s effacement of the masculinity inherent in a 
theoretical paradigm of Cold War ideology of total destruction and Dick’s deconstruction 
of masculinity within his larger critique of American hegemony. Dick is frequently 
criticized for his narrowly developed characters, and while this criticism is often fair, his 
deconstruction of masculinity is far more than just casual. Nonetheless, it seems that Dick 
is hardly self-conscious of gender as he works through his various permutations of the 
male anti-hero. His female characters are ordinarily quite underdeveloped, if not simply 
villainous. This Dickian lapse in vision when it comes to gender is out of place when we 
consider his occasionally brilliant studies of American class and consumer capitalism. 
There is, thus, a similarity between Jameson and Dick in this way. Both Jameson and 
Dick, coming from their respective and dissimilar discourses, have gender in their 
(mostly Marxist) purviews, but they are uneven at best in their capacity to visualize the 
integral role that gender plays in all human structures.   
And yet, when we evaluate Dick’s theoretical patterns, that of deconstructing 
oppositions and specifically that of the subject and object, it is clear that his work 
resembles Derrida’s critique of logocentrism. It is just four letters and a few steps to a 
critique of phallogocentrism, a journey many critics and fiction writers often fail to make. 
Moreover, Dick’s work shows up the degree to which critics of capitalism fail to estimate 
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the importance of gender to the fundamental structure of all ideologies. Nonetheless, 
while Dick fails to chart this critique his work cannot be dismissed as merely sexist, 
because he marks an important moment in a deconstructive and Marxist critique of 
masculine culture. His work in Dr. Bloodmoney articulates keenly how an analysis of 
American post-war ideological and an economic structure, which includes a complicated 
representation of masculinity in crisis, might begin.  
We must return to a discussion of genre in order to understand more clearly why 
Dick fails to see gender as a critical category. Raffaella Baccolini has considered a new 
category of utopian literature, the critical dystopia, in order to understand how feminist 
science fiction writers of the 1980s and 1990s have incorporated resistance into their 
texts. She says, “A new genre seems to have emerged: science fiction novels that negate 
the notions of utopia and dystopia as mutually exclusive terms to describe a future 
alternative society. The science fiction novels of some women writers contain, instead, 
both elements at once” (18). Granted, it may seem unfair to use a late twentieth century 
model to evaluate Dick’s texts, especially one that addresses specifically a particular 
period; Baccolini’s work traces the history of resistance since the 1950s and argues that 
this special kind of feminist literature emerges as peculiar to the circumstances of the 
1990s. However, I contend that it is precisely the benefit of retrospect that may give us 
the tools to understand the form of Dick’s work. Indeed, Dick’s work demonstrates some 
of the key features of the critical dystopia, so it is only appropriate to use the model to 
appreciate his work.  Baccolini bases her model of the critical dystopia on the work of 
Tom Moylan and Lyman Tower Sargent. She works from Moylan’s notion of the critical 
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utopia as a representation of both the original society and the utopian society. Key for 
Baccolini is Moylan’s observation of the formal quality of the genre, that is, “the way the 
text becomes self-aware and self-critical” (17). Sargent then asks whether a critical 
dystopia is even plausible, to which Baccolini answers that it is “not only plausible but is 
one of the preferred forms of resistance for the end of the century” (17).  As Baccolini 
figures it, the critical dystopia is a representation of an alternative society as decidedly 
dystopian that nonetheless “maintain[s] the utopian impulse within the work” (18, 
Baccolini’s emphasis). In order to see how gender figures in Dick’s oeuvre, we must first 
understand the way utopia and dystopia appear. 
The utopian impulse does not show itself often in Dick’s work. However, as Kim 
Stanley Robinson has noticed, Dr. Bloodmoney is the one novel that depicts a utopian 
post-holocaust world (66). The pastoral communities mark a return to a less complicated 
way of life, where human activity is not parceled out into the discrete spheres 
characteristic of capitalist societies. There are elements of utopia in Dr. Bloodmoney, 
such as the spectrum of physical and psychical differences that we have seen in the main 
characters, as well as the relative chaos that still persists in the major cities. The novel 
functions best as a critical dystopia, in Moylan’s sense, since it represents the dystopian 
society and then presents some criticism of it. For instance, Hardy tells Stuart 
McConchie, who is thinking of leaving the city and going to the country to make a living, 
“Nothing happens; they just farm and listen to the satellite. Anyhow, you’re apt to run 
into the old race prejudice against Negroes, out in the country; they’ve reverted to the old 
patterns . . . It’s one of the greatest myths that ever existed, the superiority of the country. 
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I know you’d be back here in a week” (154). Similarly, the dystopian post-holocaust 
society gives a physically disadvantaged person like Hoppy Harrington ample 
opportunity to advance; however, Hoppy takes cruel advantage of the improved social 
circumstances, suggesting that utopian impulses do not eliminate all negative human 
behavior. The tone of the novel tends to bear out this criticism.  
As Baccolini argues, critical dystopia is a special measure of resistance to 
hegemonic norms. Therefore, it is easy to see how Dr. Bloodmoney might take its 
resistance so far and no further. In Moylan’s sense, Dr. Bloodmoney is a critical dystopia 
in that it does present both the original society and the dystopian society, and the 
dystopian society does mark in some ways an improvement over the society it replaces. 
The Man in the High Castle is also a dystopian novel and as such we may compare it to 
Dr. Bloodmoney as a way of articulating the formal qualities of Dick’s work that both 
permit and exclude a reading of gender. Robinson notes that The Man in the High Castle 
is different from Dick’s other earlier dystopias “for the very important reason that the 
dystopia in this novel is not overthrown” (40). In the earlier dystopias, like Vulcan’s 
Hammer and The Penultimate Truth, there is a little protagonist who achieves the 
overthrow of the dystopian regime. Robinson suggests that there is still a little protagonist 
in High Castle, namely Frank Frink, but I suggest that like Dr. Bloodmoney the typical 
Dick character structure is subverted such that there are no less than five main characters 
in High Castle. Significantly, those five main characters include a woman—Mr. Tagomi, 
Mr. Baynes, Robert Childan, Frank Frink, and Juliana Frink. This is quite different from 
the quadrate characterology in Bloodmoney. There, the four main characters are, as we 
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have seen, all male. Robinson sees High Castle as an immensely depressing dystopia 
from which there is no escape. There is no hope of redemption or salvation: “here the 
best that can be accomplished by the protagonists is the holding action of keeping things 
from getting immeasurably worse” (40). 
High Castle has, however, its utopian moments. For instance, Mr. Tagomi stands 
up to Herr Reiss, who excuses his own actions as being controlled by the larger German 
regime; Mr. Tagomi calls Herr Reiss “Chickenshit.” Robinson sees this as dystopian 
because no American resists the hegemony—a Japanese official articulates this resistance 
instead. I argue alternatively that this scene is a utopian moment, if for no other reason 
than somebody does indeed speak out against the repressive German regime. The fact that 
Mr. Tagomi is the character to utter this resistance is merely a feature of the critical 
quality of Dick’s dystopia. In fact, this scene is invested with a reversal of otherness, such 
that American readers may feel the heavy oppression of an imperialist administration that 
America itself has engendered in this world for many years. Mr. Tagomi’s appropriation 
of the American term “chickenshit” only serves to drive the point home.  
Similarly, there is a utopian moment when Juliana Frink saves Hawthorne 
Abendsen’s life, a point that Robinson does not make. Hawthorne Abendsen is the author 
of the novel, The Grasshopper Lies Heavy, within High Castle that many of the 
characters are reading. Abendsen’s novel is an “alternative history” to the history that is 
retold in High Castle; in The Grasshopper Lies Heavy the Allies win the war. Juliana gets 
involved with a man named Joe Cinnadella, a German hit man who is assigned to kill 
Abendsen. Juliana does not realize she has been drawn into this plot until she is stuck in a 
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motel room with Joe on the way to Abendsen’s house in Cheyenne. Once she does realize 
Joe’s intentions, she slices his throat and leaves for Cheyenne to warn Abendsen. Here, 
Juliana marks significant and effective resistance to the German regime, even if highly 
localized and fairly small. Abendsen symbolizes literary resistance to both the Japanese 
and the German hegemony, although the Japanese are fairly permissive of the book. In 
killing Abendsen’s assassin, Juliana signifies opposition to hegemonic censorship and 
Nazism. 
Juliana is also at the center of the final scene of the novel. There, she discusses 
with Abendsen how the novel came to be. She presses him until he admits that the I 
Ching wrote the entire novel. She then asks if she can consult the oracle and discover the 
reason why the I Ching chose to write this novel, a request to which Abendsen only 
reluctantly assents. When asked, the I Ching reveals that it wrote the novel because the 
contents of it are true, that indeed the Allies did win World War II and Japan and 
Germany lost. Abendsen and his wife are upset at discovering this, but Juliana takes the 
news rather easily. She leaves the Abendsen house and the novel closes. Robinson and 
others have taken this scene as “weak” and as a “marring” of an otherwise brilliant novel. 
Robinson says, “Now [the news that the contents of the novel are true] is something that 
the reader already knows, so it does us no good to be told it again” (48). Robinson 
compares the relative weakness of this scene to the scene where Tagomi has a vision of 
our San Francisco. In it, Tagomi briefly walks down our 1962 San Francisco streets, and 
he envisages the Embarcadero Freeway, which does not exist in the novel’s world. He is 
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horrified. Robinson argues that this scene is much more effective in connecting the 
novel’s world to ours.  
I argue first that there are two entirely different critical strategies going on in the 
Tagomi scene and the Juliana scene and, second, it is the Juliana scene that grounds and 
explains the Tagomi scene. The Tagomi scene occurs within the terms of the novel—that 
is, for some unexplained reason, Tagomi has been teleported to the actual world. His 
disbelief is of course appropriate to the experience. This scene must, however, be 
grounded somehow by a more literal explanation. The Juliana scene provides that 
explanation. The final scene of the novel is something on the order of the shattering of 
the fourth wall in theater, where the distinction between the stage and the audience is no 
longer clear. Dick shatters the fourth wall of the novel so that Juliana may emerge as a 
fully realist character—in other words, one of us. Likewise, the reader emerges into the 
space of the novel in a way that the Tagomi scene can never achieve. Tagomi is not 
hallucinating, but we don’t know at that point what the conditions are that cause the 
experience, and in any case the fourth wall is not shattered in the Tagomi scene—the 
scene still acquiesces to the terms of the novel. At the end of the novel, we can look back 
and see that Tagomi actually traversed the boundary between parallel worlds and how 
exactly he does so. The Juliana scene is a much more radical tear in the sacrosanct 
narrative, a radicalization that Dick seems (always) urgent to make. 
It is interesting that Robinson does not notice the important and privileged role 
that Juliana plays in the narrative. Here, unlike the later Dr. Bloodmoney, a woman 
functions fully as a heroic character. Of the five main characters, only Tagomi, Baynes, 
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and Juliana really do anything heroic. The two white American males, Robert Childan 
and Frank Frink, represent moral bankruptcy and cowardice, respectively. Only Tagomi, 
a Japanese official, Baynes, a German national, and Juliana, an American woman, all 
represent heroism of a kind. In fact, Juliana is the only American who shows any real will 
to action. Compared with Juliana, Frank is ineffectual. Indeed, Frank Frink recalls his 
early feelings of resistance that had simply eroded with time: “Hating the Japs as he did, 
he had vowed revenge; he had buried his Service weapons ten feet underground, in a 
basement, well-wrapped and oiled, for the day he and his buddies arose. However, time 
was the great healer, a fact he had not taken into account . . . Since 1947 he had probably 
seen or talked to six hundred thousand Japanese, and the desire to do violence to any or 
all of them had simply never materialized, after the first few months. It just was not 
relevant any more” (9). In Frank’s last scene in the novel he sets himself before his 
jeweler’s bench and begins working his piece. His resistance will materialize more 
slowly and in a much less dramatic way than Juliana’s. That Robinson reads the final 
scene as a “mistake” is less a commentary on Dick’s novelistic skill and more a 
commentary on Robinson’s inability to manifest a reading toward gender.  
In any case, all of these moments of utopia in High Castle add up to the fact that 
the novel is not as oppressively dystopian as Robinson suggests. There are moments of 
varying degrees of resistance. I would classify High Castle as a critical dystopia, in the 
manner in which Baccolini configures it, following Tom Moylan. As I noted above, the 
critical dystopia is a representation of an alternative society as decidedly dystopian that 
nonetheless “maintain[s] the utopian impulse within the work” (18, Baccolini’s 
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emphasis). Because High Castle is a critical dystopia, the possibilities for resistance 
within the novel are great and, I would argue, so are the possibilities for a reading toward 
gender. In Dr. Bloodmoney, the resistance to reification of the atomic blast creates a 
formal situation in which Dick establishes a quadrate of masculine characters that are all 
in varying stages of crisis as the result of compromised male bodies. In High Castle, by 
contrast, there are five main characters, one of which is a woman who exhibits a heroic 
will to action. None of these characters in High Castle trades in male bodies, as we have 
seen in Dr. Bloodmoney, except perhaps the fact that Joe Cinnadella’s body is traded for 
Hawthorne Abendsen’s. However, neither Joe nor Abendsen work as central characters in 
the novel, since at no time is the story ever told from their points of view. I maintain that 
it is a feature of the critical dystopia as genre of resistance that permits the emergence of 
a heroine in Dick’s work.  
Having explored the aspects of Dick’s work that may be identified as critical 
dystopia, we can also understand better why gender does not function for Dick as a 
critical category. There is no sense in which we may think of High Castle, or nearly any 
of Dick’s work, as fully self-aware about gender. There are a number of ways we may 
recognize a text as self-aware, the most obvious of which is to look at the content itself to 
see what it asserts as problematic. Dick never asserts gender explicitly as a problem to be 
solved or explored. At best, Dick occasionally situates race overtly as problematic, as he 
does in a minor way in Dr. Bloodmoney; to the degree that we may understand both 
gender and race as categories of otherness may we understand Dick’s particular relation 
to resistance. Race and gender are not equivalent categories, but resistance to their 
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oppression begins in much the same way in either case. Stuart McConchie is black, and 
his business partner Hardy warns Stuart of the renascent racism in the rural areas. Beyond 
that, Dick does not develop Stuart’s identity as a black man or explore in any detail what 
it might entail. Similarly, in High Castle, Dick addresses race briefly. He situates the 
American South, which appears to be essentially the same South that we know in terms 
of racism, as largely independent but connected very closely with the Reich. Frank Frink, 
when considering his options after losing his job, reflects on the possibility of moving to 
the American South: “What about the South? His body recoiled. Ugh. Not that. As a 
white man he would have plenty of place, in fact more than he had here in the PSA. But . 
. . he did not want that kind of place” (9). Interestingly, Dick makes whiteness visible 
here in a rare and radical way, and he explicitly characterizes Frank as non-racist. In any 
case, however, the primary focus of High Castle is not the inhumanity of the American 
South’s racist hegemony, but rather the vast inhumanity of the German Reich. Dick does 
show an awareness of race oppression, but he never shows a commensurate awareness of 
gender oppression. Dick’s work with gender must be explored at the level of form. His 
focus is always on resistance to American capitalist hegemony; it is this impulse to resist 
that occasionally brings with it a deconstruction of gender and not any particular interest 
on his part in the tyranny of gender. 
In this sense, Marxist criticism has not taken gender seriously as a category. In 
Dick we can see that a critique of capitalism, such as in Dr. Bloodmoney and The Man in 
the High Castle, formally brings with it a complication of gender even when it is not 
explicitly trying. This, however, fails to be enough. While the study of gender is in itself 
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an academic cottage industry, the danger in this lies in the reification of gender as a mode 
of inquiry. Jameson’s critique is an example of this kind of prejudice. Jameson is quite 
aware of gender as a category, but he does not see it as integral to a critique of American 
capitalist hegemony. Gender should be explored as a category in all inquiries into 
capitalist oppression. 
                                                 
End Notes 
 
1 See Chapter Five for a full discussion of The X Files. 
2 For a full exploration of the possibilities of total destruction, see Jonathan Schell’s The Fate of the Earth, 




X Marks the Spot 
The Crucible of Conspiracy and Gender in The X Files 
 
 The Fox television series The X Files, which ran from 1991 to 2001, narrates the 
paradigmatic conspiracy in the United States after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Not 
coincidentally, the series began very soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This 
dissertation assumes fundamentally that the period of perpetual war in the United 
States—a period in which the military has not once demobilized—since the onset of 
World War II is coterminous with the masculine subject in crisis, and that this crisis has 
manifested itself in, among other ways, the appearance of the conspiracy theorist as we 
now know him.  
In every sense, the study of gender, evolving as it has from feminism, has been a 
historical materialist undertaking. The phenomenological quality of feminism—its 
starting point always in lived experience—has at all times been profoundly evident. No 
matter what question a feminist analytic attempts to answer, it always returns to the 
question, “What is the condition of women?” It is not, however, a structural necessity of 
feminism to consider the economic imperatives of late capitalism. Certainly, a number of 
feminists do practice historical materialist feminism; that this is so does not imply a 
necessity. I argue that it is absolutely essential for any theorist, as a matter of 
responsibility, to work assiduously to make a historical materialist feminist dialectic an 
inevitability. Marxists tend in the main to treat feminism and gender studies as a nicety 
but not a necessity in their studies of late capitalism; feminists tend to bristle at the idea 
that women’s and gender studies ought to be integrated with other theoretical paradigms. 
But this conventional separatist attitude is enormously counterproductive in any political 
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agenda. But a historical materialist feminism is not enough. Psychoanalysis has taught us 
much about the ways that humans develop, and the ways that we organize socially. Any 
meaningful political dialogue will account for these insights. Terry Eagleton has shown 
in After Theory that cultural theory is in danger of trivializing itself out of practical 
existence. His point here is precisely why I argue that we must take a rigorously dialectic 
approach to theory. And while he indicates that poststructuralism is passé, I would argue 
that gender studies is the way in which we will revitalize the absolutely essential and not 
at all passé theories of Marxism and psychoanalysis. By looking at The X Files, we can 
see the ways in which, in the light of feminism, gender works to foreclose on meaningful 
and productive political discussion. The point precisely is that this foreclosure is after 
second- and third-wave feminism. How insidious is gender oppression, then, when we 
can’t put our finger now on outmoded or oppressive representations? 
 At first glance, The X Files appears to be subversive: its fundamental storyline 
articulates elaborately the inner workings of government conspiracy in the United States. 
And in many ways the series is subversive, but less for its exploration of government 
conspiracy and much more for its remarkable tenacity in holding conventional gender 
ideology at bay for so many years, a point to which I will turn in detail shortly. Herbert 
Marcuse’s notion of repressive tolerance best expresses both the phenomenon of the X-
Files franchise in the American market and the diegetic condition of the two main 
characters, Fox Mulder and Dana Scully. The X files themselves are the unsolved cases 
that the FBI will not close—they can close them if they wish; they choose not to. 
Powerful officials have kept the X files open in order to keep Fox Mulder both busy and 
inside the FBI, where he may be safely controlled. For Marcuse, tolerance that augments 
 141
 
repression is not tolerance at all—it is, in fact, typical in democratic societies for “the 
people [to] tolerate the government, which in turn tolerates opposition within the 
framework determined by the constituted authorities” (83). The FBI tolerates Fox 
Mulder, not as a condition of Mulder’s freedom but rather precisely the opposite—to 
limit what he can and will do but specifically under the pretense of permitting his free 
acquisition of knowledge. Mulder is of course aware of his positioning in the agency; he 
is in this way Zizek’s ironist, in that he knows he is situated inside of a particular cultural, 
political, and bureaucratic structure with no possibility of acting outside of it and fully 
accepts this positioning even as it reifies his own fictionality. Žižek draws a distinction 
between the cynic and the ironist in their relation to the symbolic order:  
from the right premise that "the big Other doesn't exist", i.e. that the 
symbolic order is a fiction, the cynicist draws the wrong conclusion that 
the big Other doesn't "function", that its role can simply be discounted — 
due to his failure to notice how the symbolic fiction nonetheless regulates 
his relationship to the real of enjoyment, he remains all the more enslaved 
to the symbolic context that defines his access to the Thing-Enjoyment, 
caught in the symbolic ritual he publicly mocks. This, preciely, is what 
Lacan has in mind with his les non-dupes errent: those who are not duped 
by the symbolic fiction are most deeply in error. The ironist's apparently 
"softer" approach, on the other hand, far more effectively unbinds the 
nodal points that hold together the symbolic universe, i.e. it is the ironist 
who effectively assumes the non-existence of the Other (“From Joyce-the-
Symptom”). 
 
Mulder is acutely aware of the way in which he is ideologically constructed and is 
(mainly) content to work within that construction—he knows, in Žižek’s terms, that the 
big Other, or the symbolic order, functions even though it doesn’t exist . Mulder, thus, 
spends the entirety of the series working to use the repressive tolerance employed to 
prevent his subversive acts as precisely the means by which he will subvert the system. 
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 While Mulder is emblematic of the institutional use of repressive tolerance, the 
appearance of the series is itself a case of repressive tolerance. That is, the series 
represents the American government generally and the FBI specifically in a very negative 
way; this representation is in every sense permitted by the hegemonic structure. Media 
representations are controlled and suppressed routinely for a variety of reasons, most 
often national security and interests, but not always. The cancellation of the CBS 
broadcast of the television film The Reagans is just one case in point. Thus, in a stunning 
inversion, The X Files is a case of repressive tolerance in action, in which it actually 
represents the systematic use of repressive tolerance by the American government 
precisely in order to perpetuate a policy of repressive tolerance with regard to theories of 
government conspiracy.  
 Marcuse’s idea of repressive tolerance, however, is less pessimistic in its 
construction than an Althusserian view of ideology. Althusser views ideology, as he gives 
it in “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” as being consummate, a structure 
outside of which no individual may exist. This is best seen in his notion of the Subject 
with a capital S: the Subject is the position of “subject” which ideology allows individual 
subjects to fill.1 Marcuse, by contrast, suggests that we can resist the hegemony by 
exceeding ideology. In some way The X Files attempts to demonstrate this hope. The 
classic slogans of the series, “The Truth is Out There” and “I Want to Believe,” illustrate 
the possibility of stepping outside of cultural ideology. Mulder’s persistent actions to 
reappropriate his structured positioning for the purpose of discovery and subversion 
speak to this hope. Marcuse’s point is precisely that some things ought not be tolerated, 
even in the name of “democracy,” including but not limited to hateful speech and 
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oppressive regimes of labor. Mulder consistently refuses to accept FBI explanations and 
cover-ups, and he consistently accepts his repressed positioning as a means to discover 
and profess the truth about government conspiracy. Mulder discovers many truths in his 
double journey as FBI investigator and investigator of the FBI; and if he doesn’t succeed 
in proclaiming these truths to the American public, he does nonetheless succeed in 
uncovering a variety of plots to deceive them. Similarly, while The X Files is a franchise 
designed to capitalize on the generalized culture of conspiracy in the United States, and 
thus a permitted phenomenon, it does nonetheless trace the logical, occasionally plausible 
contours of a bureaucracy that is not of the people, for the people, or by the people.  
This perpetual contradiction between repression and permission is the hallmark of 
capitalism: rather than couching the phenomenon in Marcuse’s term “repressive 
tolerance,” it is more appropriate in this context to call it necessary subversion. This 
conundrum is characteristic of capitalism. Ellen Wood in her 2003 study of global 
capital, Empire of Capital, notes that it is the peculiar circumstance of the United States 
that it must both maintain the singularly and overwhelmingly dominant military force in 
the world in order to preserve the stability and order necessary for global capital to thrive 
and at the same time is obligated, in the interest of preserving markets, not to use that 
power or at least not use it excessively.  The 2001 war in Afghanistan was not so much a 
step in the “war on terror” but rather a show of force for non-compliant countries like 
North Korea. The necessity of preserving global markets is precisely analogous to the 
phenomenon of necessary subversion. It is less that the hegemonic power is intelligently 
and deceptively tolerating subversion as an intentionally repressive gesture and more that 
it is limited as to what it can do to repress subversion while still preserving its 
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dominance. Subversion is, in this sense, an unpleasant event that must, by the virtue of 
capitalist imperatives, be tolerated. Of course, the hegemonic power may at any time 
decide to use direct force to quell subversion; to dwell on this fact is, however, to miss 
the hope involved in a theory of necessary subversion. Ellen Wood notes that “Capitalism 
is uniquely driven by economic imperatives: on the one hand, the propertylessness of 
producers, which compels them to sell their labour power for a wage, and, on the other, 
the subjection of appropriators to the compulsions of the market, which oblige them to 
compete and accumulate” (89). However much the hegemony might want it otherwise, 
capitalist imperatives drive the need for tolerance because the market demands it. 
Permission to subvert is granted, not by virtue of “democratic” imperatives, but only by 
virtue of the imperative of capital accumulation. 
Indeed, these imperatives may be seen in the occasion of The X Files itself. The 
series ran for nine seasons, during which time it grounded Fox Network as a viable 
competitor in the broadcast market. David Duchovny, who played Fox Mulder, said once 
that The X Files is not on Fox Network—it is the network. By around seasons six and 
seven, that remark was arguably true. Even now, three years after the series left the 
broadcast airwaves, it is still the longest running series that Fox has had to date. The 
series spoke directly to the culture of conspiracy that has characterized the American 
post-World War II period and as such it was an enormous market success. Its tendency to 
challenge the legitimacy of the American government and its bureaucracies was hardly a 
high price to pay in the face of the huge market shares that it promised and indeed 
returned. Ironically, but not at all surprising, Fox’s news bureau is notoriously the most 
reactionary and conservative of the major news sources. No doubt the success of the 
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“subversive” X Files series contributed to the capital base that made Fox News Network 
possible. 
The X Files embodies the dialectical tension of capitalism in a myriad of ways. 
The series premiered three years after the Soviet Union collapsed. Before the end of the 
Cold War, the economic condition of the globe was characterized by the standoff 
between two major powers. After the Cold War, the United States asserted fully its global 
supremacy; this global condition changed significantly the discourse of conspiracy in the 
United States. Without the oppositional structure of Cold War politics, the substance of 
conspiracy narrative shifted to represent the centerlessness of the American power 
structure. Often, Mulder and Scully fail to draw any narratively satisfying answers, even 
though they are able with a reasonable degree of certainty to assure themselves that 
somewhere in the deep recesses of American government is a vast countersubversive 
movement. Even in the less conspiratorial and more paranormal plot arcs they are often 
unable to provide an empirical explanation for the phenomena they find.  
The end of the Cold War in 1989 marked a very special crisis in the United States: 
economically, the energy for perpetual mobilization had been sapped. Ideologically, as 
Michael Rogin has shown in his Ronald Reagan: The Movie, the Cold War produced and 
sustained the demonized opposition necessary to make perpetual war not only justifiable 
but also desirable. The opposition is similar to propping two playing cards up against one 
another in an A-frame to build a house of cards.  The opposition forms a structure; the 
resistance at the apex keeps the structure standing. Remove one of the cards, and the 
structure collapses. While the fall of the Berlin Wall was a time for rejoicing, it was also 
a potential cultural, ideological, political, and economic concern for the United States. 
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Without the Soviet Union as a threat, the infrastructure of the United States military and 
economic apparatus was at least mildly destabilized. Reagan’s revitalization of the Cold 
War in the 80s breathed new life into American raison d’être. The case for perpetual 
mobilization is quite easily made nonetheless and indeed the occasional war as well, and 
so Operation Desert Storm was undertaken in 1991-92 very shortly after the Cold War 
ended. However, the ideological and cultural implications of the end of the Cold War still 
resonate. The X Files is symptomatic and emblematic of these cultural changes in the 
post-Cold War period. 
More importantly, however, The X Files marks an important shift in conspiracy 
culture from the dialectic of Cold War politics to the dialectic of gender. Indeed, the 
series in many ways articulates the theoretical problematic of Marxism and gender 
ideology with which this dissertation is ultimately concerned. On the one hand, the series 
works successfully and at the same time fails to demonstrate a politics of necessary 
subversion. On the other hand, the show constructs a narrative that is for the entire nine 
seasons driven by the romantic tension between Mulder and Scully—even though the 
possibility of their becoming romantically involved is not seriously presented until 
around the sixth and seventh seasons, at the time of the film release. But even more than 
romantic tension is the gender construction of each character: Mulder is the intuitive 
conspiracy theorist who is often portrayed as hysterical (in both the conventional sense 
and the sense that I have outlined in Chapter One—I will turn to this detail shortly). 
Mulder majored in psychology at Oxford, a profession not exclusively the province of 
women but by no means totally dominated by men. Scully is the scientist; she is a trained 
medical doctor and takes the primacy of empirical evidence very seriously. She is 
 147
 
assigned by the powers that be in the pilot episode as Mulder’s partner, for the express 
purpose of “debunking” his theories as so much conspiracy hysteria. For all practical 
purposes, Scully is intended to be the husband to the madwoman. Right from the 
beginning, the series shifts the tension of necessary subversion onto the tension of gender 
politics. The true crisis, as I have argued in previous chapters, is one of masculinity: 
Mulder embodies this crisis. For the majority of the nine years, the dialectic of gender 
both sustains and deflects the implications of the show’s subversiveness. It does so in part 
by reversing the conventional gender roles of the two main characters. The hysterical 
male lost in the centerless vacuum of American government, however, does not make for 
good narrative, simply because the crucible of gender and conspiracy would run too hot. 
The narrative needs a woman, finally, so that the symbolic order may be (re)asserted. 
In Chapter One I showed the way in which the post-World War II crisis of 
masculinity, conspiracy theory, and gender politics all intersect at the point the symbolic 
order is reinstituted. The film Conspiracy Theory demonstrates the patterns of this 
cultural moment. In that film there is a hysterical male and a professional female who 
interact such that romantic tension is always implicit but never finally realized. Even 
further, that romantic tension must never be resolved, because to do so would be to 
collapse the supremacy of the symbolic order. This pattern is visible in The X Files as 
well; the structural components of this historically situated psychodrama are evident from 
the pilot episode (air date September 10, 1993). The pilot is especially significant in the 
development of Mulder and Scully’s relationship, because it is there that the conditions of 
their work relationship are established; these conditions will remain for essentially the 
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entire series, even in later seasons where Scully finally gives up her titular role as 
“debunker” of Mulder’s work.  
The pilot opens with scenes from the Oregon case that Scully and Mulder will 
investigate: recently graduated high school students are mysteriously dying in the Oregon 
forest, with evidence of paranormal activity being the cause. Scully appears first in the 
pilot: her first dialogue is with two unnamed administrative figures in the FBI chain of 
command. Also present at this meeting is the Smoking Man, as he will come to be known 
(although he does far less smoking in this episode than in later ones—no doubt he 
smokes more and more in order to deserve the title of “The Smoking Man”). While the 
Smoking Man’s identity and official capacity are unclear, by the end of the pilot episode 
we know that he is associated in some vague way with the Pentagon. During this 
meeting, Scully is given her assignment to work on the X Files, to “assist” Mulder and 
observe the “validity” of the work. To this charge Scully replies, “Am I to understand 
that you want me to debunk the X Files project, sir?” The senior FBI official answers, 
“Agent Scully, we trust you’ll make the proper scientific analysis.” With this exchange 
the series sets up the structure of its dual political premises: first, that science is to be 
dubiously set against other, less “valid” kinds of knowledge, and second, that a woman 
will escort this more “valid” knowledge into the plot line. These two premises are 
structurally dependent on one another; as such, it is important to understand the 
implications of the former premise in order to understand how the latter premise obtains. 
The Smoking Man’s presence at this meeting, we come to discover, signifies the 
Pentagon’s interest in deflecting Mulder’s claims to truth. Indeed, it is precisely the 
Smoking Man’s presence at this meeting that signifies the challenge to the power of 
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science to access objective truth. After all, why would the Pentagon be interested in 
“Spooky” Mulder if he were just a lunatic? It is not that the Smoking Man and other 
senior FBI officials don’t believe Mulder’s claims; it is rather that they exactly believe 
them, because they know Mulder is right. The Pentagon and the FBI have called Scully 
forward to debunk Mulder’s work and present “reports” that present scientific 
explanations for his theories, in order to obfuscate the truth. Scully’s assignment, to the 
Pentagon and the FBI, is not to find objective truth; it is to find a narrative that looks like 
objective truth. The X Files is in this regard a fully postmodern cultural artifact. In The 
Postmodern Condition, Lyotard points out that all knowledge comes in the form of 
narrative, that is, in the form of language; he thus remakes epistemology into a study of 
linguistics. This narrative view of truth seems to suggest that only localized “truths” may 
be found—there is no “truth out there,” as the series’ slogan says. However, Jameson 
points out in the foreword to the 1984 edition of The Postmodern Condition that “this 
seeming contradiction [between local narratives and the generalized function of narrative] 
can be resolved, I believe, by taking a further step that Lyotard seems unwilling to do in 
the present text, namely to posit, not the disappearance of the great master-narratives, but 
their passage underground as it were, their continuing but now unconscious effectivity as 
a way of ‘thinking about’ and acting in our current situation” (xii Jameson’s emphasis). 
There is indeed a master narrative in The X Files, and both Mulder and Scully pursue it 
regularly. That each of them represents an instance of a particular localized narrative does 
nothing to undermine the existence of the extraterrestrial conspiracy of which they find 
much evidence. The impossibility of either Scully or Mulder’s narrative to trump the 
other makes The X Files an exemplary case of Lyotard’s postmodern knowledge. The 
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positing of conspiracy in The X Files, and the nature of that positing, is fundamentally 
the work of Jameson’s submerged political narratives. This master narrative, that the truth 
is “out there,” directs all of Scully and Mulder’s activities. 
The sense that the series makes of the condition of knowledge in the postmodern 
period depends on the radical problematization of the symbolic order. The series 
destabilizes traditional knowledge in a Lyotardian sense, but only to the degree that the 
series, at least in the early seasons, defers the resolution of Mulder’s Oedipal conflict. In 
this way, a critique of The X Files, or of any cultural artifact, is useful only to the degree 
that it moves dialectically from theoretical paradigm to theoretical paradigm. So far, I 
have shown that with adjustments Marcuse’s notion of repressive tolerance is useful in 
understanding The X Files both diegetically and materially; Lyotard’s and Jameson’s 
model of human knowledge helps explain the epistemological implications of Marcuse’s 
politics; we must then turn to Lacanian and Freudian psychoanalysis to explain how 
gender functions as the fulcrum upon which human knowledge pivots. None of these 
theoretical paradigms in this context is useful without the others.  I have no doubt that a 
dialectical critique of gender is not the last word in any theoretical paradigm; surely some 
other theoretical paradigm is required to further this political cultural critique, and this 
dissertation suggests that a critical apparatus must be developed to avoid the degradation 
of critical theory into irrelevance, as Terry Eagleton has argued in After Theory. It is my 
contention that Marxist theorists such as Jameson have all too often elided the material 
reality of gender, and often a critique of capital fails to register the ways in which gender 
is integral to every phase of capitalist accumulation. That is, the capitalist subject, such as 
he often appears in Marxist critique, is rarely categorized by gender. In fact, however, the 
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capitalist subject is gendered, and that gender categorization has an effect on the way in 
which the capitalist subject moves around in capitalist society. The gender of the 
capitalist subject is inexorably a feature of the capitalist subject’s identity.  
Mulder represents the masculine capitalist subject in crisis. He is wary, sardonic, 
and suspicious of everyone—in fact, he is often told by his counter-counterinsurgent 
sources to “trust no one.” He is resolutely hysterical and paranoid, in the sense that he is 
resolved to quilt together a meaningful narrative of the conspiracy that he suspects. While 
the series does not represent in any direct way the effects or symptoms of globalized 
capital, Mulder nonetheless represents the anxiety caused by the decomposition of the 
polarized global economy of the Cold War. The enemy, such as it is, is far less 
recognizable; to the degree that the capitalist subject identifies himself by his opposition, 
in Sartre’s and Fanon’s terms, does the condition of globalized capital cause subjective 
crisis. Mulder is an absolutely critical element of the series’ success. Indeed, actor David 
Duchovny is so closely identified with the character (and the condition of the character) 
of Mulder that when his contract negotiations failed late in the series run, his 
replacement, actor Robert Patrick, could not sustain either the story as it was originally 
constructed or the fan base. Mulder’s replacement, Agent Doggett, was not sufficiently 
hysterical to work as a meaningful mirror image for the masculine capitalist subject; he 
failed to quilt together the evidence of conspiracy the way in which Mulder did, leaving 
much of that work to the by then eminently convinced Scully. Mulder, and Duchovny, 
were love objects into which the paranoid conspiracy theorist viewer, that the series 
constructs, invested his libido. Doggett and Patrick, by contrast, were rejected. But by 
himself, Mulder cannot sustain the diegesis; the series plot line must provide some sort of 
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stabilizing resolution to the interrelated crises of knowledge, globalized economy, and 
human subjectivity. It is to this purpose that the character of Scully is directed. 
Scully embodies all that is good about empirical doubt. She questions Mulder’s 
every conclusion in the pilot episode (and for many seasons after that); what is more 
interesting is the degree to which, and the manner in which, she considers his 
conclusions. The Oregon high school graduates who have either died or receded into 
various states of living decay all show one common feature as the result of whatever 
events they have suffered—they all have two distinguishable marks on their lower right 
hips, marks that look much like a snake bite, but more pronounced. Scully doubts 
Mulder’s conclusion that these marks are evidence of extraterrestrial abduction, and she 
gives him ample possibilities as alternatives. One evening in her hotel room Scully 
discovers two or three of these marks on her lower right hip; she runs noticeably shaken 
to Mulder’s hotel room to have him look at them. She slips off her robe to reveal to 
Mulder that she is in only her panties and bra (unnecessarily enough); Mulder is 
momentarily distracted by her nearly nude body, but when she looks back at him to see 
what he is doing, he shakes his interest in her body and squats down to examine the 
marks closely. After a moment he declares that they are nothing more than mosquito 
bites. In spite of this good news, Scully is still visibly shaken and falls into Mulder’s arms 
in relief. He is stunned; they have only met just days ago, and this case is their first 
together. Scully’s ingenuous show of intimacy is all but entirely out of place. And yet 
Mulder is receptive; when she says she must sit down for a moment, he says, “Sure,” and 
sits down humbly and quietly with her at the table in order to help calm her down.  
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This scene sets up a primary assumption about Mulder and Scully’s relationship 
that will never substantially change throughout nine seasons. First, Scully is clearly afraid 
that she has fallen victim to whatever killed or harmed the high school graduates. 
Whether she believes that what caused these marks is extraterrestrial is at this stage 
unclear. But since Scully, even in the first episode, displays an unprepossessing 
confidence, her anxiety in this scene is remarkably uncharacteristic. It is possible, though 
not necessarily likely, that Scully is afraid that a paranormal event has happened to her. 
Her rigorous empiricism is called into question in this scene at least topically; this 
tendency to dismiss paranormal events will become the hallmark of Scully’s nine-season 
career. Even further, because the viewer is set up to understand that the marks are indeed 
extraterrestrial, the viewer then becomes more concerned for Scully’s victimization by 
aliens than perhaps Scully is concerned for herself. In this way, Scully is structurally 
situated as the woman for whom the male viewer is paternally concerned. Neither Dana 
Scully nor Gillian Anderson, the actress who plays Scully, are constructed explicitly as 
sexual objects. They are both meant to be consumed by the male viewer, but only to the 
degree that their condition sets up a reinstitution of the symbolic order, specifically by 
positing the male viewer as the father. Similarly, this scene sets up the element of Mulder 
and Scully’s relationship that is decidedly paternal. That is, Mulder demonstrates a 
fondness and a fatherly concern for Scully in this first episode that will only deepen with 
subsequent seasons. He is initially sexually interested in Scully’s body in this scene, but 
this interest is quickly diverted once she turns to him for support and comfort. Even when 
creator Chris Carter finally acquiesced to the idea that Scully and Mulder ought to be 
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romantically involved, Mulder never loses this paternal concern for Scully. Indeed this 
paternal concern trumps every other imaginable possibility for interaction.  
Scully’s positioning should not, however, be understood as an infantilization. 
Scully is a trained medical doctor; as such, she is more educated than Mulder. When she 
speaks medically, Mulder listens and respects her opinion—he in fact takes it to be the 
unproblematic truth. More importantly, however, Scully takes care of Mulder at least as 
much as Mulder protects her. Scully is for Mulder at moments the maternal plenitude of 
the presymbolic. For instance, in the second episode, entitled “Deep Throat,” Mulder and 
Scully discover unusual testing activities at a military air base in Idaho; in order to 
discover more, Mulder trespasses onto the base. Eventually he sees an aircraft that is able 
to change direction quickly, hover indefinitely, and travel silently. This aircraft is a 
military experiment derived from, according to Mulder, the wreckage of a UFO more 
than 40 years earlier. After Mulder sees the aircraft, he is apprehended by military 
personnel, restrained, drugged, and subjected to a memory eradication procedure. Scully, 
for her part, works assiduously to save Mulder from the grasp of the military; she takes a 
military official hostage at gunpoint and orders him to take her to Mulder. He does, and 
the military uneventfully releases Mulder into Scully’s custody at the base gate. He is 
disoriented, confused, and almost childlike. It is only Scully who can pull him out of the 
military’s grasp and protect him in his bewildered state.  
This scene marks the collision of two powerful branches of government. Scully 
and Mulder bear the authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Nonetheless, the 
military summarily trumps this power by roughing Mulder and Scully up (in an earlier 
scene) and then abducting Mulder and performing medical procedures on him to which 
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he obviously does not consent. The military destroys the evidence they have obtained, 
and they return to Washington bereft of any proof of the military’s dangerous 
experiments. Their superiors frown upon their conclusions. When the military and the 
FBI clash, the symbolic order is devastated; there is no law to which Scully and Mulder 
may appeal, no higher authority to which they may turn to sort out this conflict. Their 
own authority as agents of the FBI is simply irrelevant. The State in this case fails to 
represent order in the global capitalized structure of the production of war materiel. The 
only event that will reinsert order into the real of this scene is the reenactment of the 
infant’s earliest experience of the maternal in the presymbolic. We can see the ways in 
which the Lacanian categories of the real, the imaginary, and the symbolic work 
transindividually in the mode of military production. In the movement of the phallus 
between the regulatory FBI and the productive military Mulder cathects to the mother in 
order to quell the anxiety.  
But if Mulder is by turns the father and Scully the mother, this is not to suggest 
that the series concretizes them into these categories. The fluidity of the two characters 
allows the series to examine the United States governmental infrastructure with a view to 
psychoanalytic and capitalist categories, at least for about seven seasons. The series does 
lapse into a finalizing enactment of the symbolic order in the final three seasons when 
Scully and Mulder struggle to and eventually form a sort of nuclear family. This shift in 
the series’ focus coincides with the production of the film, The X Files: Fight the Future. 
Chris Carter admits freely that the film production occurred during the regular production 
schedule of the television series and as such was incredibly intense and stressful. Just as 
importantly, the X Files’ production team shifted the mode of production from television 
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to film and then back again. The technical parameters of film mandate a different set of 
plot paradigms—most obviously, much has to be resolved in two hours. Moreover, film 
demands more spectacle. The creators could not rely on the patient tenacity of regular 
weekly viewers to drive the film’s success. Indeed, much of the television series’ success 
was the result of its ability to both resolve and confound at the same time, over a 
protracted period of time. The film was not allowed this luxury. No doubt someone saw 
the potential profit in a film version of The X Files, and so the beginning of the series’ 
demise was put into play. There was no way that the series could return comfortably to its 
original premise after the film. While the creators worked hard to make the film a 
standalone phenomenon, it was not possible to do so in a milieu where long-term plotline 
was so eminently important. In this way it is easy to see how market imperatives 
effectively warped the plot development of an otherwise successful television franchise. 
It is the nature of capitalism to destroy that which engenders its success; the capitalist 
dialectic was fully at work in the production history of The X Files. The point for the 
present discussion is especially that the capitalist dialectic of production forced the hand 
of the creators to enact in the series a final entry into the symbolic order for Mulder and 
Scully.  
The pre-release hype around the movie focused a good bit of attention on the 
matter of whether Scully and Mulder would finally kiss. For the fan base at least, it 
seemed that the omnipresent tension between deeply committed, professional, non-sexual 
friendship and sexual desire was of eminent importance. The urge to resolve this tension 
was not necessarily universal, but the concern with it was nonetheless captivating. That 
tension, after all, sustained and nurtured the success of the series for the first six seasons. 
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One of the trailers for the film gives a clip from the scene where Scully and Mulder 
almost kiss to rouse this curiosity. Regular viewers would appreciate the tease, if non-
viewers did not entirely grasp the significance of the clip. Before the film was released on 
June 19, 1998, the question of the desublimation of Scully and Mulder’s sexual attraction, 
or even whether it was present to be sublimated in the first place, was fully visible. Much 
pressure, therefore, was on the writers, Chris Carter and Frank Spotniz, to satisfy this 
viewer desire. There was no time like the film production to play dangerously with the 
nature of Scully and Mulder’s relationship. A close-up, two-head shot of an impending 
kiss was absolutely required. The trouble was that series creator Carter knew that sexual 
involvement between Mulder and Scully was counterproductive to the television series’ 
success. In interviews he has stated clearly that he never intended for the two main 
characters to become romantically involved as it would have interfered with the show’s 
ability to elaborate on conspiracy theories. He was thus caught between two substantially 
different modes of plot production with two entirely different sets of market imperatives: 
on the one hand, the television series had to maintain its successful market franchise by 
sustaining a significant viewer base over time. On the other hand, the film had to bring 
both regular viewers and non-viewers into the theater for a very short period of time. In 
this shift in the mode of production of The X Files for the sake of market (not to mention 
media) imperatives was a reassertion of the symbolic order based on gender categories. 
Subsequent to the film, the series attempted to undo or unassert the symbolic order for the 
sake of the series’ success but ultimately failed. 
The film also promised to explain more clearly the exact nature of the conspiracy 
that Carter had been developing for six seasons and in that regard was fairly successful. 
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In essence, an alien race has been residing on earth in a dormant state for millions of 
years, while waiting, presumably, for a suitable host to emerge so that they might dwell 
comfortably and ultimately dominate the terran landscape. In the late 1940s and early 
1950s government officials, not necessarily exclusively American, were contacted by 
these aliens and forced to employ a kind of diplomacy under pressure. The aliens wanted 
to colonize, and they wanted world leaders to cooperate. This group of officials, not 
always at the highest levels of government but always the most powerful and secretive, 
agreed to assist in the colonization program in order to buy time to find a cure for the 
alien infection (transmitted by the now-famous “black oil” that traverses under human 
skin) that causes the host process to begin. The aliens professed a desire to create a 
human-alien hybrid that would thrive and dominate. The officials cooperated, setting up 
operations where humans are abducted and put into a state of suspended animation so that 
the aliens might use them as hosts. In the meantime, the government officials have 
secretly developed a weak vaccine as defense. But in 1998, at the time of the film, the 
aliens began to use humans to gestate, rather than simply as hosts for hybridization. The 
unnamed group of officials became painfully aware that they had been duped by the 
aliens into thinking this was a cooperative effort; in fact, the aliens have planned all along 
to dominate the planet. This scenario is the substance of the conspiracy against the 
American people that Mulder and Scully seek desperately to uncover. The film begins 
when the secret group discovers that an alien has gestated in four human beings in a small 
community in North Texas. 
Mulder and Scully first appear in the film during a bomb threat investigation in 
Dallas, Texas. Mulder discovers the bomb in the building across the street from the 
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federal building, where the bomb threat was actually called in. Mulder finds himself 
locked in the canteen with the bomb that is set in the vending machine. He has fifteen 
minutes to get out, and shortly Scully rescues him; that each of them takes turns rescuing 
the other is consistent with the regular storyline of the television series. The ordinary 
gender structure of the series does not prioritize the dominance of the one over the other. 
What Scully and Mulder only realize later is that the bombing in Dallas is directly related 
to the conspiracy involving the aliens. That is, the bodies of the four human beings who 
had been used for alien gestation in North Texas were in a FEMA office in that building. 
As Mulder and Scully slowly come to discover that the bombing was a cover-up for the 
conspiracy, it gives Mulder a chance to say things like, “This all goes back to Dallas.” 
This is often the line that JFK assassination conspiracy theorists often give to explain the 
connections that they see. 
The division of labor in the film largely remains the same as in the television 
series.2 Mulder, because he is seen by FBI and government administration as 
irresponsible is left out of the committee hearings established to investigate the bombing 
in Dallas. Scully is the voice for the pair in these hearings. Likewise, Scully continues to 
be the voice of rational, scientific, empiricist inquiry and Mulder consistently defers to 
her opinion on forensic matters. Mulder for his part continues to be the voice of intuition, 
pursuing esoteric leads and discovering unempirical truths, meeting with obscure sources 
in dark alleys. There is, however, a barely perceptible but nonetheless very clear shift in 
the balance of mutual care in the film. That is, where about 9 minutes of film time is 
spent on Scully’s rescue of Mulder from the bomb site, fully the last 30 minutes of the 
film is spent on Mulder’s rescue of Scully from the alien/government project site in 
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Antarctica. In the television series, these rescue efforts are ordinarily fairly balanced; but 
in the film, they are disproportionate, and not only is Mulder’s rescue of Scully bigger 
and more profound, it serves to close the film, which gives it a privileged position in the 
trajectory of the plot. It is in a way something of the final word. Indeed, the last scene of 
the film indicates that this struggle between secret government operations and the FBI is 
ultimately Mulder’s alone.  
The Smoking Man brings a message to Conrad Strughold, one of the key figures 
in the government collusion with the aliens (played by Armin Mueller-Stahl), indicating 
that the X Files are being reopened by the committee investigating the Dallas Bombing 
and the Attorney General’s office. During that conversation, the Smoking Man tells 
Strughold that Mulder is determined now, to which Strughold replies, “He is but one 
man. One man alone cannot fight the future.” There is a sense in which the X-Files have 
always been Mulder’s and not Scully’s, but in the context of Mulder’s profound, film-
sized rescue of Scully, this scene resonates profoundly with the message that Scully is in 
the service of Mulder as a narrative device. In Mulder and Scully’s final scene in the film, 
Scully recommits herself to Mulder’s cause. After the committee orders her reassignment 
to Salt Lake City, Utah (presumably a damnation), before she is abducted by the 
government, Scully announces to Mulder that she is quitting the FBI to practice 
medicine, that it is time for her to start living her life for herself. In this context, Scully’s 
decision to remain with the X Files looks more and more like service to Mulder and not 
to the administrators who had asked her years before to “debunk” Mulder’s work. A 
substantive shift in Scully’s motivation occurs in the film in this moment, one that will 
change the direction of the series seasons that follow. Before the film she was committed 
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both to the protocol and directives of the FBI and at the same time to a sincere regard for 
Mulder’s work; after the film she is committed to nothing other than Mulder qua 
conspiracy theorist, friend, and eventually pseudo-husband. If there was a tension 
between Scully’s internal motivations initially, after the film those tensions are gone. In 
this way we can clearly see the seamlessness between material market imperatives and 
gender construction. The shift in the mode of story construction forced the hand of the 
creators to accede to the reenactment of the entry into the symbolic order. To point out 
that The X Files is a fictional construction is to entirely miss the point that it is a market 
product and as such is the result of a mode of production.  
Scully experiences a change of symbolic order and the film does everything to 
represent and empower that change. The pivotal scene that makes this change possible is 
not surprisingly the scene where Mulder and Scully almost kiss. Scully visits Mulder at 
his apartment to tell him that she has been reassigned to Salt Lake City and that she is 
therefore quitting the FBI. Mulder protests doggedly; he follows her out into the hallway 
where they have an exchange befitting two people who care deeply for one another. He 
tells her that he needs her, and that he owes her everything and she owes him nothing. 
Scully’s hand firmly clasps Mulder’s neck, and Mulder takes Scully’s face in his hands. 
Mulder leans in slowly to kiss her, but he is interrupted when Scully jumps suddenly 
from a sting on the back of the neck by an Africanized bee. The significance of this 
interruption is even more pronounced when one considers that this bee is part of the 
government-developed transit system for spreading the alien virus. Just the night before 
Scully and Mulder had been investigating a large, conspicuously misplaced corn crop in 
the middle of the Texas desert. At the center of that corn crop is a gigantic beekeeping 
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facility (two domed tents that look like, as Mulder put it, “Jiffy Pop poppers”) where 
Scully picks up that Africanized bee. It stays under her collar for nearly 24 hours before 
stinging her at just the moment she and Mulder nearly succumb to sexual desire. 
Therefore, the thing that interrupts Scully and Mulder’s sexual encounter is also the thing 
that will set the events leading up to the final rescue scene into motion. As I have argued, 
the final rescue scene is disproportionate and imbalanced, and is the event that signals a 
change in Scully’s symbolic order. It follows, then, that the bee sting and subsequent 
alien infection are only appropriate as a sort of coitus interruptus. Instead of participating 
in a romantic encounter, Scully immediately goes into paralysis and Mulder eases her 
limp body onto the floor of the hallway. Scully must be utterly paralyzed in order for the 
film to make this subtle turn toward the assertion of Mulder as the law of the father. 
Shifting Scully’s motivation in the film wasn’t enough to assert Mulder’s 
dominance as the law of the father; David Duchovny, the actor who plays Mulder, began 
to heave his success around in the seventh season. The series was dependent on 
Duchovny as Mulder for its success; as such, Duchovny began to take advantage of this 
dependency by demanding more creative control. He wrote several scripts and directed 
some episodes. His dissatisfaction, however, continued to grow. He demanded that the 
shooting location be changed from Canada to Los Angeles so that he could be closer to 
his new wife, Tea Leoni—a move that proved to be devastating to the show’s production, 
because production costs in Los Angeles are much higher than in Canada. Finally, his 
contract negotiations failed and by the end of the eighth season he was all but absent from 
the series.3 He made guest appearances in the final season, but that was it. Duchovny’s 
absence left the creators with a serious problem: Duchovny’s Mulder attracted a huge fan 
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base, and as such transferring this devotion to another character would prove to be 
difficult. Reactions to his replacement, Robert Patrick, were mixed. More importantly, 
though, for the present discussion, Mulder’s absence made it difficult to carry Scully’s 
motivation to its logical conclusion. Mulder’s absence, and its concomitant disturbance to 
the symbolic order, was corrected by giving Scully a pregnancy in the eighth season, in 
the final episode of which she gives birth to her son William. The phallus moved for 
Scully from the law of the FBI, to the law of Mulder as father, to finally the assertion of 
baby as phallus.  
All of Scully’s prenatal and post-natal decisions refer exclusively to her concerns 
for her baby. Her interest in government malfeasance is governed only by this concern: if 
she has nothing to gain from involving herself in investigations, she does not do it. In the 
ninth season, when she becomes concerned that baby William is the result of a 
government project to create supersoldiers, she reluctantly becomes involved in Agent 
Doggett’s investigation surrounding that project. Early in the ninth season, she is shown 
more in her apartment in domestic solitude with her child than she is anywhere else. She 
receives more guests there in the first three episodes of season nine than she does in the 
entire series run up to that point. Duchovny’s absence from the series functions wholly as 
an absence of the phallus, which must be replaced in order to fulfill the primal scene that 
was set in motion in the film. The character of Mulder remained fully a part of the plot 
construction of the eighth and ninth seasons, even if Duchovny wasn’t there to represent 
him. As such, the other characters refer often to the absent Mulder, wondering where he 
is, or attempting to get Scully to reveal where he is. He becomes finally a mystified 
enigma, creating a lack where otherwise none was before. 
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Speculation is plentiful on fan sites and series reviews about whether the series 
would have survived if Duchovny had not wrangled with the production. Certainly key 
plot developments, namely Scully’s new exclusive commitment to Mulder in the film, 
assisted in hastening the series to its conclusion, before Duchovny ever began to 
complain. In season nine, Scully gives up her baby for adoption in order to protect him 
from danger. In this move she gives up the phallus that she gained in season eight. This 
abandonment of the phallus is not, however, in itself a resolution. David Duchovny 
appears in the final episode of the series; in that episode he and Scully become fugitives 
from both military and civilian justice. The series’ final scene is of Mulder and Scully in 
a hotel room in New Mexico on the bed in a tender embrace. In Conspiracy Theory Alice 
and Jerry cannot end up together because Jerry is still operating from within the order of 
government counterinsurgency; he is in the custody of American government officials in 
order to be protected. He acquiesces to staying away from Alice because that is the best 
way to protect her from the people who would kill her. As I showed in Chapter One, 
Jerry’s acquiescence is on the order of the law of the father. He is Alice’s protector. 
Scully and Mulder on the other hand are fugitives. They have abandoned duty to the law 
in order to be together. While the conclusions to each story are different in particularity, 
they are structurally the same. In either case, the signifying phallus, the thing that gives 
order to human experience, is present—in Jerry and Alice’s case it is the custody of the 
American government. In Scully and Mulder’s case, it is Mulder himself. In the absence 
of Scully’s baby, Mulder returns to take the position as phallus and as the organizing 
principle of both Scully’s world and The X Files as a whole.  
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In each case gender roles determine what will happen to each conspiracy theorist. 
All through the nine-year run, The X Files was constructed such that it was to be 
understood as Mulder’s story—the X Files were themselves Mulder’s pet project, to 
which Scully was assigned in order to spy on Mulder. Later, the pursuit of the truth was 
less Scully’s cause than Mulder’s—in fact, much of Scully’s cause was Mulder himself. 
In truth, however, The X Files demonstrates an elaborate tale of gender, and an intricate 
replay of the primal scene. In this sense, because the feminine role is so vital to the 
dominance of the phallus, The X Files is in a demonstrative way the development of the 
story of gender. In many ways, it is Scully’s story. In both Conspiracy Theory and The X 
Files, the conspiracy theorist turns out to be unproblematically right; he also is 
understood by nearly everyone, except the important female figure, to be completely 
insane. He is perpetually caught in the epistemological abyss. And in both cases it is the 
presence of a female that serves to ground his knowledge in a way that no other element 
of human experience can. It is only against the woman that the conspiracy theorist may 
assert the order of the phallus. Otherwise, he is caught in the damning real of his 
exemplary knowledge.  
The X Files is indeed Scully’s story—not in any overt way, however. In a cultural 
artifact that looks for all the world like a fully self-conscious postmodern examination, 
The X Files is unambiguously a demonstration of the fact that we are still in the historical 
moment of psychoanalysis. The psychoanalytic subject emerged roughly at the same time 
as the capitalist subject. That is, capital accumulation in Venice and the first use of 
manufactured mirrors both appeared in the 16th century. The emergence of a product 
which enabled humans to apprehend their own form more clearly than ever before marks 
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the beginning of the Lacanian category of the mirror stage. We have not yet emerged 
from that period of human subjective development and experience. The X Files is to be 
commended for its rigorous exploration of the condition of human knowledge at the end 
of the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st. But Scully’s positioning is fully 
instructive of the way in which the psychoanalytic category of gender remains 
underquestioned, in spite of the fact that the series appears to be self-conscious about the 
condition of women. Scully is a scientist, and as such is the sentinel of empirical certainty 
and rational doubt. This is a reversal of traditional gender roles if there ever was one. But 
simple reversals will not solve the problem of gender oppression. If the conspiracy 
theorist is emblematic of the postmodern age in his perpetual quest for and failure to find 
the truth, his unwavering distrust of the scripted and received story, his faith in 
unempirical knowledge, and even his neuroses about the globalized reach of late 
capitalism, our representations of him still necessitate the reenactment of the primal scene 
of the infant in conflict with the phallus.  
Scully’s function in The X Files, at the surface, is to play foil to Mulder’s theories 
and provide a referent for tension. More importantly for any political and theoretical 
discussion, Scully’s function is to mark the necessity of theory to turn its attention 
repeatedly to the concerns which feminism originally brought to our attention. At its 
broadest, feminism asks us, “What is the condition of women?” We cannot return, 
however, to the second or even the third wave of feminism, or even worse assert that we 
are now “post-feminist.” As theorists we must find a way to move dialectically from 
theoretical paradigm to theoretical paradigm. In every case, we must ask of any work of 
art, any cultural artifact, any economic system, “What is the function of gender here?” In 
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the case of The X Files, as well as Conspiracy Theory, gender serves as a means by 
which the radical representation of the condition of human knowledge, in the form of the 
conspiracy theorist, may be summarily foreclosed. A materialist analysis of The X Files 
shows us that even in an economic sense, gender trumps the form when the forces of 
market imperatives act on a cultural phenomenon. When the mode of production of The 
X Files shifted from television to film, the resonant effect was for psychoanalytic 
categories of gender to dominate the plot direction. Without question, The X Files 
earmarks the way in which these three material and theoretical paradigms—historical 
materialism, psychoanalysis, and gender—intersect profoundly. Accordingly, any 
theoretical analysis of cultural artifacts such as The X Files must account for at least 
these human social and political categories. 
Both Alice in Conspiracy Theory and Scully in The X Files are professional, 
intelligent, independent women. We have succeeded in revolutionizing representations of 
women; this has done only so much to revolutionize the category of gender itself. This is 
why theory must change with the historical moments that theory itself worked so 
tirelessly to transform. If, as I have argued, where there is a shift in mode of production 
there is a relegation to the primal psychoanalytic scene with its concomitant gender 
oppression, then it is more imperative than ever to examine this phenomenon in the 
period of late capitalism, which is above all a shift in production from, in the United 
States, a manufacturing society to an information one.  How might gender be used to 
foreclose on meaningful political discussion during this shift? Will things necessarily be 





                                                 
End Notes 
 
1 This unexceedability of ideological Subjecthood is not actually consummate. In “Philosophy as a 
Revolutionary Weapon,” Althusser suggests that science is the one privileged category: “Marx founded a 
new science: the science of history. Let me use an image. The sciences we are familiar with have been 
installed in a number of great ‘continents’. Before Marx, two such continents had been opened up to 
scientific knowledge: the continent of Mathematics and the continent of Physics. The first by the Greeks 
(Thales), the second by Galileo. Marx opened up a third continent to scientific knowledge: the continent of 
History . . . Transformations of philosophy are always rebounds from great scientific discoveries” (18-19). 
 
2 Because the film is moving from the paradigm of the television form and attempting to set up a smooth 
return to that paradigm, the film does not neatly match the pattern of conspiracy film that I identify in the 
film Conspiracy Theory in Chapter 1. Nonetheless, the theoretical application still finally applies. 
 
3 It is incumbent on me to point out that since Duchovny’s departure from The X Files, he has appeared in 
several poorly rated films, proving both his inability to act and the ultimate total dependence he had on the 
series. His megalomaniacal restlessness proved, in un-paranoid fashion, to be his downfall. Moreover, like 






Pattern Recognition:  
Tracking Conspiracy from the Cold War to Globalization 
 
 This dissertation examines texts that were either produced during the Cold War or 
deal directly in their content with periods during the Cold War, with the exception of The 
X Files. Gender plays a significant role in the construction of conspiracy narratives 
during the Cold War; The X Files demonstrates the way in which gender continues to 
play an integral role in the production of conspiracy narratives even after the Cold War. 
The next significant period after the Cold War has been identified by critics and thinkers 
as the period of globalization; the question now is whether gender plays or will play a 
significant role in the discourse of globalization in the 21st century. My analysis of The X 
Files shows that gender does continue to constitute a significant proportion of the 
infrastructure of conspiracy narratives. Fredric Jameson has argued that globalization 
replaces the need for conspiracy narratives: “[W]e no longer need Pynchon’s staples of 
paranoia and conspiracy to wrap it all up for us, since global capitalism is there to do it 
more efficiently; or so we are told” (“Fear and Loathing”). The question is also, then, 
whether we are still in a period of conspiracy, or whether the relative spread of capitalism 
across the globe has eliminated the need for narratives of conspiracy. The X Files is on 
the border between the Cold War and globalization, situated as it is in the liminal space 
of the 90s, between the Cold War and the 21st century. Therefore, while The X Files 
marks the intersection of conspiracy and gender, we will look at a text of the 21st century 
that deals with both conspiracy and narrative to test whether conspiracy narrative and 
gender’s integral role in it are a thing of the past. Jameson considers William Gibson’s 
novel Pattern Recognition to be an example of a “new” literature that exceeds both 
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Gibson’s science fictional roots and Pynchon’s paradigm conspiracy narrative. I will 
evaluate Jameson’s take on Pattern Recognition and suggest what I see to be the case for 
21st-century conspiracy narrative and globalization. I will show that we still have 
conspiracy narratives, and gender continues to shape the contours of those narratives. 
Gibson’s placement of a woman at the center of the conspiracy does nothing to mitigate 
or change the (re)assertion of the symbolic order in the end. 
 Published in 2003, Pattern Recognition is told in the present tense by a young 
woman named Cayce Pollard. She is a “coolhunter,” a person who consults with 
marketing firms to determine what image or logo will be the next fad or craze. Her talent, 
however, results not from training or specialized knowledge of the field but rather an 
innate telepathic, perhaps clairvoyant, reaction to bad logos. She reacts physically to 
images like the Michelin Man, suffering bouts of nausea and disorientation. If she does 
not have a bad reaction to an image, then she knows the image has marketing power. 
With this skill, Cayce tries “to recognize a pattern before anyone else does . . . [and then] 
I point a commodifier at it” (PR 86). It is not clear whether Cayce’s talent is grounded in 
realism or whether it is a science fictional element; for this reason Gibson’s novel 
stretches the border of the genre for which he is known—the special category of SF 
known as cyberpunk. Jameson sees Cayce as “an industrial spy of times to come”; and 
while the novel is set very nearly in the exact present or at best about five minutes into 
the future, Jameson’s characterization seems apt (“Fear and Loathing” 112). 
 At the center of Pattern Recognition lies the story of a series of pieces of film 
footage that mysteriously turn up on the internet. An entire subculture of fans develops 
around this strange, untraceable, and unidentifiable cultural event. The bits of footage 
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contain no real visual cues to identify the period or the artist, and the subculture is 
devoted to finding out who is responsible for this “unmarked” text and what it might 
mean. Cayce is herself deeply concerned with the footage. As Jameson points out, the 
footage is for Cayce “an epoch of rest, an escape from the noisy commodities themselves, 
which turn out, as Marx always thought they would, to be living entities preying on the 
humans who have to coexist with them” (“Fear and Loathing” 114). Jameson sees this 
footage as the link between Pattern Recognition and the paradigm novel of conspiracy, 
The Crying of Lot 49: “For the post-horns and the other tell-tale graffiti [of Lot 49] have 
here been replaced by something like a ‘work of art’: the clues point, not to some 
unimaginable reality in the social world, but to an (as yet) unimaginable aesthetic” (“Fear 
and Loathing” 110). The footage, for Jameson, signifies a pronounced contradiction 
between the overdetermined world of commodifiers and logos that dominates Cayce’s 
experience and the unmarked world of the footage that is entirely absent of cultural 
signifiers.  
 Cayce’s obsession with the footage drives her finally to the center of a global 
marketing conspiracy. Her contractual employer, Hubertus Bigend, is fascinated with the 
footage and wants to track it and find out who is doing it so he can use it for a major 
marketing scheme. And while Cayce is suspicious of her employer and his motives, she 
nonetheless accepts his offer to bankroll her investigation into the origin of the footage. 
Jameson downplays the conspiratorial quality of this enterprise, arguing instead that “the 
footage is not the central issue of this novel, even though it supplies the narrative 
framework” (“Fear and Loathing” 111). Yet it is Cayce’s pursuit of the footage that leads 
her finally to Russia where it becomes clear in the final moments of the novel that she has 
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been caught in a global capitalist battle over the footage between Hubertus Bigend and 
Russian mogul Andrei Volkov. For Jameson, “the truth of emergent globalization” has as 
much to do with global entrepreneurship as with Pynchonian paranoia (“Fear and 
Loathing” 105). Jameson downplays the conspiratorial developments in Pattern 
Recognition in favor of extolling its exploration of the commodity world and global 
capitalism. However, Cayce is paranoid: when her professional rival Dorotea breaks into 
her apartment and rearranges a few things, Cayce resorts to James-Bond-like detection 
strategies, such as pasting a hair on the crack of the front door and putting face powder on 
the underside of the doorknob. The footage shows that Pynchonian conspiracy has 
morphed into its late capitalist, 21st century analog, the global capital conspiracy. 
 Gibson has placed a woman in the position of protagonist in this novel, and her 
name is exactly homonymous with the hero of Gibson’s earlier novel Neuromancer 
(1984). This element marks a significant shift from the conventional conspiratorial 
narrative of the Cold War, where most of the time the paranoid subject is male. Perhaps 
Cayce is the 21st century Oedipa for whom, as Jameson argues, the signs of the 
conspiracy are in fact effaced in the form of the footage. There is significant difference 
between Oedipa and Cayce: Cayce is availed of an epistemological advantage over 
Oedipa, in that she can divine commodity trends. In other words, Cayce can decode the 
noise of objects and images. Rather than pair Cayce off with Oedipa, however, it is more 
instructive to compare her to Case, the lead character of Neuromancer, in order to see 
how gender informs the conspiracy narratives of the period of globalization. 
  Chapter 38 of Pattern Recognition is entitled “Puppenkopf,” which is the German 
term for “doll’s head.” In this chapter Cayce is assaulted by her unwanted rival Dorotea, 
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who slips Rohypnol into her drink. During her unconsciousness, she is transported to a 
Russian prison; also during this time, all of the other characters, all male, fall into 
position and the conspiracy is, for all intents and purposes, resolved. Mainly, Hubertus 
Bigend and Andrei Volkov reach an agreement over the footage. Cayce’s friend 
Parkaboy, for whom Cayce had just recently provided a ticket to Russia and gotten him 
involved, knows more about the events that transpired during Cayce’s unconsciousness 
than Cayce herself, who up until that time had been at the center of events. In other 
words, at some point this narrative requires the unconsciousness of the leading female 
character in order for events to proceed. In fact, the doll’s head of this chapter is indeed 
Cayce’s head, which is summarily emptied of all knowledge and, more importantly, all 
agency. This sadistic narrative device is not in any way new, so Jameson’s claim that 
Gibson’s novel is a “new” literature ought at least to be qualified. We may see the 
accomplishments of a work of art when gender is part of the critical strategy. In Pattern 
Recognition and in Jameson’s critique, we have an exploration of capitalist global 
paradigms. And yet both discourses fail still to see the ways in which the psychoanalytic 
category of the symbolic order structures historical events. 
 Jameson claims that the gender change from Neuromancer to Pattern Recognition 
“suggests all kinds of other stereotypical shifts of register, from active to passive, for 
example (from male hacker to female future-shopper)” (“Fear and Loathing” 114). 
However, Jameson oversimplifies the way in which activity and passivity play out in 
each novel. In Pattern Recognition, Cayce goes from an active and engaged consultant 
and then investigator to, in the final pages of the novel, a passive and recently 
hospitalized woman shuffling in slippers to a major meeting where Bigend and Volkov 
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are making arrangements. In Neuromancer, however, Case goes from being passive to 
active. Case spends a good deal of time in the “sensorium,” a technology whereby the 
person on the “deck,” or computer, can experience the exact sensations of another person 
into whom they are jacked. He experiences Molly’s sensations as she goes about the tasks 
of obtaining information, killing people, and finally being captured. Case does nothing; 
he only receives. In the end, though, he must save Molly, who is otherwise an entirely 
capable and independent woman, so he becomes active. It is interesting to note how 
Jameson classifies what is “masculine” and “feminine.” For him, sitting behind a deck 
and hacking is considered active, whereas shopping—that act of actively seeking out 
commodities and obtaining them—is passive. The activity/passivity distinction is not at 
all the way in which Jameson characterizes it in these two novels. Rather than going from 
active (Neuromancer’s Case) to passive (Pattern Recognition’s Cayce), the women 
protagonists in both novels go from active to passive. In an attempt to rewrite the gender 
coding of global culture, Gibson has succeeded merely in reintroducing it. 
 If Pattern Recognition is a new literature, it is only because it reaches into the 
future by way of commodity fortune-telling and not because of any especial bending of 
the genre of science fiction or cyberpunk, as Jameson suggests. Many writers are 
experimenting with the bending of the SF genre, such as Octavia Butler’s Kindred, which 
is a historical science fictional novel where the main female character’s “special” skill is 
unexplained and may not be SF at all. Nalo Hopkinson’s Brown Girl in the Ring is a 
blend of magical realism and science fiction. Rather, there is much in Pattern Recognition 
that is quite the same as what came before it—women who must, if not die, become 
passive at key points in the work, while men set about to orchestrating all the significant 
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events. There is indeed a pattern in Pattern Recognition, and in spite of the fact that the 
novel works to give phrase to the new globalized economy, much remains the same. The 
shift from the male protagonist in Neuromancer to the female protagonist in Pattern 
Recognition serves to mark the effect of critiques of representation, but not a shift in the 
narrative structures that serve to confine women. In Neuromancer, Molly must be 
captured and saved by Case; in Pattern Recognition, Cayce must become unconscious 
and subsequently be saved by Parkaboy and Bigend. By virtue of the fact that we still see 
an assertion of the symbolic order in a narrative of conspiracy, we may conclude that 
nothing has been shown by Gibson to resove the masculine subject in crisis. It is even 
more disconcerting to note that the inclusion of a woman protagonist serves to draw 
attention away from the existence of the masculine subject who (re)asserts the symbolic 
order in his own interest. 
 While decidedly post-Cold War, Pattern Recognition is a conspiracy novel that 
has put a woman in the position of protagonist and still ends in a reassertion of the 
symbolic order. In this case, events are ordered according to the mandates of capitalism, 
regardless of whether it is global or not. This novel is instructive, for while it may seem 
that conspiracy narratives are a thing of the past, as Jameson seems to suggest, they in 
fact persist into the 21st century. What Pattern Recognition also shows us is that 
regardless of what stage of capitalism we are in, as long as it persists it will be necessary 
for women to be passive and step aside while men arrange the global deals. While I had 
hoped to see a shift in the role of gender in conspiracy narratives after the Cold War, this 
is sadly not the case. In the spectrum of texts covered in this dissertation, Philip K. Dick 
is the only artist who actively if not self-consciously works to subvert gender paradigms. 
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We continue to have narratives of conspiracy in the period of globalization, even as they 
shift to accommodate the global market. And these narratives continue to shape and be 






Althusser, Louis. Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. Transl. Ben Brewster. London: 
NLB, 1971. 
 
Amiel, Jon, dir. The Core. Perf. Aaron Eckhart, Tchéky Karyo, Hilary Swank. 
Paramount, 2003. 
 
Baccolini, Rafaella. “Gender and Genre in the Feminist Critical Dystopias of Katharine 
Burdekin, Margaret Atwood, and Octavia Butler.” Future Females, The Next 
Generation: New Voices and Velocities in Feminist Science Fiction Criticism. Ed. 
Marleen S. Barr. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000. 
 
Bay, Michael, dir. Armageddon. Perf. Bruce Willis, Ben Affleck, Billy Bob Thornton. 
Touchstone Pictures, 1998. 
 
Benjamin, Walter. Illuminations: Essays and Reflections. Ed. Hannah Arendt. Transl. 
Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken, 1968. 
 
Booker, M. Keith. Monsters, Mushroom Clouds, and the Cold War. Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood P, 2001. 
 
Bowman, Rob, dir. The X Files: Fight the Future. Perf. Gillian Anderson, David 
Duchovny, Martin Landau. Twentieth Century Fox, 1998. 
 
Carter, Chris. The X-Files. Fox Broadcast Network. 1993-2002. <http://www.thex-
files.com>. 
 
Corber, Robert J.  In the Name of National Security: Hitchcock, Homophobia, and the 
Political Construction of Gender in Postwar America. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 
1993. 
 
-----. Homosexuality in Cold War America: Resistance and the Crisis of Masculinity. 
Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1997. 
 
Cranny-Francis, Anne. “Gender and Genre: Feminist Subversion of Genre Fiction and Its 
Implications for Critical Literacy.” The Powers of Literacy: A Genre Approach to 
Teaching Writing. Ed. Bill Cope and Mary Kalantzis. Pittsburgh: U of Pittsburgh 
P, 1993. 
 
Cronenberg, David, dir. Videodrome. Perf. James Woods, Sonja Smits, Deborah Harry. 
Universal Pictures, 1983. 
 
Davis, David Brion. The Slave Power Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style. Baton Rouge: 




-----. The Fear of Conspiracy: Images of Un-American Subversion from the Revolution 
to the Present. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1971. 
 
DeLillo, Don. Libra. New York: Viking, 1988. 
 
Derrida, Jacques. “The Law of Genre.” Transl. Avital Ronell. Critical Inquiry: A Voice 
for Reasoned Inquiry into Significant Creations of the Human Spirit. 7.1-2 
(1980): 55-81. 
 
-----. The Gift of Death. Transl. David Wills. Chicago: U of Chicago P,1995. 
 
Dick, Philip K. Dr. Bloodmoney. 1965. New York: Vintage Books, 2002. 
 
-----. The Man in the High Castle. 1962. New York: Vintage Books, 1992. 
 
-----. Martian Time-Slip. 1964. New York: Vintage Books, 1995. 
 
----. The Transmigration of Timothy Archer. 1982. New York: Vintage Books, 1991. 
 
Donaldson, Roger, dir. Thirteen Days. Perf. Bruce Greenwood, Steven Culp, Dylan 
Baker, Kevin Costner. New Line Cinema, 2000. 
 
Donner, Richard, dir. Conspiracy Theory. Perf. Mel Gibson, Julia Roberts, Patrick 
Stewart. Warner Home Video, 1997. 
 
Dor, Joël. Introduction to the Reading of Lacan: The Unconscious Structured Like a 
Language. Ed. Judith Feher Gurewich and Susan Fairfield. New York: Other, 
1998. 
 
Eagleton, Terry. After Theory. New York: Basic Books, 2003. 
 
Ehrlichman, John. The Company. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976. 
 
Evans, Dylan. An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis. London: 
Routledge, 1996. 
 
Felman, Shoshana. Jacques Lacan and the Adventure of Insight: Psychoanalysis in 
Contemporary Culture. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1987. 
 
Frankenheimer, John, dir. The Manchurian Candidate. Perf. Laurence Harvey, Frank 
Sinatra, Angela Lansbury. United Artists, 1962. 
 
Fodor, Nandor and Frank Gaynor. Freud: Dictionary of Psychoanalysis. Westport, CT: 




Freedman, Carl. Critical Theory and Science Fiction. Hanover: Wesleyan UP, 2000. 
 
-----. The Incomplete Projects: Marxism, Modernity, and the Politics of Culture. 
Middletown: Wesleyan UP, 2002. 
 
Freud, Sigmund. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud. Transl. James Strachey. V XII (1911-1913), London: Hogarth, 1958. 
 
-----. Dora: An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria. Ed. Philip Rieff. New York: Macmillan, 
1963. 
 
-----. Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious.  Ed. and transl. James Strachey. New 
York:  W.W. Norton, 1960. 
 
Gibson, William. Neuromancer. New York: Ace, 1984. 
 
-----. Pattern Recognition. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2003. 
 
 
Gosse, Van. Where the Boys Are: Cuba, Cold War America and the Making of a New 
Left. London: Verso, 1993. 
 
Griffin, Dustin. Satire: A Critical Reintroduction. Lexington: UP of Kentucky, 1994. 
 
Campioni, Mia and Elizabeth Grosz. “Love’s Labours Lost: Marxism and Feminism.” A 
Reader in Feminist Knowledge. Ed. Sneja Gunew. London: Routledge, 1991. 366-397. 
 
Higgins, Trumbull. The Perfect Failure: Kennedy Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bay of 
Pigs. New York: W.W. Norton, 1987. 
 
Hofstadter, Richard. The Paranoid Style in American Politics. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1965. 
 
hooks, bell. “Sisterhood: Political Solidarity Between Women.” A Reader in Feminist 
Knowledge. Ed. Sneja Gunew. London: Routledge, 1991. 27-41. 
 
Jameson, Fredric. “After Armageddon: Character Systems in Dr. Bloodmoney.” On 
Philip K. Dick: 40 Articles from Science Fiction Studies. Ed. R.D. Mullen, Istvan 
Csicsery-Ronay, Jr, Arthur B. Evans, and Veronica Hollinger. Terre Haute: SF-
TH Inc. 1992. 
 
-----. The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World System. Bloomington: 
Indiana UP, 1995. 
 
-----. “Pleasure: A Political Issue.” The Ideologies of Theory: Essays 1971-1986 Volume 
2: The Syntax of History. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1988. 
 180
 
-----. The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. Ithaca: Cornell 
UP, 1981. 
 
-----. “Fear and Loathing in Globalization.” New Left Review v 23. September-October 
2003. 105-114. 
 
Johnson, Haynes, et al. The Bay of Pigs: The Leaders’ Story of Brigade 2506. New York: 
W.W. Norton,  1964. 
 
Kennedy, Robert F. Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1969. 
 
Kerouac, Jack. On the Road. New York: Penguin, 1955. 
 
Knight, Peter. Conspiracy Culture: From Kennedy to the X-Files. London: Routledge, 
2000. 
 
Kornbluh, Peter, ed. Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of 
Cuba. New York: New Press, 1998. 
 
Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Transl. Alan Sheridan. New York: W.W. Norton, 
1977. 
 
-----. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book VII, 1959-1960. 
Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Transl. Dennis Porter. New York: W.W. Norton, 1986. 
 
-----. On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge: Encore The Seminar of 
Jacques Lacan Book XX, 1972-1973. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Transl. Bruce 
Fink. New York: W.W. Norton, 1998. 
 
Lukás, Georg. The Historical Novel. Transl. Hannah and Stanley Mitchell. London: 
Merlin, 1962. 
 
Lumet, Sidney, dir. Fail Safe. Perf. Henry Fonda, Walter Matthau, Dan O’Herlihy. 
Columbia Pictures, 1964. 
 
Lyotard, Jean-François. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Transl. 
Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1984. 
 
Mahoney, Richard D. Sons and Brothers: The Days of Jack and Bobby Kennedy. New 
York: Arcade, 1999. 
 
Mandel, Ernest. Late Capitalism. Transl. Joris De Bres. 1972. London: NLB, 1975. 
 
Marcuse, Herbert, Robert Paul Wolff, and Barrington Moore, Jr. A Critique of Pure 




May, Ernest. “Thirteen Days in 145 Minutes.” National Forum: The Phi Kappa Phi 
Journal 81.2 (Spring  2001): 34-37. 
 
McGee, Patrick. “The Purloined President or JFK as Signifier.” Baton Rouge, unpub. 
 
Mcgrath, Douglas and Peter Askin, dir. The Company Man. Perf. Alan Cumming, 
Anthony LaPaglia, Denis Leary, Douglas McGrath, John Turturro, Sigourney 
Weaver.  Paramount, 2001. 
 
Melley, Timothy. Empire of Conspiracy: The Culture of Paranoia in Postwar America. 
Ithaca: Cornell, 2000. 
 
Moylan, Tom. Scraps of the Untainted Sky: Science Fiction, Utopia, Dystopia. Boulder: 
Westview P, 2000. 
 
Motyl, H.D., dir.  Image of an Assassination: A New Look at the Zapruder Film.. MPI 
Teleproductions, 1998. DVD 
 
Mulvey, Laura. “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema.” Issues in Feminist Film 
Criticism. Ed. Patricia Erens. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1990, 28-40. 
 
New Oxford Annotated Bible with the Apocrypha. Ed. Herbert May and Bruce Metzger. 
New York: Oxford UP, 1962. 
 
O’Donnell, Patrick. Latent Destinies: Cultural Paranoia and Contemporary U.S. 
Narrative. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2000. 
 
Pakula, Alan J., dir. All the President’s Men. Perf. Dustin Hoffman, Robert Redford, Jack 
Warden. Warner Brothers, 1976. 
 
Phillips, Kevin. American Dynasty: Aristocracy, Fortune, and the Politics of Deceit in the 
House of Bush. New York: Viking, 2004. 
 
Pipes, Daniel. Conspiracy: How the Paranoid Style Flourishes and Where it Comes From. 
New York: The Free Press, 1997. 
 
Robinson, Kim Stanley. The Novels of Philip K. Dick. Ann Arbor: UMI Research P, 
1984. 
 
Rogin, Michael. Black Face, White Noise: Jewish Immigrants in the Hollywood Melting 
Pot. Berkeley: U of California P, 1996. 
 
-----. Ronald Reagan, the Movie and Other Episodes in Political Demonology. Berkeley: 




Russ, Joanna. The Female Man. Boston: Beacon Press, 1975. 
 
Sargent, Lydia, ed. Women and Revolution: A Discussion of the Unhappy Marriage of 
Marxism and Feminism. Boston: South End P, 1981. 
 
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Critique of Dialectical Reason Volume One. Transl. Alan Sheridan-
Smith. 1960. London: Verso, 2004. 
 
-----. Search for a Method. Transl. Hazel E. Barnes. New York: Vintage, 1968. 
 
Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky. Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial 
Desire. New York: Columbia UP, 1985. 
 
Silverman, Kaja. Male Subjectivity at the Margins. New York: Routledge, 1992. 
 
-----. The Threshold of the Visible World. New York: Routledge, 1996. 
 
Stone, Oliver, dir. Comandante. HBO Documentary, 2003. 
 
-----. JFK. Perf. Kevin Costner, Kevin Bacon, Tommy Lee Jones, Laurie Metcalf, Gary 
 Oldman, Sissy Spacek. Warner Brothers, 1991. 
 
----- and Zachary Sklar. JFK: The Book of the Film. New York: Applause, 1992. 
 
-----. Looking For Fidel. HBO Documentary, 2004. 
 
-----. Nixon. Perf. Anthony Hopkins, Joan Allen, Powers Boothe, Ed Harris, Bob 
Hoskins, Mary Steenburgen, J.T. Walsh, James Woods. Hollywood Pictures, 
1995. 
 
Suvin, Darko. Metamorphoses of Science Fiction. New haven: Yale UP, 1979. 
 
Vidal, Gore. The Last Empire: Essays 1992-2001. London: Abacus, 2002. 
 
White, Ed. “The Value of Conspiracy Theory.”  American Literary History v 14 i 1 
March 2002: 1-31. 
 
White, Hayden. Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1973. 
 
Wood, Ellen Meiksins. Empire of Capital. London: Verso, 2003. 
 




Žižek, Slavoj. Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture. 
Cambridge: MIT P, 1991. 
 







Valerie Rose Holliday was born on November 5, 1967 in New Orleans, 
Louisiana, to Rose and John Holliday. She was raised in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and has 
lived here all her life. She entered Louisiana State University in 1986 as an undergraduate 
in English literature and completed her baccalaureate degree in August of 1990. A deep 
interest in literary theory compelled her to study philosophy at the master’s level at 
Louisiana State University from 1990 to 1992, taking a Master of Arts in May of 1992. 
She worked as a food stamp and eligibility worker for a number of years with the 
Louisiana Department of Social Services, eventually taking a position as supervisor with 
that agency. She entered the doctoral program in English at Louisiana State University in 
August 1997 as a part time student. In September of 2000 she left the Department of 
Social Services and committed herself full time to doctoral study in January of 2001. She 
now teaches philosophy and English at Baton Rouge Community College. 
 
 185
